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Lucio R. Renno, PhD 
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This dissertation has two main goals.  The first is to test how environments with distinct political, 
historical and institutional characteristics affect voters’ ability to obtain information about 
candidates in legislative elections.  In broader terms, this is an exploration of the correlates of 
learning about politics.  More specifically, the emphasis is on how institutional environments 
condition learning.  Second, I investigate how information affects specific vote choices related to 
holding individual politicians as well as political parties accountable for their performances in 
office. The emphasis, then, falls on the importance of information in affecting concrete electoral 
decisions. 
Overall, this dissertation is an investigation of the microfoundations of electoral accountability.  
Accountability is not possible without information.  With this in mind, the focus is on how voters 
learn about candidates during elections and how such information affects electoral choices 
directly related to holding politicians accountable. 
This study focuses on the 2002 Brazilian elections for the Chamber of Deputies mostly, but not 
exclusively, because Brazil offers great variation in electoral environments.  Brazil is also an 
interesting case because pundits and laymen alike have constantly claimed that corruption and 
clientelism abound in Brazil.  Hence, an exploration of the microfoundations of accountability 
may shed some light in the roots of such problems. 
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 1. Chapter 1: Introduction – Accountability, Information and Elections 
1 
 1.1. Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation has two main goals.  The first is to test how environments with distinct 
political, historical and institutional characteristics affect voters’ ability a information about 
candidates in legislative elections.  Hence, in more general terms this is an exploration of the 
correlates of learning about politics.  More specifically, the emphasis is on how institutional 
environments, hereby understood as part of the opportunity structures that affect voters’ choices, 
condition learning.  Second, I investigate how information affects specific vote choices related to 
holding individual politicians as well as political parties accountable for their performances in 
office. The emphasis, then, falls on the importance of information in affecting concrete electoral 
decisions. 
A central normative assumption is that voters must have at least some information about 
candidates in order to hold representatives accountable for their performance in office.  
Following Przeworski, Manin and Stokes, accountability is understood here as voters’ ability to 
punish their representatives for wrongdoing and to reward them for good performances (1999).  
In order to do so, voters must have some minimal information about representatives.  
Accountability, an inherently retrospective form of voting, is only possible when voters are 
minimally informed about their representatives’ performance in office (Fiorina 1981).  To do so, 
they must know something about the incumbent. 
Furthermore, voters must also know something about challengers.  That is, voters must be 
aware of the alternatives available during an election in order to be able to replace incompetent, 
dishonest incumbents.  Information about incumbents and challengers, therefore, is fundamental 
for the existence of accountability in a political system. 
2 
 In sum, this dissertation is an investigation of the microfoundations of electoral 
accountability.  Accountability is not possible without information.  With this in mind, the focus 
is on how voters learn about candidates during elections and how such information affects 
electoral choices directly related to the idea of holding politicians accountable. 
This study focuses on the 2002 Brazilian elections for the Chamber of Deputies mostly, 
but not exclusively, because Brazil offers great variation in the electoral environments voters are 
embedded in.  Brazil is also an interesting case because pundits and laymen alike have constantly 
argued that problems of corruption and clientelism abound in Brazil.  Hence, an exploration of 
the microfoundations of accountability may shed some light in the roots of such problems. 
Contrary to expectations, I find that Brazilian voters are able to learn about their 
candidates during the campaign even amidst complex electoral environments1.  However, voters 
tend to gain more of specific types of information.  Voters do not learn about everything there is 
to know about candidates.  I also find that distinct types of information differently affect vote 
choices, indicating that better informed voters do behave differently from less informed ones.2
In the next section, I explore the conceptual underpinnings of accountability.  I then 
discuss how an exploration of the micro-level attributes of accountability is important to 
understand Latin American politics. The fourth section sets out some of the central questions that 
I will explore in the dissertation. The idea of Complex Electoral Environment (CEE) will be fully 
explored then.  Section five explains why Brazil provides interesting opportunities to test these 
hypotheses and section six hints at some of the main hypotheses that will be tested.  Finally 
section seven describes the research design. 
                                                 
1 Complex electoral environment is a key concept in this study. I will discuss it extensively ahead. 
2 Both of these findings speak directly to central controversies in the study of voting behavior.  The first one is 
directly related to the discussion about how environments affect learning and voting.  The second to the debate about 
the role of information in influencing vote choice. 
3 
 1.2. Micro-Level Requirements of Electoral Accountability3 
 
Accountability is intrinsically related to the idea of representation.  Political 
representation, in turn, is central to any definition of democracy.  Nevertheless, what 
representation means is not a straightforward issue.  Does representation refer to similarity in 
personal, demographic and economic characteristics between the selected set of representatives 
and the entire population – what Pitkin refers to as descriptive representation (1967)?  Should a 
body of representatives be constituted by a representative sample of a larger population that 
mirrors all the distinct social groups, classes and interests?  The answer is no.  As Pitkin argues, 
similarity in demographic and economic characteristics does not guarantee that representatives 
will act in the interest of voters.  Hence, the answer to the above question is that representation 
requires more than class, race, gender similarities between representatives and electors. 
Hence, representation involves a different type of relationship between voters and 
representatives, based on ideas such as mandates, responsiveness, public interest and 
accountability.  In order for representation to take place, politicians must hear voters’ demands 
and voters must be able to punish and reward politicians for their actions in office. Pitkin refers 
to this form of representation as “acting for” (1967). 
Acting for, as hinted above, may take place in several different ways.  It may be 
understood as politicians’ closely following the directions given by the electorate.  However, 
Susan Stokes (2001), following Edmund Burke, has argued that the strict following of mandates 
may be counterproductive, even harmful, for the collectivity.  Politicians may not be able to 
                                                 
3 The emphasis here is solely on the relation between voter and representative, what O’Donnell refers to as vertical 
accountability (1998). For a discussion of other relationships that involve accountability, such as between politicians 
and bureaucrats, see Rockman (1986). For a discussion of accountability between politicians in the executive and 
legislative branches in Latin America, see O’Donnell (1998). 
4 
 accomplish their initial campaign promises due to changes in situations after the campaign.  
Sometimes politicians will not follow through with their initial plans and programs so that the 
public interest is not harmed.  A politician may not be responsive to short-term popular demands 
in the name of being responsible regarding long-term goals.  In doing so the incumbent, rather 
than severing representative links with voters, is acting for the voter. 
Given information asymmetries between voters and representatives, it is unquestionably a 
hard task for voters to assess representatives’ performance.  The fact that politicians will try to 
convince voters that they did well while in office and sometimes will masquerade facts to their 
own advantage aggravates voters’ inability to pass judgment (Ferejohn 1990, Kuklinski 2000).  
Nonetheless, Pitkin argues that politicians must be able to explain to voters why they did 
not respond to popular demands in the short term.  The dilemma, then, from the voters’ 
perspective, is to evaluate whether the politician is acting in the voters’ interest or if the 
politician is, instead, trying to take advantage of his/her power position to increase his/her 
personal gain.  Moreover, voters have to undergo this calculus in environments with imperfect 
and incomplete information.  Hence, voters have to cope with a very demanding task during 
elections. 
Pitkin goes on to argue that even though politicians are unable to follow strictly the 
demands of the public all the time, they must do so sometimes.  Politicians must also have good 
excuses for ignoring the public will when they shirk initial promises (Pitkin 1967).  Eventually, 
voters will necessarily punish politicians that fail in justifying their actions and convincing voters 
that they acted on behalf of the public interest.  This is exactly what distinguishes democracy 
from other forms of government: the population periodically evaluates politicians (Pitkin 1967, 
Przworksi, Stokes, and Manin 1999).  If a politician has consistently ignored the demands of 
5 
 his/her constituency or has been unable to justify his/her shirking, at some point in time the 
population will remove the incumbent from office.  Even incumbents who masquerade facts, are 
not able to do so forever if there are other alternatives and competition in the political system. 
Accountability is exactly related to removing from office inefficient, dishonest, 
incompetent politicians and it is central to understand the conception of representation as “acting 
for”.  Accountability takes effect when politicians who don’t “act for” the general public are 
booted from office by voters.  Accountability, therefore, is the mechanism through which 
representation is assured.  In sum, without accountability, there is no representation. 
Pzreworksi, Stokes and Manin argue that voters sanction politicians based on ex post 
assessments of incumbents’ performance in office (1999).  That is, accountability involves a 
voting rationale based on retrospective evaluations of incumbents.  The belief is that voters are 
minimally aware of what their representatives are doing in office and that politicians, in turn, 
believe that voters are paying attention.  In fact, the mere prospect that a politician might be 
removed from office for wrongdoing is seen as enough to keep him/her from engaging in 
opportunistic behavior (Przeworksi, Stokes and Manin 1999, Mayhew 1974).  However, if voters 
are not looking, the latitude for wrongdoing increases. The argument is that voters must have 
minimal levels of information to be able to sanction politicians, to set them accountable. 
But, there are also other voting rationales.  These same authors argue that voters may 
adopt an ex ante approach, in which they rely on prospective evaluations of campaign promises 
instead of holding incumbents accountable for their past behavior (Przeworksi, Stokes and 
Manin 1999). This is a choice that is not necessarily related to punishing incumbents for 
wrongdoing.  In a more recent book compiled by Stokes (2001), several authors point out to 
other criteria voters engage in when judging their representatives.  Voters can have an 
6 
 intertemporal posture, where they will forgive incumbents who offer hardship in the short run in 
exchange for bonanza in the future.  Voters may also have an exonerating posture, based on the 
belief that present hardship is attributable to previous administrations. 
Even though the vote calculus may be based on distinct premises, there is a problem with 
the argument that representation, and therefore democracy, can fully exist without accountability.  
As Pitkin has argued, representation is risked if incumbents are constantly reelected without 
being judged for their past behavior.  Voters’ electoral choices require at least some kind of 
evaluation of incumbents, based on knowledge of incumbents’ performance, and some 
information about challengers’ proposals and records.  My view is that voting is not a one-
dimensional act. It in involves evaluations of incumbents as well as of challengers; retrospective 
as well as prospective.  It has become common knowledge that voters are incompletely and 
imperfectly informed about the political system (Stokes 1999), but some minimal informational 
requirements are necessary for voters to evaluate candidates for elected offices (Downs 1957, 
Fiorina 1981, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991).  If voters are ignorant of the options they have, i.e. 
unaware of challengers and poorly informed about incumbents, the amplitude for shirking is 
great. 
What voters must know about candidates and incumbents, though, varies by institutional 
setting (Lupia and McCubbins 2000).  Lupia and McCubbins argue that the characteristics of the 
party and electoral systems are fundamental ingredients in affecting the amount of knowledge 
voters have and the role information plays in electoral choices.  If parties are not strong signaling 
devices about candidates’ preferences, then they will not serve as useful shortcuts.  If the 
electoral system generates too much complexity, with many parties and candidates competing, 
obtaining information may be harder than in simpler systems. 
7 
 Following this argument, my view is that the incentives and constraints to learn and the 
role of information in elections varies by institutional environment.  Hence, the discussion of the 
role of political information and how it matters for voting decisions must necessarily be bounded 
by space and time.  It is conditional by the institutional setting voters are embedded in. 
The Brazilian legislative elections, which is the focus of this study, has multiple parties, 
multiple seats in contest by electoral district and several candidates competing in each district.  
Furthermore, candidates’ names and parties are not written in the ballot. Voters must enter the 
voting booth knowing the names and candidate identification numbers in order to vote.  
Certainly the Brazilian system generates a particular set of learning incentives and constraints for 
voters.  These specific incentives and constraints will be discussed ahead, for now it suffices to 
claim that there are three minimal informational requirements that allow voters to hold 
representatives accountable in the Brazilian setting. 
First, voters must be able to recognize their representatives.  In order to judge their 
representatives, voters must know who the representatives are.  This is especially so because 
voters must know the names and identification numbers of candidates when they cast a vote in 
the electronic ballot and there is more than one candidate per party competing in the elections.  
Therefore, knowing the party alone is not sufficient. 
Second, voters must be able to evaluate the incumbent’s performance in office, even if 
only in very generic terms, or identify which political party he/she belongs to.  If not, there is no 
basis for judgment, because there is no way to credit or punish incumbents for their actions or 
that of their parties. 4
                                                 
4 Following the burgeoning literature on on-line processing (Lodge, McGraw e Stroh 1989, Lodge, Steenbergen e 
Brau 1995, Rahn, Krosnick e Breuning 1994), I do not expect voters to know any factual details about their 
representative’s behavior, such as voting on specific roll calls, credit claiming for disbursement of federal largess or 
position taking on national issues. The goal is to verify if voters are minimally capable of recognizing 
8 
 Third, voters must be able to differentiate between incumbents and challengers.  If voters 
do not know what the alternatives available are, there is no basis for choice.  Hence, voters must 
be able to recognize some of the candidates competing in the election.  If any of these conditions 
are not met, it is improbable that voters will be able to hold politicians accountable.  The 
diffusion of information about the political system is a cornerstone of electoral accountability 
(Santos 1998, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). 
Notice that none of these tasks are extraordinarily demanding and none require detailed 
levels of information.  The requirements mentioned above are all related to basic information 
about the actors of the political process.  They can be seen as the necessary conditions for 
accountability in the Brazilian political system.5
In the US, as Lupia and McCubbins (1998, 2000) argue, ignorance about the names of 
incumbents might not be a sufficient indicator of voters’ inability to make choices.  Since only 
one representative is elected per district and most belong to one of either two parties, knowing 
his/her party might suffice.  On the other hand, in Brazil, recalling the name you voted for in the 
previous election and knowing if a candidate is an incumbent or a challenger are central, if not 
the only ways, of setting incumbents accountable. 
Hence, the quantity and type of information necessary to make decisions varies by 
institutional environment. This dissertation contributes to this debate by testing how different 
types of environments affect voters’ gain of basic information about incumbents and challengers 
during elections.  The information I focus on are simply the necessary requirements for making 
                                                                                                                                                             
Representatives and candidates and express some judgment about them.  The idea is that voters store evaluations, 
not facts. 
5 Adaptations of the minimal informational requirements are necessary for the study of other political systems.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify these requirements in every political system.  It is also reasonable to claim that 
the necessary requirements for the Brazilian system apply to other elections where there is more than one candidate 
by party, where more than one representative is elected and where there are several parties. 
9 
 an electoral choice. That is, it refers to knowing the different actors in the political system and 
having basic information about their political stands and past performance. 
 
1.3. Contributions to the Study of Latin American Politics and Some Disclaimers 
 
In addition to the broader debate about accountability and representation, this dissertation 
aims at making a contribution to the study of legislative politics in Latin America.  This is an 
area of inquiry that has seen great improvements in the last decade.  There are several studies 
about executive legislative relations and the role of the executive branch in the policymaking 
process (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Crisp 1997, Morgenstern 2001, Cox and Morgenstern 
2001, Amorim Neto 2001, Siavelis 2001, Pereira 2000, Ames 2001).  We also know more today 
about how political parties influence the functioning and organization of Latin American 
legislatures (Figueiredo e Limongi 1995, Mainwaring and Scully 1997, Mainwaring and Liñan 
1997, Mainwaring 1999, Ames 2001, Nacif 2001, Jones 2001, Kulisheck and Crisp 2001, Carey 
2001, Santos and Renno, forthcoming). 
The role of federalism in affecting the lawmaking process (Samuels 2000, 2001) and 
representatives’ careers (Samuels 2003) has also seen great development.  In addition, there are 
several studies about how electoral rules affect Federal Deputies’ performance in office (Ames 
1995, 2001), career choices (Leoni, Pereira and Renno, forthcoming), and electoral success 
(Ames 1995, Samuels 2001a, 2003a, Pereira and Renno 2003).  Finally, we know a great deal 
more about how distinct institutional settings influence the overall functioning of democracy and 
affect policy outcomes (Jones 1999, Cox 1995, Shugart and Carey 1992, Carey and Shugart 
1995, Shugart 2001, Johnson and Crisp 2003). 
10 
 However, we know very little about voters’ behavior regarding legislative elections.  
Very few studies of voting behavior in Latin America focus exclusively on legislative elections 
and rely primordially on data collected directly from voters, such as survey data.6  Despite the 
central role voters’ play in deciding elections and in defining standards of accountability, voters’ 
preferences and knowledge about candidates are still missing links in the study of Latin 
American legislative process.  A central motivation of this dissertation is to start to fill this gap. 
In addition to its intrinsic importance, the study of voting behavior in Latin American 
legislative elections can also contribute to advance our understanding of broader theoretical 
issues. For instance, given that Latin American political parties are generally weaker than their 
American and European counterparts (Mainwaring and Scully 1997), there is more variation in 
the strength of party cues in Latin America than in the traditionally studied countries. Hence, 
how voters’ learn about politics and candidates in environments where parties are weaker 
sources of information is a pressing question.7
Furthermore, in Latin America electoral districts tend to have magnitudes greater than 
one. That is, more than one representative is elected per district.  In such environments, voters 
have to learn about and choose among various distinct alternatives, not just the restricted set of 
two, which usually is the case in single-member electoral districts.  Therefore, the study of 
voting behavior in Latin American legislative elections also offers the opportunity of evaluating 
                                                 
6 There are studies about electoral volatility (Lawson and McCann 2003) and vote choice (Stokes 2001, Domingues 
and McCann 1996, Kaufman and Zuckerman 1998, Domingues and Poiré 1999), but most focus on executive branch 
elections and evaluations of incumbent parties. Those that study legislative elections, such as Moreno (1999), Cinta 
(1999), and Dominguez and McCann (1996) do so not for a specific theoretical interest in legislative elections per 
se. Cinta actually states that the study of a legislative election, instead of a presidential one, is a limitation of his 
study (175, 199).  Furthermore, these studies focus on voting for party lists and not for candidates and do not take 
the impact of environmental variations in vote choice into account.  
7 There are studies in the US that focus on elections were party cues are not so evident. However, these studies focus 
on direct legislation elections (Lupia 1992, 1994, Gerber and Lupia 1995) and not on candidate evaluation.  When 
they do focus on candidate evaluation, the emphasis is on elections of nonpartisan posts, like superintendent of 
public instruction (Shaffner and Streb 2002).  
11 
 the impact of a distinct set of electoral rules on voters’ ability to learn about politics and to make 
electoral choices. 
The fact that the number of candidates and parties competing exceeds two opens the 
opportunity for differently testing a central claim of the discussion about elections and 
democracy; i.e., that electoral competition increases voters’ ability to hold representatives 
accountable.  This issue has been best laid out in Mayhew’s discussion about the fear of the 
vanishing marginals in the US.    The idea is that lack of competition insulates incumbents from 
popular pressure and demands.  Consequently, incumbents’ responsiveness to constituents is 
hindered as well as constituents’ interest in the elections and ability to obtain information about 
incumbents (Mayhew 1974a, Jacobson 1983). This argument, however, has been made only with 
the US case in mind, where increases in electoral competition only mean the entering into the 
electoral arena of a strong challenger.  Given the low turnover rates in the United States, even 
such scenarios are rare. 
In most of Latin America, and Brazil in particular, competition is usually between more 
than two candidates. The variation in electoral environments is much greater in Latin America 
and presents voters with very distinct sets of incentives and constraints.  A generalizable theory 
about voters’ ability to hold their representatives accountable in democratic regimes must 
incorporate the environmental heterogeneity that surrounds voters.  Latin America offers great 
opportunities to compare the impact of distinct institutional settings in voting behavior, which 
has been pointed out by several authors as one of the new frontiers in the study of voting 
behavior (Kuklinski 2002, Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 2000). 
 In sum, the study of the relationship between electoral competition and accountability 
has only to gain with the analysis of contexts where there is more variation in the number of 
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 serious contenders by locality, where incumbent advantage is not as pervasive as in the US, and 
where most parties do not have strong “brand names,” to use Lupia and McCubbin’s term 
(1998).  Does the theoretically predicted positive and linear relationship between electoral 
competition and voters’ ability to hold representatives accountable apply to such systems?8
Finally, the literature about clientelism is rich in examples of how clientelistic ties 
between voters and politicians plague Latin American democracies (Archer 1990, Banck 1999, 
Fox 1974, Grindel 1977).  Some authors have pointed out to the negative implications of 
clientelistic ties in mining citizenship rights and perpetuating a long tradition of corruption, 
income inequality and poverty in Latin America (Fox 1997, Chalmers, Martin and Piester 1997). 
An exploration of how voters’ learn about their candidates and what criteria they use when 
making voting decisions is a central factor in deciphering how voters hold representatives 
accountable. Do voters base their choices on party identification, ideology and concerns with 
national issues or are local level concerns, like casework and patronage, the main influence in 
vote choice?  Do voters use the information they have about incumbents when making their 
electoral choices?  Answers to these questions are important to characterize the bases of the ties 
between representatives and voters in Latin America and may offer insights about the problems 
of corruption, inequality and poverty that are chronic in Latin America. 
This dissertation seeks responses to the above questions. More precisely, this is a study of 
how voters embedded in distinct institutional environments and social contexts learn about their 
representatives and candidates for lower house legislative offices, how such information is used 
to evaluate candidates, and how it affects voters’ final electoral choices.   
                                                 
8 Gerber and Lupia (1995) have argued that increases in competition are neither necessary nor sufficient for more 
responsive postelection policy outcomes in direct legislation elections. They evaluate competition by examining the 
presence and absence of a ballot measure opponent. 
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 As opposed to other studies of Latin American legislative elections (Ames 1995, Samuels 
2003a, Pereira and Renno 2003), I explore the factors that influence incumbents’ electoral 
success and how distinct electoral contexts affect voters’ choices from the voters’ perspective. 
The emphasis is not on the electoral strategies politicians adopt, but on how voters cope with the 
task of choosing a representative.  The focus is exclusively on mass politics.  Therefore, the 
actors studied are voters.  How candidates’ campaign and how they use their resources to get 
their messages across to voters plays a marginal role here. 
A last disclaimer: The emphasis of this study is not on how voters process the 
information they have access to.  It is not about the cognitive mechanisms, the brain calculations 
employed in information processing.  This is a study about how outside sources affect voters’ 
collection of information about candidates and incumbents during elections.  The main goal is to 
test how distinct political environments affect voters’ access to information (Sniderman 2000, 
Kuklinski et al 2001) and how such environments affect voters’ familiarity with candidates 
(Bartels 1988).  To employ Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin’s words (2000, 13), this is an 
investigation of how external elements of reason, which are “incentive-altering forces outside the 
body, such as social norms and political institutions,” affect voters’ collection of information. 
 
1.4. Electoral Complexity 
 
The main question that this dissertation addresses is how voters learn about politics 
during electoral campaigns in complex electoral environments (CEE)?  By CEE I am referring to 
a context where at least some of the following are present: voters weakly identify with parties, 
multiple parties exist, more than one seat is in dispute by district, and many candidates run for 
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 the same office.  Obviously, there are gradations of electoral complexity, defined by the extent of 
concomitant occurrence of the above factors.  Nonetheless, an environment with at least a few 
such characteristics does not correspond to Sniderman, Brady, and Tetlock’s (1991) description 
of the political system in the United States, where voters are able to pick up effective cues during 
electoral campaigns because the  “world of politics is so organized” (Sniderman et al. 1991, 29).   
In the United Kingdom, also an extensively studied country, electoral disputes are even less 
convoluted than in the US (King 1997). 
More recently, Sniderman (2000) has actually proposed an interesting experiment with 
implications for the study of comparative politics: 
“Transplant Americans to a political order where – whether because of the 
chaos of institutions or the enfeeblement of ideology – the structure of 
political choice sets is either more complex or more obscure than here (the 
US) and they will have still more difficulty in grasping the order of politics.” 
 
This dissertation tests Sniderman’s proposition:  Obviously, not by transplanting a big 
enough sample of Americans to a distinct political order.  Instead, by verifying how voters’ 
behavior varies under environments with distinct configurations in political orders where the 
structure of choice sets is more complex than in the US. 
Several Latin American countries provide excellent opportunity to test the above 
hypothesis.  Political parties in most of Latin America are weaker than their American and 
Western European counterparts (Stokes 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1996), proportional 
representation is very common (i.e., more than one representative is elected per district) (Nicolau 
1999) and democracy is incipient.   The motivation of this research is to extend the studies of 
information diffusion during electoral campaigns and voters’ use of heuristics to political 
systems with CEEs, such as those of Latin America. 
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 A more specific theoretical puzzle that emerges from this discussion asks whether 
electoral complexity hinders voters’ ability to set their representatives accountable.  Can distinct 
environments impose cognitive limitations that restrict voters’ ability to acquire information 
about candidates? 
A central indicator of complex electoral environments is high levels of competition 
between more than two candidates.  Conventional wisdom argues that more electoral 
competition linearly increases the visibility of candidates and the saliency of elections (Mayhew 
1974a, Campbell et al. 1960, Rahn 1993), hence increasing voters’ access to information (Zaller 
1992). The existing literature, focusing primarily in the case of the US, argues that the relation 
between competition and voters ability to set representatives accountable is positive and linear.  
This dissertation tests the impact of electoral competition on voters’ levels of information about 
candidates and incumbents in contexts where increases in competition are not just from one to 
two candidates, but where the number of serious contenders competing in a locality varies from 
one to ten. 
Does the traditional hypothesis that there is a positive, linear relation between voters’ 
familiarity with candidates and electoral competition hold when the number of candidates is 
greater than two and political parties do not provide strong cues about candidates?  Since various 
countries around the world have adopted proportional representation electoral rules and where 
parties are more ephemeral than in the US, a generalizable theory about the impact of electoral 
competition on voters’ ability to learn about candidates must consider the existing heterogeneity 
in environments were voters are embedded. 
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 1.5. The Brazilian Case:  Heterogeneity in Electoral Environments 
 
The 2002 election for the Chamber of Deputies Brazil offers the perfect opportunity to 
test hypotheses about the effects of CEEs on voters’ capacity to evaluate candidates.  This is so 
not because Brazil is a most likely case for the existence of CEEs, but because electoral rules, 
party system, and local histories in Brazil allow for subnational variation in levels of electoral 
competition and party strength.  Brazil has an electoral system that stimulates voting on 
candidates instead of party lists and where multiple seats are allocated by district (Open-list 
Proportional Representation - OLPR).  In addition, the party system until the 2002 elections had 
very low entrance barriers, allowing for the existence of multiple political parties. Finally, 
electoral districts are at-large, corresponding to the boundaries of states.  Just as an example, in 
Minas Gerais, a very important electoral district, 554 candidates from 27 different parties ran for 
53 seats in the 2002 legislative elections. 
Notwithstanding these astronomical figures, competition is less intense in specific 
regions of Minas Gerais.  Two factors lead to local level variation in electoral complexity inside 
electoral districts.  First, candidates tend to concentrate their votes in specific localities that they 
share with other candidates, creating a situation where the number of candidates campaigning 
varies by locality (Ames 1995).  Candidates, then, concentrate their campaign efforts in 
“informal” districts, where only a few candidates are actually able to get their names and 
proposals across to voters.  Second, there is also regional variation in levels of party 
organization.  Parties in some municipalities and states are better organized than in others.  
Hence, I can study CEEs in a comparative perspective within the Brazilian case. 
Whereas cues emanating from political parties and the number of viable candidates per 
district are relatively constant in the UK and US, this is not so in Brazil.  The comparison of 
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 localities with different levels of electoral competition as well as strength of party cues, holding 
constant other factors, can broaden the theoretical scope of the discussion about the impact of 
electoral environments on voters’ ability to learn about politics and set there representatives 
accountable.  Sub national variation in patterns of electoral competition and party strength found 
in Brazil assure heterogeneity in environmental complexity. 
The study of Brazil helps illuminate the impact of open-list proportional representation 
on voter/representative relations.  Studies that focus on the electoral strategies of incumbents 
have emphasized that those who win re-election tend to rely more often in constituency service 
than in involvement with national level issues (Ames 1995, Pereira and Renno 2003).  This leads 
Pereira and Renno (2003) to claim that voters’ judgments about their representatives are based 
on more pragmatic issues, such as transferring federal monies to specific municipalities, than on 
ideological ones, such as voting inside Congress.  Accountability standards seem to be based on 
local level demands.   Samuels has also claimed that campaign expenditures play a central role in 
affecting electoral success, weakening even further any form of accountability (2001a).  These 
findings tend to focus on the limits of accountability imposed by an electoral system that the 
literature points out as possibly creating gaps between voters and representatives.  However, if 
voters are still able to learn about candidates, even in complex electoral environments, this may 
shed new light on how the Brazilian electoral system works.  
 
1.6. VI. A Model of Information Acquisition in Complex Electoral Environments 
 
The central variables that compose an explanatory model of information acquisition in 
proportional representation elections are the number of candidates competing in a locality, 
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 strength of party cues, access to distinct sources of information diffusion, both of an impersonal 
as well as a personal nature (Mutz 1998), and voters’ individual predispositions and motivations.  
The general idea, which will be explored in more detail in future chapters, is that environments 
directly affect voters’ information gain during campaigns as well as conditions the impact of 
individual level variables.  The main characteristic of political environments discussed here is the 
number of candidates competing in a specific locality. 
1.6.1. Number of Candidates 
 
A central component of a CEE is the high intensity of electoral competition among 
multiple candidates. As I have said, the Brazilian political system allows for variation in electoral 
fragmentation by locality. Levels of competition are measured by a count of the number of 
candidates receiving votes in a specific locality. Molinar’s (1991) number of parties (NP) index 
was adapted to the Brazilian OLPR elections to serve as indicator of the number of viable 
candidates competing in a locality.  This index offers a way of evaluating how competing 
candidates share the votes of a locality.  The difference between the traditional use of this index 
and the one applied in this research is that I will count the number of candidates, not parties, 
receiving votes in each neighborhood.  Therefore, I use this index as a proxy for number of 
candidates. 
Given that competition can be measured as a continuous variable (number of candidates 
competing in a locality) and not merely as a dichotomous one (presence or absence of a strong 
challenger, which is how it usually is conceptually devised in the US) this allows for more varied 
tests of the impact of electoral competition on voters levels of information about their candidates.  
For example, I can test if number of candidates has a non-monotonic impact in voters’ levels of 
knowledge about candidates and incumbents.  That is, instead of being linear and positive, as the 
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 studies of the US indicate, in the presence of an elevated number of candidates, the relation 
between competition and accountability may be curvilinear. 
1.6.2. Party Strength 
 
The organizational capacity of political parties and their level of influence in local 
politics affect the complexity of the electoral environment.  Party cues will clearly be a stronger 
aid to voters if parties are important political actors. Variation in the levels of party organization 
will be central contextual factors in influencing voters’ ability to deal with the complexity of 
electoral competition. The hypothesis is that strong party cues increase voters’ ability to learn 
about candidates, independent of the number of candidates competing in the system.  It is also 
assumed that the strength of political parties should be reflected by voters’ identification with 
parties. Therefore, where party identification is stronger, voters will rely more heavily in party 
cues.  The relation between party identification, on one hand, and voters’ levels of information, 
on the other, should be linear and positive. 
1.6.3. The Electoral Impact of Civil Society Associations 
 
Civil society associations may also serve as a source of information for voters.  Where 
civil society associations are more active and influential, voters should have stronger parameters 
to judge politicians because they potentially have more information about the political system 
(Putnam 1993).  If such associations tend to emphasize personalistic relationships with 
representatives, instead of demanding public benefits from politicians through institutional 
means, then voters’ capacity to judge their representatives may be limited to personal gains 
instead of public goods (Gay 1994). 
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 Neighborhood associations may also distance themselves from elections purposely, in 
order to maintain a neutral position and in that sense gain more independence from elected 
politicians.  Such independence may pay off, because civil society associations avoid the risk of 
supporting a candidate that may lose the election, latter having to negotiate group demands with 
politicians they did not support in the elections.  Hence, the impact of civil society associations 
in voters’ ability to learn about candidates is also open to empirical investigation. 
In addition to the traditional forms of civil society engagement customarily analyzed, 
such as participation in neighborhood associations, church groups, sports groups, labor unions 
and political parties, I will also investigate the impact of the Participatory Budget as an instance 
of civil society mobilization. The cities that serve as loci for this study have adopted a very 
creative mode of governing based on the direct participation of citizens in the formulation of the 
municipal investment budget, called the Participatory Budget (Orçamento Participativo) (Santos, 
1998; Abers, 1998). 
Baiocchi argues that this style of governing synergizes civil society by creating the 
opportunity structure for a more efficient influence of both organized civil society and individual 
citizens in the government’s budgetary decisions (2000). In addition, the Participatory Budget 
also serves the purpose of educating citizens about the functioning of the government as well as 
increasing the transparency of the budgetary process (Santos, 1998). Hence, the Participatory 
Budget creates a public space for the discussion of both politics in general and, more 
specifically, the performance of incumbents. The OP increases the likelihood of information 
diffusion about the political system (Baiocchi, 2000). 
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 1.6.4. Traditional Means of Information Diffusion 
 
According to Beck, “contemporary political life is dominated by two types of 
intermediaries – personal networks and the mass media” (1991, 372).  These final two sources of 
information should have distinct impacts in voters’ ability to learn about politics in CEEs.  I 
expect personal networks – family and friends – to be more influential than the written and 
electronic media in affecting voters’ levels of knowledge about Federal Deputies.  The reason for 
this is that candidates for Federal Deputy receive very little coverage from the media.  Voters 
will probably learn more during the campaign from conversations with their friends, family and 
activists than from television news broadcasts and newspapers. 
1.6.5. Ideology 
 
Finally, individuals’ ideological predispositions should affect their familiarity with 
candidates.  In multiparty systems like Brazil, the ideological orientation of parties serves as cue 
for the different partisan policy positions (Pappi 1996, 264).  It is easier for voters to know if a 
party is in favor of or against the government or if it has a leftist or rightist inclination than 
knowing exactly what are the specific policy proposals of the parties.9  Hence, if voters feel 
ideologically close to a party’s position, this piece of information can be an important shortcut 
that instructs voters when making their electoral choice.  There is no consensus on the electoral 
behavior literature in Brazil about voters’ ability to use ideological and partisan cues (Baker 
2001, Almeida 2001, Soares 2000, Singer 1998, Meneghello 1994, Lamounier 1980). 
In summary, the political determinants of voters’ ability to hold their representatives 
accountable are related factors that conceptually should be measured in distinct levels of 
                                                 
9 Canache, Mondak and Conroy (1994), in their study of the multiparty 1989 Honduran election, find that ideology 
is an important indicator of vote choice, more specifically for those who vote for leftist parties. Furthermore, they 
find that the aggregate opinion of the neighborhood of dwelling reinforces personal inclinations to cast a leftist vote.  
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 analysis.  In a more aggregate level, environmental aspects of the political system, such as 
electoral competition and pervasiveness of party cues cannot be ignored.  In the individual level 
of analysis, voters’ attention to distinct sources of information, personal political predispositions 
and prior levels of knowledge are the main explanatory factors.  Therefore, a more complete 
analysis of learning about politics and vote choice is necessarily an investigation that 
incorporates distinct levels of analysis.  A research design that incorporates variation within and 
between levels of analysis is the most appropriate way to tackle such issues. 
 
1.7. Research Design 
 
In order to test the hypotheses mentioned above, I participated in the design and 
collection of a unique data set that is part of a broader project coordinated by Barry Ames.  The 
primary data source is a panel study of voters with measures collected in three points in time 
during the 2002 Brazilian elections. The units of analysis are individuals and aggregate as well as 
individual-level independent variables were included in models that explain voters’ information 
about candidates and vote choice. 
The selection of subjects follows the logic of a natural experiment (Babbie 1989).  First, 
variation in the strength of party cues is maximized through the selection of two cities – Juiz de 
Fora and Caxias do Sul – similar in socio-economic and demographic terms, but very distinct 
when it comes to levels of political party organization.  Second, variation in electoral 
competition is obtained by randomly selecting neighborhoods that were stratified by number of 
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 viable candidates campaigning in each, controlling for population size and income.10  Subjects 
were then randomly selected inside neighborhoods with differing degrees of electoral 
competition and in cities with different levels of party organization.  This strategy maximizes 
variation in the characteristics of the environments individuals are embedded in.  It guarantees 
that voters are exposed to distinct stimuli. 
In other words, this research compares the role of distinct covariates of political 
information and vote choice in two Brazilian mid-size cities that vary on the complexity of the 
electoral environment but are similar in socio-economic terms.11  A most similar systems design 
was employed in the selection of the cities, which is the first step in defining the sampling 
frames.  Cities were selected allowing for variation in a main explanatory factor, in this case 
variation in the complexity of the electoral context, holding constant extraneous sources of 
explanation, i.e. demographic and economic factors (Przeworski and Teune 1981). 
The political system of Juiz de Fora in the state of Minas Gerais is organized around 
individual political leaders.  Politics is carried out mostly on a personalistic base and parties are 
weakly institutionalized (Reis with Barboza Filho 1978).  Interviews with members of different 
parties in Juiz de Fora during the summer of 2001 confirmed the organizational weakness of 
parties and the preponderance of personalized leaderships. 
On the other hand, Caxias do Sul in Rio Grande do Sul has a long tradition of an 
institutionalized party system polarized by two clearly distinct ideological positions that are 
                                                 
10 Electoral data by voting section, which is the lowest level of voting records aggregation available in Brazil, was 
collected in both cities and then aggregated to the neighborhood level. Molinar’s number of party index was then 
calculated for each neighborhood.  I would like to thank the Center for Latin American Studies of the University of 
Pittsburgh for support of preliminary research in both cities during the summer of 2001.  
11 Educational levels, levels of wealth, size of voting population, and migration levels are similar in both cities. The 
cities are different in the size of their rural population, 10% in Caxias and 2% in Juiz de Fora, but the sample will 
only include urban populations, so this difference is not so important. Data on SES available from the Base de 
Informações Municipais, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.  See table 8 in the appendix for detailed data 
on demographic and SES characteristics of the cities. 
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 intimately related with social class disputes (Trindade 1978, Cew 1978).  Parties in Caxias are 
well structured and activism is quite strong.  Interviews with activists in preliminary phases of 
this research indicated that four parties (PT, PDT, PMDB, PPB) have well-organized municipal 
offices and carry out meetings and events with certain regularity.  The best example is the 
Workers’ Party (PT) with two full-time secretaries and a full-time President, all paid by the 
party. Such an environment, with stronger party cues and a polarization between the Workers’ 
Party and a coalition of the other parties, more clearly approximates Sniderman et al.’s definition 
of an organized political system, where cues are more evident and efficient. 
A second stage in defining the sampling frame was the selection of neighborhoods.  As I 
have pointed out above, candidates concentrate their votes in specific localities and tend to share 
such localities with other candidates.  There are neighborhoods in which only one candidate gets 
most of the vote or the number of candidates that share the neighborhood votes is small.  There 
are others were the vote is fragmented among several competitive candidates.  Taking advantage 
of this situation, we selected a stratified sample of neighborhoods based on size and income.  In 
neighborhoods where the vote for Federal Deputy is fragmented, it is possible that it is harder for 
voters to obtain information about all the various campaigns. 
Once the neighborhoods were specified, census maps inside each neighborhood were 
randomly selected. Inside the areas defined by the census maps, households were selected using 
a selection interval and, finally, inside households a respondent was randomly selected using the 
last birthday criteria.  A gender quota in the household level was established to assure equal 
representation of men and women.12
Twenty-two urban area neighborhoods in each city, selected according to their political 
competition characteristics controlling for SES variables, served as loci for the selection of 
                                                 
12 See table 9 in the appendix for indicators of the data collection process. 
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 survey respondents.13  In order to measure the aggregate opinion of the neighborhood, 
approximately 100 interviews were carried out in each.14  This permits the assessment of how the 
neighborhood contextual opinion affects access to political information (Huckfeldt & Sprague 
1995). 
 
1.8. Dissertation Outline 
 
In addition to this introduction, the dissertation contains five other chapters.  The next 
two chapters focus on the theoretical foundations of the hypotheses listed above and on how they 
are operationalized.  The main hypotheses are derived from theories about how contextual and 
institutional factors provide cues for voters – a central component of what became known as the 
political heuristics school (Sniderman et al 1991, Lupia et al 2000, Kuklinski et al 2001, Lupia 
1992, 1994, Lupia and Gerber 1995).  I contribute to this discussion by analyzing the impact of 
complex electoral environments in affecting learning and voting. 
A second strand of literature that influences this study focuses on the discussion about 
how access to information influences voters electoral choices (Bartels 1988, Zaller 1992,  
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, Mutz 1998, Alvarez 2001). The core of this debate is which source 
of information diffusion plays a more decisive role in instructing voters and affecting their 
electoral choices.  Finally, I also borrow from the literature on how voters’ individual 
                                                 
13 Data about the neighborhoods SES characteristics has been obtained in the Mayor’s office of both cities. Data on 
political competition, measured by the results of the 1998 elections for the Chamber of Deputies was obtained in the 
Regional Electoral Courts in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, the capitals of Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais 
respectively, and in the Municipal Electoral Precincts of Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora.  
14 Two of the larger neighborhoods in Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora had around 200 respondents selected in each 
in order to increase their proportionality in the sample.  
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 predispositions, either of a partisan or ideological nature, filter the information received (Zaller 
1992). 
The subsequent two chapters provide empirical evidence of learning processes during the 
campaign and test models of familiarity with candidates and vote choice. Chapter 4 tests the 
main hypotheses of this study, focusing on the covariates of the voters’ levels of information. 
Chapter 5 develops and tests models that explain vote choice for Federal Deputy. Chapter 6 
concludes. 
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 2. Chapter 2: Approaches to the Study of Information, Voters and Environments 
28 
 2.1. Introduction 
 
 
Voting behavior studies emphasize the impact of three main factors that affect voters’ 
choices: individual predispositions, information, and environmental characteristics.  All three 
factors were considered in the pioneering studies on voting behavior that took place in the United 
States in the 1940’s and 1950’s (Campbell et al. 1960, Lazarsfeld et al. 1944).  An impressive 
literature, probably the most prolific in political science, has further developed theoretical 
expectations about how individual predispositions, information and environments relate to each 
other and affect voters’ preferences. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main approaches to the study of these three 
central concepts of voting behavior that will orient the analysis of the Brazilian case.  First, I 
focus on the classical studies of voting behavior, which set the tone of the entire research agenda.  
I then proceed to more recent studies that focus on the role of information in elections. The 
emphasis here is on the disagreement of recent scholarship on the amount of information voters 
need to make choices.15  Some argue that voters do not need much information.  Others dispute 
this claim, arguing that more information is always better.  However, an important point that 
emerges from this literature – and one closely related to the second main theoretical issue 
discussed on this chapter – is that environments condition the amount and type of information 
voters have access to. 
Finally, I discuss how environmental factors affect the acquisition of information and 
vote choice.  I will then raise some problems of current studies that focus on environmental 
                                                 
15 Extensive literature reviews about the main discussions that spurred from the initial studies in voting behavior 
abound. For some very interesting ones see Alvarez and Brehm 2002, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991, Bartels 
1993, Sullivan, Rahn and Rudolph 2002. 
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 factors, which I intend to confront in my own analysis of the Brazilian case.  The bottom line is 
that the main problem with current studies of information acquisition is the lack of comparative 
investigations of environmental impact in learning processes. 
 
2.2. Classical Studies of Voting Behavior 
 
 
Early studies of voting behavior defined the main questions and theoretical issues that 
still puzzle scholars and motivate an ever-growing debate about vote choices.  The studies can be 
divided into three main strands of research:  The Michigan School, centered on research headed 
by Converse, Campbell, Miller and Stokes; the Columbia School, which has Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, Gaudet and McPhee as main researchers and the work of Anthony Downs, which is an 
interface between politics and economics.  Each of these different strands of research 
emphasized distinct aspects of the triad predispositions-information-environments.  But all 
attempted to deal with normative questions about citizens’ competence to vote and hold 
representatives accountable for what they do in office. 
Individual predispositions and information are the essence of the concept of voters’ 
political sophistication, a key idea to understand the debate about the structure of mass beliefs 
and its influence in vote choice, a topic dear to the Michigan School (Converse 1964).  In the The 
American Voter, the classic work by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960), the focus is 
on individual predispositions. The idea of constraint is central to explain citizens’ political 
sophistication.  A constrained belief system is one in which predispositions (values, beliefs, 
opinions) correlate with each other and are organized in a hierarchical manner.  That is, there are 
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 some core values that affect general opinions about issues, which then guide specific policy 
choices, in a hierarchical structure that moves down from more abstract, ideological concepts to 
concrete policy preferences (Campbell et al. 1960, Hurwitz and Peffley 1984).  Sophistication is 
related to the organization and content of ideological preferences. 
Michigan scholars come to very pessimistic conclusions about voters’ belief systems and 
the ideological underpinnings of vote choice.  In their view, voting is based only on vague 
impressions about candidates based on long lasting attachments to political parties and not on 
issue preferences.  Voters do not know the issues of the day; much less have a stand on them or 
know candidates’ positions.  The emphasis is on how belief systems are organized.  Information 
is just a component of individuals’ personal predispositions. 
On the other hand, the idea of sophistication in the view of Lazarsfeld and his colleagues 
at Columbia University is closely intertwined with voters’ levels of information, not the mental 
structuring of individuals’ predispositions.  Opinion leaders are voters who hold more 
information about the campaign.  They obtain information through the media, and because they 
are more aware about politics, they exercise influence over other voters.  Lazersfeld et al. 
referred to this process of information diffusion as the two-step flow of information (1944). 
However, voters who are more prone to obtain information are also the ones who already 
have consolidated views about politics.  Therefore, according to Lazarsfeld and colleagues, 
information obtained through the media during the campaign only activates and reinforces 
previous views about politics.  Preference instability, i.e., opinion change, occurs mostly among 
voters who are inattentive to the media and have weak political links to organizations and parties.  
That is, independent (no party preference) and inattentive voters are the most prone to being 
persuaded. These voters were a minority and were the ones most prone to be influenced by 
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 opinion leaders in the Erie county study.  Hence, in the view of the Columbia School, 
information and previous predispositions interact in influencing vote choice. 
In a totally distinct approach to the study of voting behavior, Downs applied concepts of 
economics to the study of vote choice (1956). He argued that the act of voting is irrational 
because the impact of each individual vote has a very limited influence in the outcome of the 
election and because obtaining information about the elections is extremely costly for voters.  
The “rational ignorance” argument, based on the idea that the costs of obtaining information 
outweigh the benefits, would later serve as the basis for approaches that relaxed assumptions 
about how much voters need to know about politics to cast a “rational,” reasoned vote16.  Given 
that the costs of obtaining information are high, voters rely on simplification strategies to make 
decisions.  One of these simplification strategies is to guide concrete electoral choices by 
partisan affinities, which are constructed over time based on past experiences with the parties, 
what Downs refers to as the party differential.  Hence for Downs partisanship is more decisive 
than specific information about politics. 
In all of these studies, some more explicitly than others, the idea that environments affect 
incoming information during the campaign is always present.  Early studies focused extensively 
on the impact of factors related to the political environment, such as the context of campaigns 
and how previous, concrete experiences with the political system affect vote choice.  The 
pioneering studies of voting behavior already advocated a clear idea that environments, mostly 
related to campaign events and current affairs of the period, affect voters’ views about 
candidates.  Subsequent discussions about campaign effects (Holbrook 1994), about the role of 
personal networks and context (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), about informational environments 
                                                 
16 Rational and reasoned are used interchangeably following Lupia and McCubbins (1998).  Both refer to choices 
that involve consideration of different alternatives and rely on available information. 
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 (Rahn et al. 1994, Kuklinski et al. 2001) and about the conditioning impact of institutional 
determinants in the effectiveness of cue sources (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) all emphasize the 
role of environments. 
It seems that none of the authors above would disagree that voters need to have some 
information to make their electoral choices and that the acquisition, retention and processing of 
information is affected by individual predispositions as well as by the context in which voters are 
imbedded.  More specifically, individual predispositions affect how information will be used and 
how influential it will be in vote choice. Environments, on the other hand, condition the amount 
of information available for voters.  Therefore, any model about how much voters know about 
politics and how they gain information about candidates during an election must incorporate 
voters’ predispositions and the characteristics of the environments. 
 
2.3. Shortcuts or Full Information: What do Voters Need? 
 
What voters need to know, though, is a matter of debate.  In fact, Niemi and Weisberg 
(2001) argue that how much information voters should have is a central controversy in the study 
of voting behavior. 
There are basically two main competing views.  One side argues that assumptions about 
the necessity of full information should be relaxed.  These authors rely on some of Down’s 
points about the costs of information and directly criticize Campbell et al.’s negative view about 
voters’ levels of sophistication.  This strand of research, which became known as the Heuristics 
School (Kuklinski et al. 2002), argues that voters only need minimal amounts of information to 
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 make decisions.17  The main argument is that the political system offers a series of informational 
shortcuts and cues that instruct voters about candidates’ positions and preferences.  Because 
information is costly and the value of voting is low, voters have no incentives to become fully 
informed about politics.  Hence, voters satisfice, they rely on summary evaluations to simplify 
their decision process.  They take shortcuts to decide.  As the argument goes, voters are able to 
make reasoned choices even with minimal information. 
The normative appeal of this approach is undeniable.  Nonetheless, some authors are 
critical of the idea that heuristics, cues, suffice to instruct voters.  Basically, those who criticize 
the heuristics school claim that voters with lower levels of information do not vote or act in the 
same way as more fully informed voters. Consequently, information leads to different vote 
choice; usually one that is more moderate (Luskin et al. 2003) and based on issue preferences. 
2.3.1. Heuristics 
 
The heuristic school of voting behavior clearly incorporates the teachings of Anthony 
Downs about the costs of information gathering and innovates by incorporating lessons from 
cognitive psychology regarding the mental tasks related to information processing. A common 
trait of this literature is that explanations about vote choice require attention to the processes 
voters undertake when evaluating political candidates (Rahn 1993). This literature seems to 
agree that people use taxonomies, schemata, cues, stereotypes, and shortcuts to reduce 
uncertainty about the world (Sniderman et al. 1991, Popkin 1996, Rahn 1993, Mondak 1993, 
Huddy and Terkildsen 1993, Lau and Redlawsk 1997, Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Lupia, 
                                                 
17 I will not discuss here the view, also linked to the Heuristic schools, which argues that aggregation processes of 
public opinion repair individual level inconsistencies by canceling out individual errors and therefore, that aggregate 
analysis of voting behavior provide distinct insights about the structure of mass beliefs. The focus of my dissertation 
is on individual level behavior and not on collective performance. For a detailed discussion of the properties of 
aggregate level analysis of vote choice see Page and Shapiro (1992).  Bartels (1993) and Luskin (2002) probably 
offer the best structured criticism of this approach. 
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 McCubbins and Popkin 2000).  In this way, voters make the most out of the limited information 
available and rely on their affect towards specific political groups as guides for vote choice.  
Mondak offers a valuable summary of the main conjecture of the Heuristic School: “if the 
individual does not possess the motivation and the ability to engage in deliberative evaluation, 
then the use of cognitive efficiency mechanisms is likely” (Mondak, 1993; 188). 
Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin (1990) were among the first to develop fully the idea that 
voters rely on strategies of minimizing the burden of obtaining information about elections and 
that voters use minimal quantities of information to make their decisions.  Their main view is 
that voters rely on specific sources of information, like partisanship, when evaluating candidates. 
In the American system, where partisanship is correlated with other important aspects of the 
political system such as ideology and policy preference, relying on partisanship as a mechanism 
for choosing candidates is a form of summarizing various distinct types of information.  One of 
their central points is that less informed voters are satisficers:  They use only the bare essential 
amount of information to make a decision, instead of making choices “based on a comprehensive 
survey and elaboration of the full array of possible alternatives” (Sniderman et al. 1990, 131).  
To use Lupia’s words, voters do not need “encyclopedic knowledge” about politics in order to 
make choices that take into consideration different alternatives and the limited information 
available (1993). 
Political parties are a central source of information.  In political systems like the 
American, where the choice set is simple, partisanship is a good proxy for candidate policy 
preferences (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991, Sniderman 2000).  Parties are a central source 
of informational shortcuts for voters because they serve as signaling devices of candidates’ 
preferences, issue positioning and ideology.  Parties are sources of candidate stereotypes that 
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 help voters organize their views about politics.  In this way, partisanship is also an important 
organizing device that aids citizens in better understanding the political world.18
Popkin is another strong defender of the view that voters are capable of understanding 
and thinking critically about politics. “Citizens have premises, and they use those premises to 
make inferences from their observations of the world around them” (Popkin 1991, 7). Common 
citizens use information shortcuts and rules of thumb to obtain information about politics in 
order to minimize the costs of the process, not because they are simple-minded.  The influence of 
Downs’ discussion of rational ignorance is blatant in Popkin’s view: When the costs of obtaining 
information are high, voters will rely on shortcuts that minimize effort.  Popkin innovates by 
claiming that campaigns are central in affecting the cost of information. His point is that 
campaigns can change the salience of issues in two ways; by providing better connections 
between issues and offices in dispute and by increasing the perceived difference between rival 
candidates (Popkin 1991, 15).  Hence, in some instances information is more readily available.19
Individuals tend to be ambiguous about their central values and do apply cognitive 
shortcuts in their decisions, but this does not mean that they ignore issues when choosing 
(Popkin 1991, 218).  Citizens use timesaving strategies to get information. One example is to 
follow the suggestions of friends who have more access to information, as in the Columbia 
School’s two-step flow of information. Voters also rely on the personal characteristics of 
candidates as proxies for candidates’ political records, such as a reputation of competence, 
                                                 
18 It is clear here that the discussion about heuristics is intimately related to previous studies that started to 
incorporate aspects of cognitive psychology. I’m referring to works that apply schema theory to voting behavior 
(Feldman and Zaller 1984, Hamill, Lodge and Blake 1985). 
19 Popkin’s point is in fact closely related to Fiorina’s (1990) discussion about the availability of information in 
current societies. In Fiorina’s view, information does not cost as much today as it probably did in the past, simply 
because it is more readily available.  
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 honesty and hard work.20  Therefore, personal traits are fundamental to make connections 
between issues and candidates. 
In agreement with Sniderman et al.’s position, Popkin also argues that parties offer very 
strong cues about candidates and are an efficient mechanism of facilitating the evaluation and 
judgment of candidates.  In this way, a main advance proposed by the Heuristics school is that it 
turns the Michigan School argument about political parties on its head.  Parties are no longer 
seen as a residual category that supplants issues when voters make their electoral decisions.  
Instead, parties are signaling devices, providing summary information about candidates’ issue 
preferences.  Political parties are important actors in the system because they provide voters with 
simplified information. 
The heuristic schools also shifts attention to the cognitive processes involved in 
acquiring, storing and using information.  Rahn (1993), for example, contrasts two models of 
information processing; theory-driven models, which rely on the use of party stereotypes, and 
data-driven models that are issue oriented and more extensively rely on campaign information.  
In theory-driven models, information is largely confirmatory. What is against one’s preferred 
party or candidate is ignored.  In data-driven models, voters are more strongly influenced by 
information obtained through the campaign. The environment of the election conditions the use 
of the distinct processing strategies.  Low motivation settings with high costs of obtaining 
information increase the likelihood of relying on a theory based model.  On the other hand, 
information inconsistency between party stereotype and candidate information leads to a data 
based model.  The model voters finally adopt is influenced by the context of the election. 
Lodge, McGraw and Stroh (1989) refer to similar mental processes as memory-based 
strategies and on-line models of information retrieval.  The basic distinction is that in memory-
                                                 
20 Rahn (1993) more fully explores aspects of candidate evaluation. 
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 based models individuals make decisions based on facts collected in the past. On-line model, or 
impression-driven model, relies on the storage of previous judgments, previous evaluations of 
candidates and not the facts that lead to the evaluations. On-line models also defend the idea that 
individuals use current information to confirm prior evaluations.  Voters’ preferences bias the 
retrieval of information; positions voters favor are attributed to their most preferred candidates. 
However, it must be clear that the on-line model is not an indication that issues and 
campaigns do not matter in voters’ decision-making process (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 
1995). The on-line model combines the previous personal biases and old information with new 
information made available by the campaign. Even though the content of the message might be 
lost over time, it does not lose its impact on the voters’ judgment of politicians and parties.  
Evaluations are constantly being updated by new information, and previous opinions influence 
the interpretation of new information. Consequently, voters are still responsive to the campaign 
and to candidates’ position-taking in relation to issues, but this is mediated by the “running tally” 
of stored impressions. 
Finally, Rahn, Krosnick and Breuning (1994) come to a similar conclusion in their 
discussion of rationalization processes.  The authors ask whether survey respondents’ answers to 
open-ended questions about candidates’ like-dislikes reflect derivation processes based on 
memory retrieval or if these answers are in fact rationalizations of the likes-dislikes based on the 
respondents’ previous identification with the candidate. If the former is true, then memory-based 
models are more accurate descriptions of voters’ preference formation. If the latter is true, then 
on-line models are better descriptions of voters’ decision-making process. Their findings support 
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 the view that respondents’ answers are rationalizations to prior evaluations of the candidates. 
Only late deciders tend to use derivation and memory-based models of decision-making.21
In sum, the debate about information processing indicates that voters tend to rely on on-
line, theory-based approaches to the use of information, which leads more often than not to 
rationalizations of vote choice.  That is, voters tend to store final, overall evaluations of 
candidates and these are biased by voters’ previous experiences and stored information about 
politics.  This is why endorsements are so important in elections.  The reasoning is that voters 
who like specific groups or personalities will also like the candidates these groups and 
personalities endorse. This is the essence of the likeability heuristic proposed by Sniderman et al. 
(1990).  Furthermore, voters tend to use information very selectively.  Voters rationalize their 
vote choice in an a posteriori process of assuming candidates’ positions without knowing details 
about such positions.  Nonetheless, these assumptions are based on prior information and on the 
cemented biased views voters’ hold about the political system. 
Last but not least, a central and very forceful argument advanced by the Heuristics 
School is that voters who have lower levels of information vote in a similar way as those who 
have full information. Lau and Redlawsk attempt to identify if voters feel they voted correctly by 
simulating voting behavior first with limited information and then with full information (1997). 
Correct vote is defined as one “that is the same as the choice which would have been made under 
conditions of full information” (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; 586). Through an interactive 
experiment, the authors evaluate voters’ strategies of filtering information. First, they overwhelm 
their subjects with different kinds of information about mock candidates. Second, they force the 
                                                 
21 This finding is completely in odds with the findings of Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), who claim that late deciders are 
voters who neither base their choices on predispositions or on extensive memory-based processes based on 
campaign facts. Instead, late deciders are the ones least interested in politics and more prone to the influence of 
opinion leaders. 
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 subjects to choose the most relevant information. Third, the subjects vote on their preferred 
candidate. Finally, subjects determine if they voted correctly after being given a full set of 
information about the candidates and being asked if they would still cast the same vote.  If 
subjects still voted as they did before, then they would be classified as having voted correctly 
(Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; 589).  The premise of this study is that voters themselves are the only 
ones who can actually judge if their vote was correct or not. 
Having defined the dependent variable of their study in this way, Lau and Redlawsk go 
on to try to predict the accuracy of the vote based on the congruence between voters’ values and 
beliefs and the characteristics attributed to the candidates. In fact, the congruence between 
individuals’ values and candidate traits explains to a great extent voting correctly. Hence, 
knowledge of voters’ beliefs and their evaluation of candidates are sufficient in determining if 
the individual voted correctly. In the experiment, 70% of the subjects voted correctly, both in 
their own view as well as by the authors’ predictions based on voters’ beliefs. 
A core point of this research strand is that voters who rely in minimal amounts of 
information end up acting in the same way as voters who are fully informed.  All authors 
discussed above argue that heuristics are sufficient to allow for instructed decisions and that 
early studies’ normative assumption that voters need to be fully informed in order to carry 
through their democratic task is exaggerated.  Voters do not need to be fully informed; they can 
very efficiently come to decisions using a restricted amount of information that offer cues and 
signals about candidates.  We all use cues and shortcuts on our daily decisions.  Why would it be 
different in politics?  Furthermore, information processing is strongly affected by previous 
predispositions and memory processes are less common than the storing of final, considered 
evaluations.  According to this stream of research, voters store evaluations, not facts. 
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 2.3.2. Fully Informed Voters 
 
Several authors have disagreed with the view posed by the Heuristic School that less 
information is equivalent to full information. Their main criticism is that voters who are fully 
informed, or approximately so, display distinct political preferences than voters who aren’t fully 
informed (Luskin et al. 2002).  Another point, defended by some authors, is that information 
reduces voters’ uncertainty about candidates’ policy positions, therefore aiding in voting choices 
(Alvarez 2001, Alvarez and Brehm 2002).  Voters also tend to avoid voting for candidates they 
know less about (Bartels 1988).  Hence, more information is always better than less. 
Larry Bartels offers one of the first and most thorough criticisms of the Heuristics 
School’s view that low information is irrelevant for the electoral process (1993).  Bartels 
simulates the behavior of a “fully informed” electorate and compares actual voting behavior to 
this hypothetical baseline.  One of his main arguments is that studies of the Heuristics School 
have failed to provide evidence that mass publics do in fact overcome knowledge limitations by 
using minimal amounts of information.  Furthermore, in direct reference to Gerber and Lupias’s 
work on direct legislation elections (1993), Bartels points out that voters who have encyclopedic 
information about politics vote quite differently from those who base their decisions on cue 
information. 
Bartels concludes that uninformed voters perform better with minimal information than 
they would if they had no information at all. However, they perform differently from fully 
informed voters.  Levels of information affect choices differently. As Bartels claims, “whatever 
the sources of aggregate discrepancies between actual vote choice and hypothetical ‘fully 
informed’ vote choices may be, however, they suggest very clearly that political ignorance has 
systematic and significant political consequences” (1993, 220). 
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 Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell embrace Bartels’ claims and test how individual political 
behavior varies depending on levels of information by using Deliberative polling experiments 
(2002).  Deliberative Polls are experiments in which a representative sample of a population, in 
their study the British one, is brought together to spend a weekend learning and discussing 
politics.  Before and after the experiment, subjects respond to questionnaires that contain items 
measuring their levels of information, opinions about specific issues and vote intentions. “A 
Deliberative Poll is designed to show what the public would think about the issues, if it thought 
more earnestly and had more information about them” (Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell 2002, 458).22
Like Bartels, Luskin et al. find that changes in opinion before and after the experiment 
are impressive.  Among other changes, in this specific experiment that focused on criminal 
punishment opinions regarding the harshness of sentences became more moderate with higher 
levels of information.  Positive views on the respect of procedural rights of accused were also 
overall strengthened.  Hence, after learning about the discussed issue in more detail, subjects’ 
opinions changed.  The authors also make sure that the change in opinions are due to 
informational gains (acquisition of more information), than to other factors, such as group 
influence. In a multivariate analysis of acquisition gain, controlling for group influence, they find 
that learning processes lead to changes in opinions. 
On a more theoretical level, Luskin forwards some of the most acid criticism of the use of 
heuristics (2002). His first point is that informational shortcuts are information nonetheless and 
that they are not equally accessible to all citizens. Not all voters have access to heuristics and are 
able to meet some of the requirements imposed by informational shortcuts.  For example, and in 
reference to Brady and Sniderman’s (1985) likeability heuristic, voters might not have a defined 
opinion about an issue and might not know which groups he or she likes. Hence, the imposition 
                                                 
22 Italics in the original. 
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 of attributes and policy stances to groups based on ones own preferences, which is the essence of 
the likeability heuristics, places high informational requirements on voters. 
 His point is that more information is always better. More sophisticated voters see policy 
and vote options more clearly, are able to make leaps from specific information to broader 
issues, and know group positions more accurately.  In fact, Luskin goes on to argue that most 
studies focusing on information levels point out that very few voters are able to use shortcuts as 
they are defined by the Heuristic schools.  Furthermore, only voters who are sophisticated and 
have a broader knowledge about political facts use informational shortcuts.  These same publics 
are the ones who are able to make “correct” choices, and they are only a minority of the 
population. 
Alvarez (2001) and Alvarez and Brehm (2002) have also provided intense defenses of the 
role of information in elections.  Their view, more broadly expanded in Alvarez and Brehm 
(2002), is that information has two direct effects in voting behavior. First, it reduces uncertainty.  
Information gives voters more precision in their evaluation of politicians’ behavior and reduces 
ambiguity about issues. Second, information is central to persuasion and opinion change 
(Alvarez and Brehm 2002, 29).  Voters must be presented with new information in order to be 
persuaded about some policy or have their opinions regarding a candidate altered.  Building upon 
Zaller’s (1992) and Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1944) works, Alvarez and Brehm argue that information 
affects voting behavior by making some specific political predispositions more salient than 
others.  That is, information activates and reinforces certain values and predispositions. 
Delli Carpini and Keeter also stress the importance of information in elections (1996).  
They argue, both on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds, that information matters to the 
quality of public policy being enacted.  Voters must know at least who the actors of the political 
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 process are, what are the issues being discussed and what are the rules of the game and the 
institutional framework that orients how actors behave.  Delli Carpini and Keeter also provide 
evidence that information about these facts tends to be strongly inter-correlated.  That is that 
voters who know some of these points, tend to know all of them. The problem is, the distribution 
of knowledge throughout society is unequal (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989, 154).  Even though 
most citizens are generalists and they know a little bit about several distinct domains of public 
information, there are clear group differences in political knowledge. 
The clear problem of unequal access to information arises when such inequality mirrors 
other inequalities. If voters are not equally capable of defending their own interests and if 
information allows them to do so, and if these same groups are already the least benefited by the 
political system, then the basic tenants of democracy are in check (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1989, 155).  The authors find reinforcing forms of inequality in the American society: “men are 
more informed than women; whites are more informed than blacks; those with higher incomes 
are more informed than those with lower incomes; and older citizens are more informed than 
younger ones” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989, 157).  What is even more worrisome, in their 
view, is the stability of the knowledge gaps over time.  The same groups are always less 
informed. 
It is clear from the above discussion that there is a controversy about how much 
information voters need to have in order to perform their main democratic responsibilities. All 
would agree that more information is better, but some argue that voters who know little still are 
able to make “correct” decisions.  Others claim that information in the form of heuristics and 
cues is not widely distributed, and those who rely on it act differently from voters who have 
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 more information. Convincing empirical evidence has been amassed on both sides, granting it 
almost impossible to come to a final conclusion about which side is right. 
One must not lose sight of the fact that at least some information is necessary to allow 
voters to make their decisions and that even these minimal amounts of information are not 
universally available.  A first question, then, is what affects the distribution of information 
amongst voters?  Are there systematic differences in levels of information in the electorate?  
Another, altogether distinct question is what is the impact of information in vote choice?  In 
other words, do voters who have different stocks of information behave differently?  These are 
the central questions that orient the data analysis on chapters 4 and 5. 
A central explanatory factor for the variance in information levels and the role of 
information in elections is the environment in which voters are embedded.  Recent developments 
in this literature have indicated that answers to the questions above are conditional upon the 
characteristics of the environments voters are embedded in.  Hence, in addition to individual 
predispositions, the environments voters are embedded in strongly affect learning processes and 
vote choice. 
2.4. Environments and Information 
 
Luskin (2002) and Kuklinski (1986 and 2002) are among some of the scholars who have 
defended a shift in the analytical focus of the discussion about information and elections from 
how much information voters need to have to how environments condition access to information 
and the role information plays in voters decision making.  Explaining how voters obtain 
information and how information affects vote choice is as a central question in the study of 
voting behavior.  In fact, studies that rely on survey data have attempted to model vote choice in 
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 a two-step estimation process. First, scholars model the acquisition of information and then 
model vote choice using informational levels as a determinant of choice.  I adopt this strategy in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
The emphasis on explaining variation in informational levels and the impact of 
environments on information naturally gives the debate about political psychology a more 
comparative flavor.  The study of environments and context is, by its nature, one of comparison 
of distinct aggregate attributes that influence individual behavior (Przeworski and Teune 1980).  
Therefore, the focus on political environments calls for a comparative approach to the study of 
political psychology.  When talking about how distinct environments condition individual 
behavior, one is necessarily engaging in the comparative analysis of the influence of macro-
structures in micro phenomenon. 
The main point that will be discussed in this section is that current analyses focusing on 
the impact of the environment on voting behavior have not correctly incorporated the macro 
level in their analysis exactly because they do not engage in comparative studies of 
environments.  I argue two points based on the literature. First, most studies fail to fully 
incorporate in their models the multilevel nature of the study of political environments and 
voting behavior.  Second, most empirical studies fail to measure environments as a higher level 
of analysis, one that encompasses voters.  By failing to model voters as subsets of political 
environments, the current literature is unable to estimate fully the impact of environments on 
individual behavior. 
2.4.1. Environments or Contexts? 
 
The impact of environments is assessed in different ways when it is incorporated in 
models that attempt to explain voters’ preferences and levels of information. (Huckfeldt and 
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 Sprague 1995, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989, Nicholson 2003, Kuklinsi et al. 2001, Rahn et al. 
1994, Sniderman et al. 1991, Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Nonetheless, a common trait of these 
studies is that environments affect the availability of information and condition the complexity of 
the choice set presented to voters.  The explicit idea is that individuals are nested in specific 
settings and that these settings generate incentives and constraints that mold individuals’ learning 
and choosing abilities. 
Delli Carpini and Keeter have argued that two external factors that mold voters’ 
preferences are the informational and political environments (1989, 209).  Informational 
environments refer to the role of the traditional mechanism of information diffusion; television, 
radio, newspapers in propagating news about the political system.  The emphasis is on how 
media coverage of current events aids voters in learning about politics. Political environments, 
on the other hand, refer to the mobilization of citizens around political issues and the role of 
parties and activists in distributing information about politics.  They find that both affect 
citizens’ levels of information. 
In addition to the role of different mechanisms of information diffusion in distributing 
information, Delli Carpini and Keeter also point out to the role of systemic, institutional 
determinants of variation in individuals’ informational levels.  Such determinants refer to the 
ways in which the political system organizes the distribution of information and how historical 
disadvantages of certain groups affect their access to information.  The emphasis is more on 
institutions and how they mold behavior and less on the specific mechanisms of information 
diffusion, i.e. media and personal networks. 
Sniderman, Brady and Tetlock (1991) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) have indicated 
that political institutions affect voters’ levels of information and condition their learning 
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 processes.  Sniderman et al. argue that the complexities of the environment in which citizens are 
embedded are intimately related to voters’ ability to obtain and use information.  When the 
choices voters face are more clearly and simply structured by the institutional setting, then voters 
have more ease in dealing with the amount of information. 
Following the lead of Sniderman et al., Lupia and McCubbins (1998) have argued that 
the role of important sources of informational shortcuts, such as political parties, should vary 
depending on the institutional setting that structures the functioning of parties and electoral rules.  
For example, parties will be more effective in aiding voters in institutional settings that restrict 
the number of competing parties and that increase their relevance in the electoral process.  Such 
is the case of electoral systems based on single-member plurality districts.  An electoral system 
that stimulates parties to create a “brand name” distinguishing it from other parties clarifies the 
choices available for voters.  Parties become efficient sources of cues when they actively 
organize the functioning of the political system.  Conversely, where parties are weak, voters have 
more difficulty in learning about politics.   In their words, “nonpartisan elections seem to us a 
classic example of an institutional environment that hinders reasoned choice” (Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998, 225). 
Lupia and McCubbins also argue that electoral competition can create the conditions for 
learning (1998, 208).  Competition creates the possibility of verification of politicians’ claims 
and actions, increasing voters’ ability to evaluate and judge politicians.  However, competition is 
also conditioned by institutional characteristics of the political system and about the messages 
sent out by distinct competitors.  In environments were competing messages are obscure or hard 
to identify and, therefore, are not effective in persuading voters, then more competitors will not 
aid voters in learning about politics. 
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 Competition at the environmental level may also affect vote choice directly.  As Mayhew 
argued, competition may decrease incumbency advantage in single-member districts (1974).  
When there is a strong challenger, voters may have more access to information, which increases 
their ability to better judge incumbents. 
Probably Huckfeldt and Sprague (1990, 1995) and Huckfeldt with a series of distinct co-
authors (Huckfeldt et al. 2002, Beck et al. 2003), who have more clearly explored the impact of 
contexts and environments in vote choice.  An initial important distinction is between 
environments and contexts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1990).  Borrowing from Eulau’s work 
(1980), Huckfeldt and Sprague propose the following definitions: 
“… an environment is a structured setting that shares one or more common 
characteristics: spatial boundaries, political functions, institutions of 
governance, political organization and so forth.  In contrast, a context is defined 
in terms of an environment’s social composition and the resulting consequences 
of social composition for social interaction and the social transmission of 
information and influence” (1990, 25). 
 
Hence, environments are the systematic characteristics of the political system of which 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1989), Sniderman et al (1991) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) talk.  
Environments are exogenous to voters’ preferences, to their patterns of interaction and to the 
social composition of the spatially defined area. They are “extraindividual factors” (Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1995, 10).   Contexts, on the other hand, are a product of the interaction between 
citizens and are conditioned by the institutional boundaries that compose the environment.  
Contexts refer more specifically to the transmission of information through personal and 
impersonal means.  Hence, when Delli Carpini and Keeter talk about political and informational 
environments, they are referring to what Huckfeldt and Sprague call contexts.  Contexts refer to 
the personal networks, the patterns of interaction between citizens and include the role of the 
media in electoral campaigns.  A central claim of this chapter is that in empirical studies, 
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 distinguishing environments from contexts is essential in disentangling the impact of institutions 
in affecting voting behavior.  This also requires that measures of the context should be different 
from measures of the environment. 
2.4.2. The Study of Contexts and Environments 
 
Most studies do not incorporate the environmental level of analysis, as it is described 
above, in their analyses even though they claim to do so.  Environments involve factors that are 
exogenous to individuals, and very few studies have measured environments in such a way.  
Huckfeldt and Sprague are probably the exception.  In their study published in 1990, they 
measure environments at the county level by the aggregate vote for the Democratic Party.  In 
their 1995 study, Huckfeldt and Sprague use neighborhood measures of voter registration in 
previous elections and participation in primary elections (1995, 233).  This is an advantage in 
comparison to other studies of environmental and contextual effects because it clearly 
incorporates the exogenous, more aggregate level nature of environments in the analysis. 
However, Huckfeldt and Sprague’s theoretical distinction between environment and 
context and the use of aggregate level data to measure environmental impact has been 
consistently overlooked by studies that claim to evaluate environmental impacts.  Most studies 
also tend to focus on the information aspects of environments, and not on the political ones.  
Environments are commonly understood and measured as information contexts (Rahn et al. 
1994).  Hence, the predominant definition of environments is what Delli Carpini and Keeter 
called the informational environment. 
For Rahn and her colleagues, the campaign environment is subsumed by the information 
made available to voters.  On their study, based on experiments, they contrast the impact of 
exposure to political debates and to “infomercials” as different components of the informational 
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 environment.  The emphasis is on political communication settings and how their characteristics 
influence voters’ candidate evaluation.  Rahn and colleagues focus on the distinct impacts of 
these formats in voters’ attention and the cognitive burden of processing the information made 
available.  Infomercials raise less attention but offer information in a more simple way.  Debates, 
on the other hand, raise more public attention, but are more complex and multidimensional, 
increasing the cognitive burden of information processing. In spite of their limited 
operationalization of environments, Rahn et al. defend the interesting point that the complexity 
of environments hinders voters’ ability to learn about politics. 
Kuklinski et al. (2001) follow a similar line of inquiry.  For them, environments are also 
defined by the quantity of information available to voters.  Political environments are “the 
totality of politically relevant communication to which citizens are exposed” (Kuklinski et al. 
2001, 411).  It includes, therefore, statements by candidates, interest groups, public officials and 
information given through the media.  Their main goal is to investigate if voters assess difficult 
political issues in a more effective way under distinct configurations of the political environment. 
Like Rahn et al. (1994), Kuklinsi and his colleagues understand that environments can 
enhance motivation as well as the amount of information available. In Kuklinski’s study, 
variation in environmental characteristics is also achieved through experiments, by controlling 
for the wording of questions presented to survey respondents.  Some were presented with 
questions that provided cues about expert positions on issues. Others responded to questions that 
increased motivation to think responsibly about the issue, as if voters were themselves the 
“responsible public official”. Others still were presented only with a simple question about issue 
trade-off, without any introductory qualifications. 
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 Findings indicate that when the environment does not provide guidance, or only provides 
motivational incentives to act responsibly, individual levels of cognitive engagement shape 
decision-making more than variation in informational contexts (Kuklinski et al. 2001, 416).  
However, when voters are presented with an environment of highly diagnostic information, 
where they get information about the opinions of experts, they make choices so easily that 
motivation enhancers are not necessary.  Further, less sophisticated voters are able to make trade-
offs when presented with more information.  In summary, environments facilitate voters’ 
learning processes when they help provide simple, clear sources of cues.  It is also interesting 
that when environments are more complex and convoluted, voters will rely more often on their 
personal predispositions and prior knowledge to “protect” themselves from the burden of 
updating their evaluations. 
Both of the studies mentioned above come to the comforting conclusion that “the 
responsibility for improving democratic performance lies not with the citizens themselves but 
with the elites who shape, and have opportunity to alter, the political environment” (Kuklinsi et 
al. 2001, 423).  However, both rely on experiments to manipulate the characteristics of political 
systems, and neither use data on citizens that are actually embedded in environments with 
distinct political and institutional characteristics.  Furthermore, neither study actually measures 
characteristics of the political environments; instead, they measure how distinct formats of 
information diffusion affect voters’ judgments.  In my view, these studies are referring simply to 
the role of information diffusion mechanisms.  They do not focus on the interactions between 
citizens, which is in the essence of the idea of context, nor on the institutional characteristics of a 
locality, in essence what environments are. 
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 Nicholson’s study is similar in that “the opportunity for political learning depends on the 
amount and type of information available in the political environment” (2003, 403).  Differently 
from the above studies however, his analysis of awareness of ballot propositions in direct 
legislation elections defines and measures the political environment as variation in the 
characteristics of the political system.  Using time-series data, Nicholson assesses how awareness 
of ballot propositions, measured through surveys collected from 1956 to 2000, varies according 
to several factors.  The environment in which voters make decisions about direct legislation is 
affected by the election type, midterm or presidential, by the amount of campaign spending, by 
the amount of media coverage of the proposition, the type of issue being voted, voter fatigue, 
measured by the number of propositions voted for in that specific election, and a count of days 
before the election that the question was asked.  Clearly, this is an improvement regarding 
studies that focus exclusively on experiments, because it incorporates actual political factors that 
characterize the political environment. 
Nonetheless, most empirical studies mentioned above, with the exception of Huckfeldt 
and Sprague (1990, 1995), are not able to measure how variations in the structural characteristics 
of the environments affect voters choices.  This is so because none of them is comparative in 
nature.  Nicholson approximates this goal by relying in variation over time, but he is still limited 
by focusing on only one case and on direct legislation where the structuring components of the 
elections, such as competition and partisan cues, are fixed. 
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 2.5. Conclusion 
 
From the discussion about heuristics and full information we learn that voters do not need 
“encyclopedic” knowledge about politics, but that they need to know some minimal aspects of 
the political systems.  Even if voters rely on shortcuts and heuristics, they must know who the 
actors of the political system are and must also have some individual predispositions towards 
specific issues of the day.  Hence, voters must have information, even if only elementary, about 
politics in order to make decisions.  The literature has also moved in the direction of analyzing 
how distinct environments condition voters’ access to information and ability to cope with the 
amount of information available.  The discussion has shifted from how much information is 
necessary to how environments condition the availability of information.  Models moved from a 
simple specification where information is yet another independent explanation of vote choice to 
one where information itself is endogenous and is influenced both by personal predispositions as 
well as environments. 
All authors focusing on the study of political environments and voting behavior agree 
that in systems where the complexity of electoral choices is more complex it is harder for voters 
to acquire and process information.  Rahn et al. (1994) synthesize this argument when they claim 
that an excess of information can overload voters when that information is not summarized or 
filtered.  Distinct authors agree that environments condition access to information and affect the 
processing of information.  Environments can hinder voters’ ability to learn and can constrain 
political involvement.  Furthermore, environments can also condition the amount of information 
necessary to make choices.  It may be that in simpler environments, where the structure of choice 
sets is better organized; voters need less information to make electoral choices.  Finally, 
Kuklinski et al. (2003) have argued that when environments are too complex, voters tend to rely 
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 on their previous levels of information and experience with the political system to make 
decisions.  That is, where environments do not provide efficient information simplifying 
mechanisms, the impact of environments in voters’ decision becomes less relevant than personal 
predispositions. 
However, only in a few occasions have environments truly been measured as external to 
individual behavior.  Another, probably more damning problem of the existing literature on 
political environments is that most empirical studies, again with the exception of Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, do not analyze the impact of environments and individual predispositions in voters’ 
levels of information as a problem involving multiple levels of analysis.  Even though most 
studies rely exclusively on individual level data, their hypotheses are based on the assumption 
that specific variables are observed in different levels of analysis. 
There is a clear, albeit not always enunciated, hierarchical assumption in the theoretical 
modeling of how environments and contexts affect individual behavior.  Huckfeldt and Sprague 
clearly discuss this on their work, but they do not use appropriate statistical techniques to 
evaluate the hierarchical nature of their data.  The discussion about environments assumes that 
voters are subsets of political environments.  In this case, environments are the more aggregate, 
higher level of analysis whereas individuals are the more disaggregated, individual level of 
analysis.  Furthermore, characteristics of the higher level directly and indirectly affect the lower 
level variables.  Unquestionably, this calls forth for an approach that correctly incorporates 
distinct levels of analysis in the same broad model.  All previous studies fail to do so, mostly so 
because techniques that allowed for the simultaneous estimation of different level variables 
surprisingly are not as widely used in political science studies as they should. 
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 Because the solution of theoretical problems mentioned above involves the use of 
appropriate statistical techniques, it is important to highlight how the use of multilevel statistical 
models can contribute to solve some of the theoretical puzzles in the literature.  Steenbergen and 
Jones (2002) have recently called attention to the substantive and statistical motivations for 
employing multilevel models in the analysis of political phenomenon.  The goal of such methods 
is to “account for variance in a dependent variable that is measured at the lowest level of analysis 
by considering information from all levels of analysis” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219).  
There are a few clear substantive reasons to rely on multilevel analysis.  First, researchers can 
combine different levels of analysis in a “single comprehensive model”.  Second, multilevel 
analysis allows for the exploration of causal heterogeneity.  By specifying cross-level 
interactions, researchers can verify how higher-level factors differently condition the impact of 
lower level predictors.  Finally, multilevel analysis permits more robust tests of the 
generalizability of the findings. It allows for tests of how results obtained under one setting differ 
from those obtained under distinct settings (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). 
There are also statistical issues in carrying out analysis with different levels of analysis 
that ordinary multivariate estimation techniques fail to consider.  A main problem with using 
common multivariate techniques is that these ignore the impact of error variance in the higher 
levels of analysis.23  If such variance is not taken into account, standard errors can be deflated 
and researchers can incur type I errors.  Multilevel data is clustered data, and observations (and 
errors) are not truly independent.  This violates a central assumption of estimation techniques 
such as ordinary least squares and analysis of variance. The correlation between errors generated 
by the hierarchical nature of data collected in multiple levels causes estimated standard errors to 
                                                 
23 For technical and mathematical details of hierarchical models and mixed models, see Raudenbush and Byrk 2003, 
Verbeke and Molenberghs 2000, Singer 1998. 
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 be low, leading predictors to have statistically significant impacts when they in fact do not24 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220).  The main advantage of multilevel models is that they 
incorporate error variances, or random effects, of all levels of analysis in the same estimation 
procedure, hence minimizing type I errors or false positives.25
Hence, multilevel models are a type of mixed regression, where both fixed and random 
effects are estimated.  Such models do take into account the clustered nature of the data and 
provide adjustments for variance at distinct levels of analysis.  Given that the investigation of the 
impact of political environments on voters’ choices and levels of information is a study of 
multiple levels of analysis, it must take into consideration the random and fixed effects at all 
levels. Up until now, studies have mostly ignored the impact of random effects and have only 
estimated the fixed effects of higher-level variables or their surrogates.  This is also partially due 
to the fact that the studies mentioned have not been successful in measuring environments as a 
higher level of analysis.  Environments are measured as part of individual characteristics, which 
is incorrect by definition. 
I address these limitations by incorporating into the analysis of voters’ levels of 
information and vote choice variation in the political characteristics of environments.  My study 
measures the political environment at the neighborhood level based on the level of political 
competition between candidates for the Brazilian lower house, in two cities where partisan 
structures are distinct.  Using a count of viable contenders in each locality, based on the outcome 
of the 2002 election, I am able to quantify electoral competition in a political system that allows 
for high variation in the number of candidates competing in a specific locality.  Such variation 
                                                 
24 The technical discussion of mixed models, which is highly oriented to experimental studies, refers to this as false 
positives. 
25 Error terms from higher levels can be incorporated in the intercept of the lower level equations as well as in the 
slopes of the cross-level interaction terms. 
57 
 allows for tests of more elaborate hypotheses about electoral competition at the environmental 
level and its effects on learning processes.  In addition, one of the cities has a much stronger 
tradition of organized political parties, which should reflect at the individual level propensities to 
identify with parties.  Hence, I am able to explore more fully how environmental variation in 
political structures influence voting behavior and voters’ levels of information. 
In sum, the current and growing literature on how environments provide cues for voters 
and condition the levels of information made available for voters have failed in correctly 
measuring environments as higher levels of analysis and in correctly estimating models that 
incorporate distinct levels of analysis.  Consequently, current studies have not yet been able to 
assess comparatively how environments with distinct institutional and organizational traits 
condition voters’ learning processes and vote choices.  This study gains analytical power because 
in Brazil local level variation in organization and political structures is much greater than those 
found in the US.  In addition, by relying on a research design that takes advantage of such 
variation, I am able to develop and test a model that incorporates environmental, contextual and 
individual level correlates of learning about politics and of vote choice.  Given that I also have 
data from the same respondents measured in three points in time, the dynamic aspects of the 
electoral campaign and their effect on learning and vote choice can also be evaluated.  Therefore, 
I can evaluate how environments affect not just informational levels cross-sectionally, but also 
over time, in the course of the campaign. 
In the next chapter the model of information diffusion in complex electoral environments 
is discussed in more detail.  It incorporates lessons from the literature discussed above and adapts 
it to the study of the Brazilian case.  I test this model in chapter 4.  In chapter 5 I return to the 
question of the role of information during elections, and I evaluate how information, alongside 
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 environments, contexts and personal predispositions affects specific types of vote choice related 
to legislative elections in Brazil. 
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 3. Chapter 3: A Model of Information Acquisition in Complex Electoral Environments 
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 3.1. Introduction 
 
A main controversy in the voting behavior literature concerns the amount of information 
voters need in order to make reasoned political choices.  There is a growing consensus that 
voters do not need to be fully informed about politics.  Only basic, minimal levels of information 
are necessary to guide vote choice.  The problem is that even such minimal levels are not equally 
distributed among voters.  There is variation to explain.  There are is a growing consensus that 
environments are partially responsible for variation in voters’ levels of information. 
Even though great progress has been made in theorizing about how environments 
condition learning processes, advances of a methodological nature are still called for.  There are 
serious limitations in how environments are conceptualized. A flaw of previous studies is that 
environments are seen and measured as a distinct level of analysis.  The goal of this chapter is to 
develop a model of information diffusion that more appropriately captures and evaluates the 
impact of environments in the analyses of voting behavior. 
Previous models of information diffusion have very accurately assessed the impact of the 
most variegated sources of information in voters’ levels of knowledge about politics.  Great 
advances have been made in identifying the role played by distinct information sources in 
instructing voters about politics.  The model proposed here incorporates this extremely rich 
heritage and builds upon it by proposing a new way of measuring and testing the impact of 
political environments.  The model proposed here not only incorporates the role of individual 
predispositions, but also the direct and the conditioning role of environments. 
The core hypothesis is that the impact of individual predispositions, such as identification 
with a political party or talking with others about politics, is conditioned by the complexity of the 
political environment in which voters are embedded.  Huckfeldt and Sprague’s (1991) distinction 
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 between environment and context is very useful to increase the conceptual precision of these 
terms.  Environments refer to the external characteristics of a political system, defined by the 
institutions that frame political participation.  Environments are completely independent and 
exogenous of interactions between voters; they condition the interaction of voters.  Hence, 
environments cannot be measured by the aggregation of individual attributes. It necessarily 
requires data that is measured in the aggregate level.  I rely on election result data at the 
neighborhood level to measure electoral competition, a central trait of political environments.  
Political environments are molded by rules and by the historic development of political 
institutions, not by citizens’ interaction in the present.  The central aspect of political 
environments during elections is the competition between distinct candidates.  Competition is 
affected by the rules of the electoral system and by local histories.  In the case of Brazil, the 
number of candidates competing in a locality is the measure of competition that most closely 
approximates the idea of electoral complexity. 
Contexts, on the other hand, are defined by the patterns of interaction between voters.  
Like environments, they are conceptualized as being external to citizens in that citizens are 
embedded in different contexts, but contexts are the product of the social interaction between 
citizens.  Contexts are produced by the patterns of communication between voters, by their 
networking and by how ties between individuals are constructed.  Hence, given that contexts are 
the product of social interaction, they can be measured as an aggregation of individual behavior.  
I operationalize the neighborhood interactive context by the mean neighborhood level of 
individuals’ frequency of talking about politics.  In this study, the impact of both environments 
and contexts in political information diffusion will be analyzed, alongside with indicators of 
voters individual predispositions (ability and motivation) to learn about candidates. 
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 In the next section I discuss the correlates of learning about politics. I then discuss the 
adaptation of such a model to multiparty systems, drawing examples mostly, but not exclusively 
from the Brazilian case, and calling for a model that includes various sources of political cues.  
In the last section I define and operationalize the distinct hypotheses. 
 
3.2. The Correlates of Information Acquisition 
 
The effort of modeling the correlates of voters’ informational levels must take into 
consideration two questions: 1) who has higher informational levels and 2) why do some citizens 
have higher levels of information than others.  The model proposed here borrows from previous 
studies that have tackled these questions.  Answering the first question is more clearly related to 
describing the social, economic and demographic attributes of voters who have higher levels of 
information.  The second question moves the debate to what are the factors that cause voters who 
have similar social, demographic and economic attributes to have distinct levels of information.  
Therefore it moves the debate to variables that may differentiate voters on their personal 
predispositions and the environments they are embedded in.  The main concern of the model of 
information diffusion proposed below is to answer the second question above, but it must control 
for differences generated by SES and demographic characteristics. 
The discussion about who has more information is related to the costs of obtaining 
information (Alvarez and Brehm 2002, 45).  Differences between individuals in informational 
levels and learning processes are clearly associated with the differing costs of obtaining 
information about politics.  Certain personal attributes increase or decrease the costs of obtaining 
information.  Education, age, gender, employment condition and marital status are related to 
63 
 general informational costs.  This simply means that some voters are more prone to being 
exposed to information.  As the propensity to be exposed to information increases, its costs 
decrease (Fiorina 1990).  Other voters have to struggle to obtain information; information is 
more expensive for them and they should have lower levels of information. 
The discussion about informational gains and differences in informational levels as a 
cost-benefit problem can be linked to other approaches to political learning in an attempt to 
formulate a more encompassing theoretical model.  It can clearly be related to the view of 
learning processes based on the ability-motivation-opportunity triad proposed by Luskin (1990).  
Luskin (1990) has argued that people learn about politics if they have the ability, motivation and 
opportunity to do so. 
Ability refers to the cognitive skills voters have.  Motivation refers to voters’ interest in 
searching for information.  Finally, opportunity refers to the availability of information and how 
it is presented to voters.  Ability is inherently an individual level variable in that it refers 
basically to personal characteristics that reduce individual costs of obtaining information.  
Motivation is also related to individual factors that condition informational levels and also 
incorporates the idea of costs.  For individuals who are less motivated to learn about politics, the 
chances of being exposed to political information are lower and hence the cost of obtaining 
information is higher.  Finally, opportunity refers to the availability of information in the 
environment.  Opportunities are exogenous to individuals and are defined by the characteristics 
of the setting in which they are embedded.  This clearly means that environments play a role in 
affecting voters’ levels of information. 
As Rahn has argued, the cognitive burden of obtaining information increases the cost of 
information and consequently decreases voters’ propensity to acquire information (1993).  
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 Therefore, the triad ability-motivation-opportunity describes different instances that affect the 
cost of acquiring information.   These same three factors orient the analysis of the data in this 
chapter, but they are operationalized a bit differently from how Luskin proposes. 
Luskin (1990) includes in his model of variation in information levels, explanatory 
variables such as education, occupation, interest in politics and exposure to media.  All of which 
are measured at the individual level.  For Luskin, opportunity refers exclusively to access to 
information and is equated to attention to the media. 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) follow similar strategy on their study.  They do not 
employ indicators of environments measured in different levels of aggregation.  Their surrogates 
for environmental conditioning are labeled “structural” and include education, income and 
politically impinged occupations (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 180).  Hence, what for them 
are structural characteristics, for Luskin is more clearly related to ability.  Delli Carpini and 
Keeter view attention to political news and interest in politics as linked to the motivational aspect 
of politics. For Luskin, only the latter is; the former is related to the opportunity of learning. 
Clearly this triad is closely related to the questions of who has more information and 
why.  But the studies above have difficulty in disentangling the best indicators for ability, 
motivation and opportunity, because they restrict their analyses to the individual level and 
because they incorrectly conceptualize the impact of environments. 
In my view, ability refers to the personal socio-demographic and economic characteristics 
of voters: Education, occupation, and employment status being the central ones.  Ability is 
clearly a descriptive factor in pointing out who might have more information.  Motivation, on the 
other hand, is more clearly related to why some people learn more about politics.  It provides a 
partial answer to the second question posed above.   Attentiveness to media, exposure to 
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 conversations about politics with activists, propensity to talk about politics, and closeness to a 
political party are all indicators of motivation to learn about public issues and politics.  All of 
these are direct surrogates for interest in politics.  Finally, the second part of the answer for why 
people with similar personal traits present different patterns of learning about politics is related 
to the opportunities available.  Opportunity, on its turn, directly speaks to the structure of the 
environment in which voters are embedded.  Different environments present voters with distinct 
learning incentives and constraints. 
Ability, motivation and opportunity affect the cost-benefit calculus voters implement 
when searching for information.  Because previous studies do not correctly incorporate 
environments in their models of informational levels and learning, they incorrectly define the 
triad ability-motivation-opportunity.  In the next section I discuss how the proposed model will 
incorporate distinct levels of analysis and how the hypotheses designed with the United States 
case in mind may be adapted to a multiparty environment. 
 
3.3. Multiparty Systems and Sources of Political Information 
 
Multiparty systems generate distinct incentives and constraints for learning compared to 
two-party systems.  Furthermore, single-member districts generate incentives and constraints for 
voters and politicians alike that are very different from proportional representation systems.  All 
the studies discussed above are based on data collected in a two-party system with single-
member electoral districts. It is important, therefore, to highlight how the hypotheses and 
concepts that orient the above studies travel to other institutional settings. 
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 First, the diversity of cue sources in multiparty systems is greater than in two-party 
systems.  It is naturally more demanding to know about the policy preferences and positions of 
the distinct political groups when there are more groups to learn about.  Hence, the cognitive 
burden of acquiring and processing information might be higher in environments were there are 
more political actors.  It might be even harder where parties are more ephemeral, hence 
unreliable sources of information.  This is especially true in regimes that have only recently 
undergone democratization, as in most Latin American cases.  Several other mechanisms of 
information diffusion might be more important sources of cues for voters. 
The discussion that follows aims at pointing out the increased significance of 
incorporating all the distinct sources of information voters have access to in a model that 
explains voters’ information acquisition in multiparty and more complex electoral systems.  The 
main factors discussed are the role of ideology, political parties, the media, neighborhood 
activists, and engagement in civil society organizations.  A correctly specified model must 
include the diversity of cue sources existent in new democracies. 
3.3.1. Ideology, Partisanship and Media 
 
According to Pappi, in a multiparty system the ideological orientation of parties serves as 
a way of minimizing the difficulty of comprehending all the different partisan positions (1996, 
264). That is, it is easier to know if a party is in favor of or against the government or if it has a 
leftist or rightist orientation than precisely knowing the parties’ positions in relation to specific 
policies. Canache, Mondak and Conroy, in their study of the multiparty 1989 Honduran election, 
measure ideology at the individual and aggregate levels, and both are important indicators of 
vote choice, even more so for those who vote for leftist parties (1990). The social transmission of 
information in the neighborhood and the personal inclination to adopt leftist positions are 
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 fundamental in explaining vote in opposition parties.  Przeworski and Soares (1971) come to 
similar conclusions in their analysis of vote choice based on class attachments in Chile.  In fact, 
these two studies indicate that not only ideological preferences are important sources of cues 
about candidates, but also that the environment in which voters are embedded play a central role 
in conditioning the impact of class and ideology in vote choice. 
A main concern of the literature on voting behavior in Brazil is exactly identifying how 
structured and compatible are ideological preferences and partisan loyalties. Throughout the 
various changes in party systems that happened since the end of World War II, a constant 
research topic is the evaluation of the ideological underpinnings of party preferences. 
Electoral behavior studies in Brazil can be divided by their focus on different moments of 
the Brazilian history. In the first period, from 1945 to 1964, Brazil had three main national 
parties, and both Lavareda (1991) and Soares (1965) argue that Brazilian voters had consistently 
identified with one of these three parties. There was a strengthening of the ideological basis of 
partisanship and a growing coherence between the class-based support of parties and the policy 
proposals parties defended.  Parties were gaining roots in society and representing the interests of 
distinct, identifiable social cleavages. 
This growing consistency between ideology, partisanship and policy making was brutally 
interrupted by the 1964 military coup that removed from office the progressive, left-leaning 
administration of President Joao Goulart. The following period, 1964 to 1979, dominated by an 
artificially created two party system imposed by the military dictatorship, is marked by studies 
that highlight three aspects of voting behavior: social basis of vote choice, coherence between 
present and previous party identification, and the ideological basis of party identification. 
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 Studies in this period are of special interest because they focused on specific cities.  In 
fact, Caxias do Sul (Trindade 1975, 1978, 1980) and Juiz de Fora (Reis 1978), which are also 
studied in this dissertation, were both part of this research strand that aimed at comparing voting 
behavior in different Brazilian cities.  This research program also included cities in the states of 
São Paulo (Lamounier 1975, 1978, 1980) and Rio de Janeiro (Lima, Jr. 1978). 
In general, these authors were very optimistic about the continuation of class-based party 
identification. That is, voters from poorer areas of town tended to identify with the opposition 
party, mainly because of the weak performance of the governing party. Intellectuals also 
supported the opposition party, however, due to less pragmatic and more ideological reasons: the 
opposition party stood for the opening of the system to democratic competition. Hence, the idea 
of the Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (MDB), the opposition party, as the party of reform 
was quite consistent with the desire of the social groups that supported it. 
Scholars also found a certain consistency of party preferences between previous and 
current party systems. There was a clear continuation in party identification between those who 
supported the Brazilian Workers Party (PTB) from 1945-1964 and those who supported the 
opposition party during the military dictatorship (MDB). The same could be said about 
supporters of the more conservative parties, Uniao Democratica Nacional (UDN) in the previous 
period, and Alianca de Renovacao Nacional (ARENA) during the dictatorship. 
However, the optimism that emanated from these findings about the existence of strong 
party identification was shattered by findings related to the ideological underpinnings of party 
loyalty. Lamounier and Reis are the ones that most forcefully point out to voters’ inconsistent 
understanding of the parties’ specific policy proposals. Voters, especially those with lower 
educational levels, had difficulty in identifying what were the key policy differences that 
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 distinguished the parties. Party affiliation was defined by vague impressions of how well the 
governing party was doing, instead of ideological preferences about how the political system 
should work.  Hence, voting appeared to be influenced by retrospective evaluations of the 
incumbents, to use Fiorina’s terminology (1981). 
The subsequent period, from 1982 till the present, is marked by the reestablishment of a 
multiparty system.  This period is initially defined by an explosion of civic and political 
participation, especially in the late 1980’s, with the appearance of innumerous small parties.  The 
consequence, indicated by the literature, is that party identification reached its low point and was 
consistently replaced by direct communication between individualized politicians and voters, 
based on strong media and propaganda effects (Meneghello, 1994; Rua, 1995, 1997; Lima, 1993; 
Baquero, 1997; Miguel, 1999). 
Authors who focus on this period agree that the growing identification with parties during 
the previous two decades faded away due to the installment of a party system with low entrance 
barriers and with the proliferation of parties with no social or ideological basis. During this 
period, voters seem unable to relate parties with policy proposals, do not identify with any 
political party, and tend to base their votes exclusively on the retrospective evaluation of 
governments, what Baquero calls a pragmatic vote, instead of voting based on party proposals 
(1997). Hence, it can be said that the absence of ideological basis of voters’ party preferences, 
already identified during the military dictatorship, was exacerbated in the beginning of the new 
democratic regime.  In Brazil, voters tend to rely more clearly on retrospective evaluations of 
politicians instead of in prospective evaluations. 
In addition, contingent events occurring prior to elections appear to be very influential in 
a candidate’s victory prospects.  The case of the Real Stabilization Plan prior to the 1994 
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 elections that directly contributed to the victory of the Minister of Finance, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (Rua, 1995; Meneghello, 1994), is a paradigmatic example.  This is evidence that 
campaign events and the specific personal characteristics of candidates play a major role in 
influencing vote choice.  When partisan attachments and ideological preferences are feeble, more 
circumstantial, contingent, factors gain salience in voters’ electoral choices. 
The massive influence of Rede Globo, the main television station in the country, in 
influencing the results of presidential elections is customarily singled out as decisive in 
presidential elections (Lima, 1993; Staubhaar, Olsen and Nunes, 1993; Miguel, 1999). 
Despite the apparent consensus about the limitations of ideological predispositions in 
influencing vote choice, such factors cannot be totally disregarded.  In the mid to late 1990’s the 
Brazilian party system has become more stable and voters are more clearly identifying with 
parties.  Carlos Ranulfo, using aggregated electoral data, comes to the conclusion that a process 
of crystallization of party preferences is on its way (Forthcoming).  Andrew Baker, focusing at 
the individual level, argues that presidential popularity during the second term of the Cardoso 
administration clearly fluctuates by individual according to more stable preferences (2001), 
Glaucio Soares (2000) in his analysis of the 1998 elections for governor of the Federal District, 
point out that policy preferences and ideology were central determinants of vote choice. 
Andre Singer (1999) has probably made the most forceful case that voters are able to 
position themselves in an ideological continuum and that such placements are important 
determinants of vote choice.  Singer also argues that ideological positioning is closely related to 
partisanship.  Voters who lean more towards the left also tend to identify with left wing parties.  
Finally, self-placement in the left-right ideological continuum correlates, as expected, with 
certain core values. 
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 However, Singer has been criticized, especially for methodological reasons.  Almeida 
(2000) has argued that voters hold heterogeneous, sometimes contradictory views about the 
meaning of left and right ideological position.  Even though voters may place themselves in such 
a continuum and this placement correlates with vote choice, voters don’t really know what the 
left-right continuum means.  Carreirao (2002) has explored this discussion in more detail by 
arguing that only highly educated voters can assign meaning to the distinct ideological positions.  
Furthermore, less educated voters rely less on ideological positions and more on retrospective 
evaluations of candidates as well as on views about the personal reputation of candidates that 
provide information about their past performance, such as honesty, administrative experience 
and efficiency.  Hence, the impact of ideology in vote choice, just like partisanship, is open to 
empirical verification. 
Finally, Balbachevsky (1992), in her discussion of the role of political activists as opinion 
leaders, calls attention to yet another factor that may influence vote choice in Brazil: the role of 
activists.  She finds a strong correlation between party identification and participation in politics.  
Hence, activists, who are also important sources of political information, disseminate messages 
that instruct voters about parties’ policy preferences and ideological positions.  Balbachevsky 
argues that party affiliation is closely related to higher levels of interest in politics and to 
discussing politics. This relation is even stronger amongst less educated voters (Balbachevsky, 
1992; 148). That is, voters that have some party preference are more participant, prone to talking 
about politics and influencing others. According to Balbachevsky, this is how the electoral bases 
of parties are constituted. Since the most prone to talk about politics and convince others are 
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 those that have some kind of party preference, the information they will help disseminate is 
biased towards the parties they prefer.26
Given the growing party identification with the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil, as Singer 
points out, and the potential congruency between ideological and class cleavages with 
identification with the PT, one can expect that party identification should provide cues about 
politics.  Contact with party activists, as Balbachevsky points out, is especially important.  In a 
similar fashion, those who can self-place in a left-right ideological continuum should also hold 
more information about politics and should know more about candidates.  Nonetheless, in an 
environment were parties and ideology are not the main sources of information about candidates, 
the media and personal forms of information diffusion are a central instrument for instructing 
voters about politics. 
3.3.2. Civil Society Organizations 
 
The role of opinion leaders, discussed by Lazersfeld et. al (1944) in the US and applied 
by Balbachevsky in Brazil, provides an interesting linking point with the discussion about the 
electoral impact of voluntary associations.  It might as well be that the leaders of these voluntary 
organizations function as opinion leaders, and that they catalyze party and ideological 
preferences among the electorate.  In fact, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) as well as Beck et al. 
(2002) do point to the role of organizational contexts in affecting vote choice. 
The investigation about the electoral impact of civil society organizations borrows from 
studies of how civic associations enhance the political activism of citizens. Verba, Schlozman 
                                                 
26 Ames’ (1998) finding that local level party organizations were important actors in assuring Fernando Collor’s 
victory in the 1989 presidential elections corroborates Balbachevesky’s conclusions. In what he called a reverse 
coattails effect, the support of local party structures and leaders was fundamental for the victory of Collor. 
Therefore, party structures at the local level do influence election outcomes, even if party identification among 
voters is weak. 
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 and Brady (1995) focus on how involvement in certain kinds of associations, such as church 
groups and neighborhood associations, influences individuals’ propensity to participate in 
politics. They come to the conclusion that engagement in civil society organizations increase 
individuals’ likelihood of contributing money and time to political campaigns and to specific 
issue-oriented organizations. Baumgartner and Walker, on the same vein, argue that when group 
members acknowledge the political interests of the organizations they engage in, they are more 
likely to vote and to engage in political action (1988, 926). 
In the case of Brazil, two studies about the electoral role of civic associations must be 
discussed. Gay (1994), studying two neighborhood associations in slums (favelas) of Rio de 
Janeiro, and Fontes (1996), analyzing two cases in Recife, identify distinct patterns of interaction 
between leaders of neighborhood associations, politicians and voters. 
According to Gay, the two neighborhoods he studied were organized in radically distinct 
fashions.  One presented a pattern of relationship based on clientelistic relationships with 
politicians; where votes were exchanged for concrete, pork-barrel goods for the slum (favela).  
The basis of the connection was the personalistic attachment of local neighborhood leaders to 
specific politicians. On the other hand, the other neighborhood association studied had a more 
institutionalized relationship with the government and politicians.  The leaders of this second 
association refused to support a single candidate and promoted debates and visits of several 
distinct candidates to the favela.  The neighborhood leaders in this last case were not brokers, 
they were voters’ informants. 
Fontes constructs a similar argument, however using aggregate-level data about the 
number of participants in organizations, their internal structure and the competition with other 
local level associations. Like Gay, he also points out to two types of activities carried out by 
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 neighborhood associations; one oriented towards channeling demands to the government 
regarding improvements that benefit the entire neighborhood (participacao reinvindicatoria) and 
another of assisting individual neighborhood dwellers in obtaining private benefits, such as 
construction material to remodel their homes (participacao assistencialista) (Fontes 1996, 45).  In 
both cases, neighborhood leaders adopt distinct patterns of interaction with elected office-holders 
and with the neighborhood dwellers (voters). There are clear links between participacao 
assistencialista and traditional clientelistic networks based on the exchange of goods for political 
support. Participacao reinvindicatoria, on the other hand, has a pedagogical impact on voters, 
because it indicates the formal mechanisms of pursuing local level improvements (Fontes 1996, 
46). 
Furthermore, Fontes argues that participation in associations is very limited, depending 
mostly on the action of a few community leaders that are responsible for contacting politicians 
(1996, 52).  These leaders become increasingly professionalized, in the sense that they are the 
ones with the closest contacts with politicians and more knowledgeable about the best ways of 
obtaining resources from the government. Politicians see these leaders, because of their local 
influence, as important actors during elections. Hence, there is a bond between local, 
neighborhood association leaders and politicians (Fontes 1996, 56). In neighborhoods where 
there is more competition with other local leaders, then the clientelistic relationship between 
local leaders and political machines becomes less probable. Competition among different leaders 
and politicians inside neighborhoods is fundamental for the definition of the style the association 
will adopt. 
Both of these studies are important because they point out to the role of neighborhood 
associations in creating the opportunities for the dissemination of political information through 
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 society. However, the information transmitted is contingent upon the relationship between 
politicians and local level leaders. Party affiliation and ideology is one of the filters through 
which the linkages between these actors are established.  Another is through the exchange of 
benefits, in a more clientelistic fashion. Neighborhood associations can function both as 
innovative means of increasing knowledge about the functioning of the government and the 
performance of politicians and parties as well as to enhance further the continuation of 
clientelistic relations based on the exchange of pork barrel policies and casework for votes.  In 
this sense, the impact of neighborhood associations in affecting learning processes and voters’ 
information levels is also open to empirical investigation. 
Hence, a model of information diffusion in Brazil must take into account the full set of 
cue sources voters have access to.  These include not just the traditionally analyzed ones, such as 
partisanship and ideology, but also media, personal networks, contact with activists and 
participation in organizations. 
3.4. Variables and Hypotheses27 
 
My model includes variables that tap the three dimensions pointed out by Luskin as 
essential components of informational gains: ability – motivation – opportunity.  I start by stating 
the role of opportunity structures in affecting vote choice, then move to factors related to 
personal predispositions, first by focusing on motivation, then on ability.  The goal of the model 
is to identify both those with higher levels of information about politics and the factors that 
increase voters’ levels of information. 
                                                 
27 See Table 10 on the appendix for the operationalization of all variables included in the analysis of chapters 4 and 
5. 
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 3.4.1. Structural Opportunities in Complex Electoral Environments: Party Structures 
and Ideology at the Municipal Level 
 
The environmental level of the analysis aims at capturing the impacts of electoral 
competition and strength of political parties in voters’ levels of information about candidates and 
incumbents.  The main idea is that the institutional characteristics of environments both 
condition the role of information diffusion mechanisms as well as directly affecting voters’ 
ability to learn. 
A first characteristic of the environment is the strength of party organizations.  This 
variable pertains to the highest level of analysis; inter-municipal differences.  The two cities 
included in this study were chosen exactly because they provide variation in how political parties 
structure political participation.  In Juiz de Fora, where parties are weak and personalistic leaders 
tend to focus on cultivating a personal vote, voters will learn about candidates in a different way 
than they do in Caxias do Sul, where parties are stronger sources of information.  According to 
Lupia and McCubbins (1998), where parties are weaker, voters will have more difficulty in 
learning about politics from political parties and will probably rely on other sources of 
information. 
In Caxias do Sul, where parties are stronger and the Workers’ Party (PT) has governed at 
the local level for two consecutive mandates, party cues should be more effective sources of 
information.  In Caxias do Sul, the ideological polarization between PT and a coalition of parties 
that are against it is also much stronger than in Juiz de Fora.  Hence, ideological cues, which are 
seen as being stronger sources of information for voters in multi-party systems, should also lead 
voters to learn more about politics.  Therefore, in Caxias voters who identify with parties and 
who have an ideological preference will probably have more information about candidates than 
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 those with the same characteristics in Juiz de Fora.  In statistical terms, the magnitude of the 
impact of party identification and ideology should be higher in Caxias do Sul than in Juiz de 
Fora. 
• Hypothesis 1:  The impact of partisanship and ideology on levels of information 
should be stronger were parties are better structured and ideological divides are 
more clear-cut.  As a result, these variables should have a stronger impact in 
Caxias do Sul. 
3.4.2.  Complex Electoral Environments:  Electoral Competition at the 
Neighborhood Level 
 
The number of candidates competing in a specific neighborhood is the best indicator of 
electoral competition between distinct political actors.  Competition and electoral accountability 
are intimately linked.  Without competition, accountability is at risk.  There is not enough 
incentive for voters to learn about candidates and parties and candidates do not feel pressured to 
disseminate information about them.  But this hypothesis has not been tested appropriately in the 
literature on voting behavior, mostly because there is not enough variation in levels of 
competition in the United States, where most studies have been carried out. 
The situation is different in Brazil.  Ames (1995) has shown that candidates for Federal 
Deputy have distinct patterns of vote distribution inside Brazil’s at-large districts.  This creates a 
situation where the number of candidates competing by locality varies.  The same inter-
municipal pattern of vote distribution is replicated inside municipalities.  Candidates tend to fare 
better in some neighborhoods than in others, indicating that their campaigning is more successful 
in some places than others.  This also means that the number of candidates campaigning in 
different neighborhoods varies. 
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 This form of measuring competition allows for more flexibility in formulating hypotheses 
about the impact of competition in affecting voters’ levels of information.  The traditional 
hypothesis is: 
• Hypothesis 2: Electoral competition linearly and positively affects voters’ levels 
of information and learning processes. 
The essence of this hypothesis is the idea that more competition is always better for 
democracy and that voters always profit from increases in competition. However, it is possible to 
imagine other impacts of electoral competition on voters’ ability to learn about candidates and 
incumbents, as Gerber and Lupia (1993) and Lau and Redlawski (2001) point out in their studies.  
In environments where too many candidates are competing for office, it could be that voters face 
a situation of information overload.  This could dramatically increase the cognitive burden of 
learning about candidates and could end up reducing voters overall levels of information and 
motivation to learn.  Previous research has already shown that voters choose to learn, that 
obtaining information is an active process, and that the incentives to obtain information about 
politics are reduced (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  Environments where the electoral complexity 
is too high may exacerbate this situation and further reduce voters’ involvement with the 
campaign process.  Therefore, it is possible to test a hypothesis of a negative impact of electoral 
competition on voters’ levels of information. 
• Alternative Hypothesis 2:  Number of Candidates has a negative impact in voters’ 
levels of information.  
A Sub-Hypothesis is that the impact of number of candidates on information levels is not 
constant.  In other words, the relation is non-linear.  This means that when the number of 
candidates competing in a neighborhood reaches a certain threshold, increments in number of 
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 candidates no longer make much difference.  This hypotheses has been raised by Cox (1996), 
using aggregate level data.  To test for it, a squared term for the number of candidates is added to 
the model. 
A question that necessarily comes to mind is what makes a neighborhood more or less 
competitive.  This is a key issue to understand the independent impact competition at the 
neighborhood level has on voters’ ability to learn.  First, it must be said that competition at the 
neighborhood level is defined based on candidates’ electoral strategies and resources.  
Candidates will try to maximize their electoral chances by competing on places were they think 
they will receive votes.  This is in the essence of Barry Ames’ discussion on patterns of vote 
distribution (1995).  Interviews with some politicians in Juiz de Fora lead me to believe that 
candidates get this information mostly from their campaign activists and sometimes from public 
opinion polls, even though such polls are very rare in elections for the Chamber of Deputies.  
The point is that candidates have very poor information about who much votes they think they 
will get in a specific neighborhood. 
A second factor influencing politicians’ campaign strategy is the amount of resources, i.e. 
money, they have.  Candidates that are better funded tend to spread out their campaign to all 
neighborhoods in town.  The less fortunate ones stick to specific neighborhoods.  This pattern of 
campaign investment generates a situation were the number of candidates competing in a 
neighborhood varies. 
It must be clear, though, that even though these patterns are influenced by candidates’ 
expectations about voters’ electoral preferences, such expectations are not precise. In fact, in the 
second wave of interviews, only 21% of the voters in both cities already new in whom they 
would vote.  In short, there is a strong random component in the distribution of the number of 
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 candidates competing in neighborhoods.  Candidates who have the resources to campaign 
throughout the entire city do so. Others maximize their chances by concentrating their efforts in 
localities where they think they will do better. 
3.4.3.  Neighborhood Contexts:  Talking about Politics 
 
A final aggregate level indicator refers to the characteristics of the context in which 
voters are embedded.  Again, context is a product of the social interaction between citizens.  It is 
related to patterns of sociability in a community that, even though born out from individual 
action, also has a collective nature.  Some contexts are more prone to political information than 
others.  Contexts where voters engage more often in conversations about politics will probably 
offer more opportunities for the diffusion of information about candidates.  In this study, context 
was measured as the mean neighborhood level of political conversation about politics.  This 
variable was created by first calculating an additive index of individual responses to survey items 
about patterns of discussing politics with friends, family and neighbors.  The neighborhood mean 
was then calculated and is the indicator of neighborhood context tested here. 
• Hypothesis 3:  In contexts where voters engage more often in political 
deliberation, individual levels of information will be higher. 
This hypothesis is a test of the effectiveness of political deliberation in increasing levels 
of information.  Voters embedded in a context were talking about politics is common should 
have more opportunities to obtain information about candidates. 
A final hypothesis refers to the conditioning effect of environments and contexts on the 
impact of motivation to learn in voters levels of information.  A central aspect of the discussion 
about how electoral competition affects voters’ motivation to learn is not just by directly 
providing more information, but also by conditioning voters’ interest in the election.  Hence, it is 
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 necessary to verify if environments and contexts condition the impact of individual level 
variables such as partisanship, ideology, media attentiveness, engagement in civic associations, 
etc. 
• Hypothesis 4: The impact of individual level traits related to motivation to learn is 
conditional upon values of competition and mean neighborhood conversation. 
The direction of the conditioning impact of environments is a matter of empirical 
verification.  One possibility is that as the number of candidates increase, voters become more 
motivated to learn.  Therefore, voters who are embedded in competitive environments should 
have more information than voters living in environments with little competition.  In more 
competitive environments, individual level differences should not matter much in discriminating 
between individuals.  In other words, individual level variables such as education, gender, 
political awareness should be weaker discriminators of levels of political information among 
voters when competition is more intense.  This is derived directly from Mayhew’s (1974) and 
Zaller’s (1992) discussions about electoral competition and information. 
It is also possible that as the environmental complexity increases, attachment to political 
parties, endorsements, and ideology become more effective mechanisms of summarizing 
information about candidates.  In this case, as the number of candidates increase, the complexity 
of the electoral system also increases and it becomes harder for voters to learn.  In such 
environments, voters will be more tempted to rely on summary information about candidates 
offered by political parties or other sources of heuristics.  The practical consequence is that 
individual level variables like having a party identification or an ideological position will more 
strongly affect voters’ ability to learn. 
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 The remaining hypotheses tested are all measured at the individual level.  A first set of 
individual level indicators refers to personal predispositions that may affect the motivation to 
gain information. 
3.4.4.  Individual Predispositions: Motivation to Learn 
 
As Zaller has pointed out, personal predispositions serve as filters for incoming 
information and condition learning processes (1992).  For example, more politically aware voters 
probably have more access to information, but are less prone to be influenced by new incoming 
information.  Hence, some personal predispositions increase voters’ ability to obtain more 
information and to incorporate it more appropriately.  
Voters’ motivations to learn are clearly related to attentiveness to politics.  Party 
identification and ideological predispositions are indicators of how familiar voters are with 
politics.  These variables are measured as dummies; either the voter has a party identification or 
not and is able or not to self-place in a left-right ideological continuum.  Both increase voters’ 
access to information as well as affect voters’ evaluation of new information.  Voters’ that are 
initially knowledgeable about politics are harder to persuade if they receive new facts.  They tend 
to have a biased view of politics and these biases influence in the acquisition of new information 
(Zaller 1992).  
• Hypotheses 5:  Voters who identify with a party and have a declared ideological 
preference will have higher levels of information.  However, changes in 
information levels over time will not be as dramatic for these voters because they 
already start out with a high amount of information and their previous knowledge 
of politics further limits the impact of new information.  Hence, as a campaign 
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 proceeds, voters who identify with parties and hold ideological positions will not 
necessarily gain more information than other voters. 
3.4.5.  Exposure to Information Diffusion Mechanisms: Interest in Obtaining 
Information 
 
Another set of hypotheses measured at the individual level refers to the role of 
mechanisms of information diffusion in affecting voters’ levels of information about candidates.  
Exposure is here seen as an indicator of interest in politics and is also an indicator of voters’ 
motivation to learn.  Usually, motivation is measured as interest in politics based on voters 
declared interest (Luskin 1990).  Given that declared interest is a subjective evaluation of an 
attitude, it may not translate into actual concrete behavior.  Hence, it is better to measure interest 
through objective measures of behavior, such as media exposition, conversing about politics and 
participation in forms of collective action. 
The role of the media and personal networks is part of a central discussion in the voting 
behavior literature about personal and impersonal mechanisms of information diffusion (Mutz 
1996).  Personal mechanisms were first discussed in Berelson et al.’s (1954) pioneer study in 
Erie County, Ohio. The now famous two-step flow of information is a theoretical construct of 
how information is transmitted in society.  Information about politics is obtained by opinion 
leaders from the media and then transferred to voters in what became known as the two-step flow 
of information.  Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995), clearly influenced by the Columbia School, 
focused on how patterns of conversation between voters inside specific contexts affect the 
distribution of information and ultimately, vote choice. 
Impersonal mechanisms are those in which there is no intermediation of the information 
by other voters.  Information is obtained directly from the source (Mutz 1996).  The media plays 
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 an important role in this process by transmitting the information directly to the voter.  It is 
through the media that candidates either speak directly to voters, referred to as soundbites, or 
their actions are brought to the attention of voters.  The media may play a role of agenda-setter, 
defining the themes being discussed, and may frame stories in specific ways, focusing on 
specific facts or aspects of an event.  Finally, these things lead to alteration in voters’ perceptions 
of current issues.  Priming, which refers to how voters’ perceptions and values are stimulated by 
the message, clearly affects vote choice (Iyengar and Kiewit 1987).  Hence, the media activates 
voters’ values and opinions and can define political facts in specific ways, giving it twists that 
might not be the most straightforward and obvious ones.  Even if the media plays a minimal role 
in changing voters’ opinions about candidates, it is a central source of new information that 
might increase voters’ levels of information about candidates.   Impersonal mechanisms of 
information diffusion have gained a central role in current campaigns and, consequently, in 
studies of voting behavior. 
In the case of the 2002 Brazilian elections, I measured personal and impersonal 
mechanisms of information diffusion through voters’ declared exposure to alternative sources of 
information.  Measures of exposure to impersonal means of information diffusion include 
frequency of watching television, reading newspapers and watching political ads.  All of these 
factors should have a positive impact in learning about politics.  However, they should be less 
efficient than personal mechanisms of information diffusion given the small media coverage 
races for Federal Deputy receive. 
Measures of personal mechanisms of information diffusion include talking about politics 
with friends, family and neighbors, and exposure to persuasion attempts by other voters and 
activists.  Exposure to attempts of persuasion is a crucial element in the equation that explains 
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 increases in levels of information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  Persuasion is based on the 
dissemination of new information that may change a voter’s perception about the campaign and 
ultimate vote choice.  Hence, persuasion also has a pedagogical role during campaigns. Exposure 
to personal means of information diffusion should increase voters’ levels of information about 
politics and should have a stronger impact than the media. 
• Hypothesis 6:  Exposure to personal and impersonal mechanisms of information 
diffusion increases voters’ levels of information about candidates.  However, as 
the campaign gains momentum and information becomes more readily available 
for all, less attentive voters also gain information. 
A sub-hypothesis spurs from the debate of information diffusion mechanisms that is very 
particular to the Brazilian case.  In Brazil, voters are exposed to the Free Electoral Airtime 
(Horario Eleitoral Gratuito – HEG), time allocated to all candidates for all offices in all radio and 
television stations during the 45 days leading to the first round of the elections.  Any other form 
of televised political ad by a candidate is prohibited.   This assures that candidates have at least 
some access to television advertising during the campaign. It aims at leveling the playing field by 
avoiding the possibility that better funded candidates have more access.  The goal is to curb the 
impact of money. 
In the HEG, time is allotted according to the size of the party in Congress and to the 
different races.  Programs run for 30 minutes in prime time and 30 minutes at noon.  Of these, 20 
minutes are reserved for the majority races – President, Governor and Senator – and 10 minutes 
for proportional representation elections – Federal and State Deputies.  Ads for presidential and 
gubernatorial/senate candidates alternate days.  Thus, presidential candidates divide 20 minutes 
of HEG on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Gubernatorial and senate candidates divide their 20 
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 minutes on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday.  Candidates for State have their 10 minutes during 
the state level programs.  Ads from candidates for Federal Deputy have 10 minutes in the same 
day presidential ads are in the air. 
Given the huge number of candidates for State and Federal Deputy, each candidate has 
very little television time. Each candidate probably gets no more than a few minutes.  On the 
other hand, the number of candidates for president, governor and senate is smaller, so these 
candidates have more time and their proposals are actually discussed in some detail. 
• Sub-Hipothesis 6:  The HEG, despite its limited capacity for instructing voters 
with detailed information regarding the candidates for Federal Deputy, will help 
instruct voters about who are the candidates competing. Hence, it will have a 
positive impact in informational gain during the campaign. 
3.4.6.   Engagement in Civil Society Organizations: Interest in Public Issues 
 
Civil society organizations are rarely studied as mechanisms of information diffusion per 
se, despite the fact that several distinct authors have pointed to the central role played by such 
organizations in fostering accountability and in mediating citizens’ demands (Seligson 1999, 
Booth and Richards 1998, Santos 1998, Santos 1993, Putnam 1993).  A pressing question, then, 
is how do civil society organizations foster accountability?  One possibility, customarily stressed 
by the literature, is that civil society organizations pressure politicians.  Such power comes from 
the fact that organizations, with their endorsements and sometimes, donations, affect the 
electoral success of politicians. The focus then is on the relationship between organized interests 
in civil society and elected representatives (Gay 1998).  However, for organizations of civil 
society to offer credible threats to politicians, they must have deep community roots.  That is, 
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 they must be able to affect voters’ views about politics.  In this case, civil society organizations 
must transmit information to their members about politicians and candidates. 
Engagement in civil society organizations creates yet another instance for citizens to 
obtain information about politics.  Participation in civil society organizations offers citizens the 
chance of engaging in conversations about politics and to exchange information with other 
citizens.  In addition, it also offers the opportunity for opinion leaders, who usually are active 
members of such organizations, to transmit their views and information to voters.  Finally, 
engagement in civil society organizations is yet another indicator of voters’ motivation to learn 
about politics and public issues.  Voters who participate in such organizations are usually more 
interested in politics and public issues.  I measured participation in civil society organizations as 
an additive index of involvement in church groups, neighborhood associations, sports groups and 
labor unions. 
• Hypothesis 7:  Participation in civil society organizations should increase voters’ 
levels of information about candidates and incumbents. 
3.4.7.  Ability to Learn: SES and Demographics 
 
Finally, it is important to control for the impact of personal demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of respondents.  Such variables are related to voters’ ability to learn.  
Voters with higher levels of education, with higher income and greater awareness about politics, 
i.e., voters who know more general facts about politics, should be able to understand campaigns 
better and be able to incorporate more information.  The set of usual suspects was included in the 
model to avoid spurious findings and to specify the model correctly.  The variables included are: 
education (15 point scale), income (dummy differentiating between high and low wages), age 
and age squared to control for a non-monotonic impact of age (voters learn more up until a 
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 certain age, then learning decreases), gender, race, marital status (married or not) and 
employment status (employed or not).  All of these variables are related to voters’ ability to 
obtain information.  Race and gender are included to seek biases in the distribution of 
information based on types of inequalities Brazilians face.28
It is also important to control for specific research design characteristics that may 
introduce biases in the analysis.  Even though panel studies are extremely useful to capture 
individual level changes, they generate the possibility of panel conditioning bias due to the 
repeated interviews with the same respondent and selection bias due to respondents’ dropping 
out of the research (Bartels 1999).  Measures of information are especially prone to non-response 
bias caused by attrition, where voters’ who respond a questionnaire are distinct from those who 
drop out (Brehm 1993).   In order to control for panel conditioning and selection bias, fresh 
cross-sections were interviewed in each wave and included in the final sample.  Dummy 
variables for these cross-sections of respondents control for potential differences between those 
who participated in the study since the first wave and those who entered the sample only in 
posterior waves. 
                                                 
28 Brazil faces a serious problem of racial discrimination and there are strong indications of gender and class 
discrimination as well (Andrews 1996, Lovell 2000). It is important to verify if such forms of discrimination affect 
voters’ political information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). 
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 4. Chapter 4: Explaining Variation in Political Information across Time and Space 
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 4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter finally addresses the central puzzle of the dissertation: how do voters learn 
about candidates during electoral campaigns in environments with varying degrees of 
complexity. As was argued in previous chapters, the question touches upon central normative 
aspects of democratic governance and core debates about voting behavior.  At its heart is the 
relationship between electoral competition and accountability. Given the multi-level nature of the 
research design, I am able to test more precise hypotheses about the impact of electoral 
competition, operationalized as the number of candidates competing in a specific locality, on 
voters’ levels of information.  Furthermore, other characteristics of the contexts in which voters 
are embedded can also be operationalized.  This offers the possibility of more reliably and 
precisely characterizing the hierarchical nature of learning processes: Citizens with specific 
individual characteristics and predispositions are embedded in contexts and environments with 
distinct traits, which provide a set of incentives, opportunities and constraints to learning. 
Information levels are measured in two ways.  First, I analyze voters’ ability to name 
candidates that are competing in the 2002 elections.  This is a very simple measure of the bare 
essential information voters must have in order to be able to vote in Brazil. 
In Brazilian elections, for sheer lack of space, names of candidates are not written in the 
ballot.29  Hence, voters must go to the voting booth knowing the name of the candidate they want 
to vote for and the candidate’s identification number.  It is the identification number of the 
candidate that the voter will have to type into the electronic ballot.30  Simply put, if the voters do 
                                                 
29 Remember, around 500 candidates competed in 2002 in Minas Gerais. 
30 Figure 3 in the appendix contains a picture of the electronic ballot. 
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 not know the names of candidates and their respective identification number, they will not be 
able to vote. 
It must be clear though, that there is some information available for voters in the polling 
place.  When voters enter the polling place, they find lists of all candidates running for office 
organized by party and then by the identification number of the candidate.  These lists are never 
ending because they include the names and identification number of all candidates running for all 
offices.  If a voter does not know the name or identification number of his candidate, it becomes 
very difficult to navigate in the maze of names and numbers presented in the voting place.  Given 
that there are so many candidates, voters are instructed during the Free Electoral Airtime by 
candidates as well as by the Superior Electoral Court to make a note of their candidates’ 
identification number and take it to the voting booth in order to vote correctly. 
When using the electronic ballot, voters have to type in the identification number of their 
candidates. Once they have done that, a picture and the name of the candidate, along with the 
candidate’s party and identification number appears on the screen.   The voter then confirms her 
vote. 
The voting process itself is not an easy task to carry out because in addition to the huge 
number of candidates competing for Federal Deputy, elections in Brazil are concurrent.  That is, 
in the 2002 elections, voters voted for 5 different offices: state deputy, governor, federal deputy, 
senator and president.  The voter first chooses candidates for legislative office.  Hence, voters 
first vote for state and federal deputy, then for the senate, governor, and finally for President.31  
In the electronic ballot, voters have the choice of not voting for a candidate. They do so by 
pressing the “Null Vote” or “Blank Vote” buttons.  Once a vote has been cast for a specific 
                                                 
31 In the 2002 elections two thirds of the senate seats where in dispute.  Three senators are elected by district in 
Brazil, so voters had to vote for two senate seats. 
92 
 office, the options for the next office pop up.  However, it must be clear that the names of 
candidates, their identification numbers and parties are not listed in the ballot.  Voters must know 
the names and corresponding identification number of candidates as they enter the booth. 
In addition, any kind of political propaganda is prohibited in voting areas in the day of 
the election.  Boca de Urna or “election day campaigns” is strictly prohibited.  For instance, 
voters must not go to the polling area wearing t-shirts of their candidates.  Any distribution of 
campaign materials in voting areas is prohibited.  Political parties are allowed to send their 
members to oversee the functioning of the voting process.  Hence, one can see party members 
walking around voting areas checking if there are any indications of fraud or of illegal political 
advertising.  But, no party members are allowed to persuade voters. 
Hence, voters have limited access to information about candidates in the polling place. 
Theoretically, the voter must know at least the name of the candidate and the identification 
number when they come to the voting booth.  Finding out about names and numbers in the 
voting place is possible, given that the lists are available, but such lists are not easy to 
understand.32  The opportunities for learning about candidates in the polling area are reduced. 
Given this setting, voters must have minimal information about candidates in order to 
vote and to hold representatives accountable.  This first indicator of information, a simple count 
of the number of candidates a voter can name, was measured in all three waves, so it allows for 
an analysis of the factors related to changes in individual levels of information during the 
campaign.  In each of the 3 waves, respondents were asked to name up to three candidates for 
                                                 
32 In the 2002 elections I was drafted to work in a polling place. This gave me the chance of observing all of the 
voting process in the first and second rounds of the election.  Overall, voters already come to the voting place 
knowing in whom they will vote.  Most carry their notes with the names and identification number of their 
candidates written on them. I saw very few voters perusing the lists of candidates.  In a very unsystematic way, I 
timed how long some voters took to cast their votes for all offices.  The voters who took the longest stayed in the 
voting booth for about 15 minutes, but most would take no more than 3 minutes.  
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 Federal Deputy in the 2002 elections.33  These responses were added in each wave, creating a 
count of information about candidates’ names in the 2002 elections.  This is the most basic piece 
of information voters must have in order to make an electoral decision.  If voters cannot name a 
single candidate, they certainly will have a hard time choosing a candidate and also will have 
difficulty evaluating any candidate. 
In the combined sample for both cities, in the first wave of interviews, early in the 
campaign, 47% of the respondents could not state a single name. This amount drops to 33% in 
the second wave of interviews and 20% in the last wave, immediately after the election.  These 
proportions are very similar in each city. In the first wave 50% can’t say the name or 
identification number of a candidate in Juiz de Fora and 44% in Caxias do Sul. As the campaign 
proceeds these values fall to 31% in Juiz de Fora and 35% in Caxias and, finally, 20% in Juiz de 
Fora and 21% in Caxias.  Hence, voters in both cities are quite similar in this regard.  These 
simple aggregate statistics also indicate very roughly that there is a learning process going on 
during the electoral campaign.  As the election approaches, fewer voters do not know the names 
of candidates. 
The second indicator of information level moves beyond the first, essential information 
requirement and adds a fuller set of political facts voters must know in order to judge 
representatives and evaluate candidates.  This is an index composed of items on knowledge 
about current candidates as well as incumbents measured in the final wave of the panel.  It aims 
at uncovering the full blown impact of the campaign in voters’ information about various distinct 
facets of candidates.  This variable is a more nuanced measure of voters’ levels of information.  
                                                 
33 Respondents could state either the name or the identification number of candidates; both responses were accepted 
as correct.  I checked all names and numbers mentioned by respondents in official lists of candidates.  Incorrect 
responses were equated with “do not know” responses and “do not remember” responses. 
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 It is a composite index that combines information about incumbents, about the previous elections 
and about candidates in the 2002 election.  I refer to this variable as the Information Index. 
The Information Index speaks directly to the central claim of this study, which is that 
voters should have at least minimal information both about incumbents as well as challengers in 
order to hold representatives accountable.  Hence, an evaluation about how much voters know 
about legislative elections must incorporate information about the current campaign and the past 
election.  In order for voters to evaluate their representatives, the current election should activate 
memories of how voters voted in the previous election and about the performance of incumbents.  
Furthermore, voters must also have some information about the current election, like knowing 
the names of a few candidates and having a bit more of information about the candidate they end 
up voting for.  Comparison between challengers and incumbents can only occur if voters have 
minimal information about both of these actors.  Only an encompassing index can capture these 
nuances. 
The index is composed by responses to the following questions: 
1) Who did you vote for in the 1998 election for the Chamber of Deputies? 
2) Did the candidate you vote for Federal Deputy in 1998 win office? 
3) If yes, where you satisfied with his/her performance in office? 
4) Do you know the name of a candidate for Federal Deputy that competed in the 
elections of October 6, 2002? 
5) Name 3 candidates. (Each counted as a separate correct answer.) 
6) For those who could name a candidate, whom did you vote for in the elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies in October 6th? 
7) Did the candidate you vote for get elected? 
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 8) What is the political party of the candidate you voted for? 
9) The candidate you voted for was running for reelection or was he/she running for the 
first time?34
The goal of the index is to uncover the quantity of domain specific information voters 
have on legislative elections.  It does not require voters to know specific facts about the voting 
record of incumbents inside the Chamber of Deputies or the amount of federal grants a Federal 
Deputy transferred to the municipality or even if the candidate has a reputation of being honest, 
it simple asks for the most basic information necessary to hold a representative accountable.  
Given the characteristics of the Brazilian system, the Information Index includes factors that are 
absolutely necessary for voters to know in order to make a choice between distinct alternatives.  
If voters don’t have this basic information, they will hardly have any other. 
The first three items in the Information Index refer to voting in the previous election.  If 
voters are not able to recall in whom they voted for in the past election, then, they simply have 
no basis for evaluation.  The voters’ ability to evaluate an incumbent and to compare challengers 
and incumbents is drastically reduced when voters do not recall in whom they voted for in the 
previous election.  It is also central to hold an incumbent accountable knowledge about the 
electoral success of the candidate, if she was elected or not.  It is hard to visualize a situation in 
which a voter who does not recall in whom they voted and does not know if the candidate they 
voted for was elected or not being able to judge an incumbent. 
Notice that in item 3 we only asked the respondent about his final assessment of their 
representative.  In accordance with one of the main findings of the Heuristics School, voters keep 
                                                 
34 Cronbach’s Alpha of .84. Item 3 was originally coded as a 4-point scale ranging from very satisfied to very 
dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performance. It was recoded into respondents who could give a valid answer and 
those who did not know how to answer the item.  This item, then, differentiates between those who are able to 
employ some evaluative criteria and those who aren’t. 
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 a running tally of incumbent and candidate evaluations and not necessarily the detailed facts that 
lead them to such judgment.  The literature refers to this as on-line processing.  In Brazil, if 
voters are able to evaluate an incumbent, this is the final outcome of a process based on more 
detailed information about the representative.  In the essence of the evaluation is information.  
Again, the item was coded 1 for those who could offer an evaluation of the incumbent and 0 
otherwise, hence it simply indicates if the voter was able or not to pass judgment on an 
incumbent. 
Only about 25% of respondents on both cities are able to recall in whom they voted for in 
the previous election, know if this candidate was elected and are able to make a judgment about 
the incumbent they voted for.  In Juiz de Fora this number raises to about 30% and in Caxias it 
falls to around 22%.  This indicates that the campaign does not activate memories from the 
previous election in most voters. 
The following two items in the index focus on voters’ ability to identify candidates in the 
current election.  If voters do not know the names of candidates running in the current election, 
they do not know the options available.  Having a clear idea of the options available and being 
able to contrast them with vote in the previous election is central to holding incumbents 
accountable.35
Finally, items 6 through 9 refer to the voters’ actual choice in the 2002 election.  These 
items indicate how much voters know about the candidates they voted for.  A first obvious factor 
is if voters recall the name and number of the candidate they voted for.  A second central factor 
is if the voter knows if the candidate was elected or not.  These two are sine qua non conditions 
for voters to be able to hold elected representatives accountable in future elections.  If voters do 
                                                 
35 These items are the ones analyzed individually over time because they were asked in all three waves of interviews.  
I presented their descriptive information above. 
97 
 not have this information about the current elections, they simply will not be able to evaluate the 
performance of their candidate if she was elected. 
In Complex Electoral Environments it is naturally harder for voters to find out if the 
candidate they voted for was elected, given that more than one representative is elected by 
district.  Nonetheless, if voters do not recall in whom they voted for and do not know if their 
candidate won a seat, the chances voters will be able to hold representatives accountable 
diminishes.  52% of the entire sample is able to state the name or number of the candidate they 
voted for immediately after the election and 42% know if this candidate was elected.  The 
difference recalling the names of candidates in both cities is quite similar. In Juiz de Fora 54% of 
the voters remember in who they voted for right after the election, in Caxias 48% do so.  But 
there is a big distinction between the cities in information about the electoral success of the 
candidate.  In Caxias only 32% of the respondents know the candidate they voted for was 
elected:  In Juiz de Fora 52% do so. 
The last two items refer to more detailed information about candidates.  Even though, 
knowledge of the candidates’ party, item 8, is not a dramatically instructive piece of information 
in Brazilian politics, it at least indicates if voters are minimally aware of the more general 
political preferences of the candidate.  As was claimed in previous chapters, parties in Brazil are 
no longer as weak as they were in the early 1990’s.  Parties do signal some of their members’ 
ideological preferences.  Parties are becoming more and more identified with specific policy 
positions and ways of governing.  Even though parties in Brazil are not as strong signaling 
devices as they are in the US and Western Europe, knowing the candidates’ party indicates the 
voter has at least some idea of the candidate’s general stances while in office. 
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 Item 9 is also a piece of information that indicates if the voter is aware of the past of the 
candidate she voted for.  The aim of this item is to identify if the voter knows if the candidate she 
is voting for is an incumbent.  Accountability basically refers to holding incumbents responsible 
for their performance.  Therefore, knowing if a candidate is an incumbent or not is an important 
indicator of the voter’s information about the candidate she chose. 
In the combined sample, 30% of the respondents claimed they voted for an incumbent 
and 72% knew the party of the candidate they voted for.  There is no difference between the 
cities regarding the latter, but there is a quite dramatic one in relation to the former.  In Juiz de 
Fora 41% against 17% in Caxias stated they voted for an incumbent.  The reasons for this 
difference will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.  It suffices to say now that the main 
incumbent of Caxias did not run for reelection in 2002, instead supported a challenger.  Hence, 
most votes in Caxias were for a challenger endorsed by an incumbent Federal Deputy who was 
running for governor in 2002.  What is interesting is that voters were able to identify if their 
candidates were running for reelection and the parties of their candidates.  The campaign appears 
to minimally instruct voters about the current election. 
When the entire Information Index is considered, only 15% of all respondents are unable 
to correctly answer at least one of the questions and this percentage is identical in both cities.  
38% of all respondents answer correctly between 4 and 7 questions.  Only a minority are able to 
answer all of the items (4%) and only a small percentage provide only one or two correct 
answers (18%).  The distribution of correct responses then is normally distributed, with most 
respondents being able to answer at least half of the questions. 
The central goal of this chapter is to explain individual level variation in voters’ 
information about candidates and incumbent Federal Deputies.  The next section focuses on a 
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 brief theoretical discussion about learning processes as it applies to political information.  
Following it, I discuss the results of the analysis and offer some concluding remarks. 
 
4.2. A Brief Theory of Political Learning 
  
Learning, in the political science literature, has been described both as the process of 
acquisition of information or informational gain over time (Luskin et al. 2002) as well as by 
more formal models based on Bayes’ Theorem, which focuses on updating prior information 
(Bartels 1993, Alvarez 2001).  Both forms of understanding learning processes are 
complementary, providing helpful insights about how changes in voters’ levels of information 
take place. 
Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell (2002) argue that learning is better understood as 
informational gain over time.  That is, people learn when they acquire factual information.  
Learning is the result of acquiring new information and incorporating it into the set of 
information already stored in long-term memory.  It is an act of thought and of consideration of 
new events and facts.  Hence, learning involves first being exposed to new information and, 
second, the incorporation of this information into the stock of data voters has about the political 
system. 
However, measuring informational gain is not as obvious at it might seem in the first 
place.  The obvious approach is to measure information gain as the result of subtracting the 
amount of information a person has in a prior time period (Time 1) from the amount this same 
person has in a posterior time period (Time 2).  Learning is the change in a person’s 
informational level measured in subsequent time points. 
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 In spite of the obvious nature of this claim, Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell argue that 
measuring learning as an informational difference between two time periods causes a serious 
underestimation of the acquisition of new information (2002, 480).  Based on previous research 
on psychology, education and communication, the authors claim that people who learn the most 
are those who start out at already high levels of information: “the information-rich get 
information-richer” (Luskin et al. 2002, 480).  This is so because information-rich individuals 
have a better grounding to understand and incorporate new information.  The new information 
“makes more sense” for those who can frame it in a broader context and relate it to other 
information. To do that, individuals must already know something about politics.  So, those who 
gain the most information might appear as gaining the least because of their initial high levels of 
information. 
To deal with this problem, Luskin et al. (2002) suggest that only the posterior measure of 
informational level should be evaluated.  That is, the Time 2 information level should be seen as 
the most appropriate indicator of learning.  The absolute value of information at Time 2 gives a 
less biased view of how much information individuals have at the end of the information 
acquisition process.  Luskin et al. (2002) also incorporate in their discussion corrections for 
guessing, which are related to the precision of the information voters hold and acquire.  Voters 
may very easily guess or infer certain facts based on their prior stock of information about the 
political world.  To correct for guessing, Luskin and colleagues code incorrect responses in the 
same category as “don’t know” responses. 
The Information Index I analyze aims at capturing the full impact of the campaign in the 
levels of information voters have once the campaign is over.  Hence, it follows Luskin et al.’s 
view of how information gain should be measured.  
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 Another view about learning is espoused by authors who rely on Bayes Theorem to 
model learning processes.  These authors adopt a different strategy to evaluate citizens’ 
imprecision.  Alvarez offers a more fine-grained theoretical account of the role of the accuracy of 
information in learning models (1997, 42).  Alvarez relies on a Bayesian learning model to 
explain how new information is incorporated into the existing stock of information voters hold. 
The main idea is that voters update their prior information by incorporating new facts.  Hence, 
learning is the combination of new information with old information that results in the updating 
of political assessments.  According to Alvarez, “Bayes’ theorem states that the posterior 
distribution (of information) is proportional to the product of the prior distribution and the 
distribution of newly encountered information” (1997, 43). Hence, Alvarez includes in the 
calculus of learning the idea that prior knowledge is weighted by new information. 
Furthermore, by means of mathematical manipulations, he argues that the precision of the 
prior knowledge as well as of the new information are important in changing voters’ perceptions.  
When prior information is very imprecise, voters will be more prone to change, no matter the 
precision of the new information.  When prior information is more precise, then only very 
precise new information will lead to changes.  Hence, belief updating, or policy preference 
instability, occurs only when voters are exposed to new information, but it depends upon the 
precision of prior beliefs and of the new information. 
One of the dependent variables I analyze is measured over time. It was asked in the first 
wave of the election, in the very early moments of the campaign, and in all future waves.  
Responses in the first wave are a strong indicator of the prior knowledge voters bring into the 
campaign.  Responses in future waves indicate an updating of this prior information.  By relying 
on this measure, I can evaluate to what extant priors are updated, what factors influence prior, 
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 initial information and the updating of information.  Finally, I can also evaluate what variables 
affect the levels of information posterior to the election. 
A central concept in Alvarez’ theory is the accuracy of voters’ information.  One of his 
major concerns is with voters’ ambivalence towards issues.  Voters will change their opinion 
more easily if they are ambivalent towards an issue.  This means that new information will thrive 
in affecting changes when a voter is uncertain about his/her prior beliefs. 
Such concern is justifiable when it comes to preferences over specific policies or broader 
ideological questions, but less damning when it comes to simple factual measures of information.  
Knowing candidates’ names is the type of question for which there are correct and incorrect 
responses, not gradations of uncertainty, which is in the essence of Alvarez’ view of voters’ 
uncertainty regarding perceptions of candidates’ issue positions.  Factual information about 
candidates is distinct from opinions on issues or views about candidates’ issue positioning, which 
by nature give margin to doubts and to inaccuracies because candidate positioning quite often is 
unclear (Alvarez 2001).  The treatment I offer for accuracy or uncertainty is to equate incorrect 
responses about candidates’ names with a “don’t know” response.36  Both of these types of 
responses were combined and opposed to correct responses. 
Finally, the dependent variables analyzed here are domain specific, in that they refer to a 
very precise aspect of the political system, and not chronic, generalized measures of information 
(Alvarez and Brehm 2002, 36).  Recall that voters do not need to have full information about 
politics in order to make electoral decisions (Lupia 1993), but they must have at least minimal 
quantities of information in order to fully carry out their democratic responsibilities.  I also focus 
on a soft type of information, in that it does not involve detailed facts about specific policy 
                                                 
36 I compared each response to the question about candidates’ names with lists of the actual candidates who ran for 
Federal Deputy in both states.  A common mistake was to mention a name of a candidate for State Deputy instead of 
for Federal Deputy.   This was equated to an incorrect response. 
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 proposals or issues, focusing instead on the actors of the political system (Alvarez and Brehm 
2002, 40). 
Political information in this study simply refers to basic summary facts about candidates.  
In this way it measures the essential cues, heuristics voters must have in order to vote in 
Brazilian congressional elections.  The main questions I will address are, how do environments 
affect the availability of the minimal informational requirements for holding representatives 
accountable and what are the factors that lead to variation in information between individuals 
and within individuals over time. 
4.3. A Hierarchical Test of the Information Diffusion Model 
 
The analysis that follows is carried out quite distinctly from previous studies of political 
information gain.  I apply a growth curve model to test the correlates of changes in levels of 
information (Singer 1998).  This analysis directly models the passage of time, by including an 
indicator of the distinct moments in time voters were interviewed.  Growth models estimate the 
impact of distinct independent variables in incremental changes in an individual’s trait over time. 
In this study, the trait studied is voters’ information about Federal Deputies in Brazil.  The model 
is estimated by directly including in the equation a variable that captures the distinct moments in 
which respondents’ traits were measured (Time).  This variable is entered alongside other 
independent variables and interacts with them. 
Growth models permit three types of inferences: First, indicate the impact of each 
independent variable at the initial time point. This is captured by the coefficients of the “main 
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 effects” of each independent variable.37  Second, it indicates how the grand mean of the 
dependent variable changes over time, captured by the coefficient for the “main effect” of the 
Time variable.  Third, growth models offer information about how the impact of each 
independent variable on levels of information varies over each point in time.  This is captured by 
the coefficients of the interaction terms, which indicates how the coefficients for the “main 
effects” change over time and if the change is statistically significant. 
A clear advantage of modeling political learning as an individual growth curve is that 
unequal baseline effects are incorporated in the equation.  It does so without compromising the 
estimation of changes in information over time.  This is a great advance in comparison to the 
estimation approaches adopted by Luskin et al. (2002) and Alvarez (1997).  
In addition to modeling learning processes as growth curves, the model I test also takes 
into consideration the hierarchical nature of the data:  Voters embedded in specific contexts and 
distinct institutional environments.  In fact, studying learning processes incorporating distinct 
levels of analysis is also an advance in comparison to previous studies.  It allows for a more 
precise evaluation of how much each level of analysis contributes to variation in voters’ 
information about politics, how the impact of each individual level variable is conditioned by 
environments and contexts and how variables in each of the distinct levels directly impact 
learning processes.  Previous models were only able to evaluate the latter.  They could not 
incorporate the idea of causal heterogeneity, i.e., the variegated impact of the same individual 
level variable in distinct contexts. 
                                                 
37 It is important to code the first time measure as zero (0).  In equations that include interaction terms, “main 
effects” are interpreted as the effect of each component of the interaction term when the other component is held at 
zero.  In the case of growth curves, when the first value in the Time measure is coded as zero and Time is interacted 
with other independent variables, then the “main effects” of the independent variables on the dependent variable are 
the effects of such variables in the initial time point, i.e. the first wave of the panel. For a discussion of interaction 
terms see Jacard and Turrisi (2003).  Singer offers the most detailed discussion of growth curves applied to the 
social sciences (1998). 
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 The model proposed is also more precise because it does not assume that environmental 
level variables fully account for variation in the impact of individual level variables.  Estimation 
of hierarchical models allows for the inclusion of stochastic terms in each of the levels, hence 
avoiding strong assumptions about full determination of lower level variables by higher-level 
ones.  The inclusion of error components at the different levels of analysis also decreases the 
chances of committing a type I error, a false positive.  Error terms in regular linear regression 
ignore the nested nature of data that incorporate distinct levels of analysis.  Procedures that 
estimate random and fixed effects integrate all levels of analysis when estimating variance 
components (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, Singer 1998, Verbeke and Moenberghs 2000, 
Raudenbush and Bryk 2003). 
4.3.1.  The Contribution of Each Level of Analysis 
 
A first necessary step is to verify how much variance in the dependent variable is 
attributable to the distinct levels of analysis (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, Singer 1998).  The 
process is similar to an Anova test, but it more appropriately estimates the variance at different 
levels of analysis by factoring into the equation the sample size of the different levels and by 
parceling the impact of the distinct levels of analysis. 
Table 1 contains the percentage of variation (intraclass correlations) of each dependent 
variable attributable to the distinct levels of analysis.  It is obvious that most of the variation 
occurs within or between individuals and that the environment at the neighborhood level is 
responsible for minimal parts of variation.  This is not all that surprising given that the sample 
size at the neighborhood level is only 44, where as at the individual level it is of 6733.  What is 
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 actually surprising is that the environmental level actually explains as much variation in 
individual levels of information as it does given sample size.38
TABLE 1: INTRACLASS CORRELATIONS FOR KNOWLEGDE OF CANDIDATES 
NAMES AND INFORMATION INDEX: BOTH CITIES, 2002. 
Variables Within Individuals- 
Over Time 
Across 
Individuals 
Across 
Neighborhoods
Knows Candidates Names: 2002 .58 .37 .05 
Information Index - .93 .07 
N 14368 6733 44 
 
Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the neighborhood level has similar influence in both 
dependent variables in the two cities.  In spite of the two distinct historical trajectories of both 
cities, Caxias do Sul having stronger interest representation institutions such as neighborhood 
associations, this does not lead to differences in the role of the environment in influencing levels 
of information.  It must be said, though, that in Juiz de Fora, the role of the environment at the 
neighborhood level is a bit lower in relation to the information index.  This may signal that 
environments might be weaker explanatory devices there than in Caxias do Sul. 
TABLE 2: INTRACLASS CORRELATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE OF CANDIDATES 
NAMES AND INFORMATION INDEX: CAXIAS DO SUL, 2002. 
Variables Within Individuals – 
Over Time 
Between 
Individuals 
Neighborhood 
Level 
Knows Candidates Names: 2002 .61 .36 .02 
Information Index - .94 .06 
N 7094 3440 22 
 
 
TABLE 3: INTRACLASS CORRELATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE OF CANDIDATES 
NAMES AND INFORMATION INDEX: JUIZ DE FORA, 2002. 
Variables Within Individuals – 
Over Time 
Between 
Individuals 
Neighborhood 
Level 
Knows Candidates Names: 2002 .57 .40 .02 
Information Index - .97 .03 
N 7274 3293 22 
 
                                                 
38 The Information Index is only measured in the last wave of interviews, hence it has no variation over time. 
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 4.3.2.  The Multivariate Analysis – Testing the distinct hypotheses 
 
From the table above, it becomes clear that most of the variance in the two dependent 
variables occurs between individuals or within individuals over time.  We should expect, then, a 
weaker impact of neighborhood level factors in affecting learning processes.  These processes 
appear to be mostly affected by individuals’ predispositions.   
The next step is to evaluate what individual level characteristics as well as contextual and 
environmental ones affect learning.   For this, I test how each of the two dependent variables is 
affected by the model of information diffusion in complex electoral environments described in 
the previous chapter.  I used Raudenbush et. al’s Hierarchical Linear Model 5 (HLM 5) to 
estimate fixed and random effects.  HLM 5 allows for tests of causal heterogeneity by evaluating 
how the impact of each individual level variable varies at different values of the environmental 
and contextual variables.  It also relaxes causality assumptions by including stochastic terms in 
the equations that explain lower level variables.  Therefore, it more fully accounts for the random 
components of the equation. 
HLM 5 employs maximum likelihood estimation for both the fixed and random-effects in 
three-level models, such as the one presented in table 4.  For two-level models, the case of the 
estimated equation presented in table 5, HLM estimates the variance-covariance components by 
means of maximum likelihood and the fixed effects through generalized least squares; this 
procedure is known as “restricted maximum likelihood”.  By default, the program assumes that 
the errors of prediction are normally distributed.  Therefore, HLM uses a normal sampling model 
and an identity link function. 
This assumption is problematic for my purposes, because both of the dependent variables 
analyzed here are counts and therefore are skewed towards having zero values.  However, HLM 
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 5 allows for estimation of nonlinear models appropriate for skewed count data, following 
extensions of the generalized linear model.  For count data, HLM 5 uses a Poisson sampling 
model and a log link function.  Given the potential presence of overdispersion, I also estimated 
the dispersion parameter for level 1, α2 (Long 1997).  Finally, because I include in the analysis 
both the cross-section of replacements in waves 2 and 3 as well as the respondents initially 
interviewed but who dropped out in future waves, there is a problem of unequal exposure.  The 
model is also estimated accounting for each observation’s unequal exposure. 
Finally, because this study is based on comparing voters in two municipalities with 
distinct environmental characteristics, I partitioned the sample by city to verify if the impact of 
the individual level variables is different in the distinct cities.  This is part of test for causal 
heterogeneity. 
4.3.3.  Explaining Information Acquisition over Time 
 
The equation for the dependent variable measured over time has three levels of analysis.  
The first one is the impact of the passage of time on levels of information.  It refers to variation 
within individuals over time.  Hence, the temporal dimension is included in the analysis.  This is 
done by incorporating a variable representing each of the waves (Time), coded zero in the first 
wave to facilitate the interpretation of the two and three-way cross-level interaction terms. 
The second level of analysis includes the individual level variables related to the personal 
predisposition and ability of voters to learn.  The third level of analysis is composed by the 
environmental level characteristics that generate the opportunity structure for learning.39
                                                 
39 I did not impute any of the values in the dependent and independent variables.  Most independent variables are 
coded as dummy variables indicating the presence or absence of a specific characteristic.  Missing values were 
coded as zero in the dummy variables or equated with value 0 when the variable is a count.  The dependent variables 
are counts, so “do not know” responses were equated to not having information about candidates.  See the appendix 
for a description of all variables in the analysis.  I adopted identical strategy in chapter 5.  The only variables that 
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 The “main effect” of the individual and contextual variables indicates the impact of these 
variables when the time measure is zero, that is; it indicates the impact of these variables in the 
initial moment of the campaign.  This is approximately equivalent to the influence of the model 
on the prior levels of information.  The coefficients for the two-way interaction between each 
independent variable and the time variable indicate how the impact of each independent variable 
changes over time.  It is a measure of the growth curve of information, that is, of how the impact 
of each independent variable in informational levels changes as the campaign proceeds.  The 
two-way interaction terms between contextual variables and individual level variables indicates 
how the impact of individual characteristics on initial levels of information varies in 
environments with different characteristics.  Finally, the coefficients for the three-way 
interaction terms indicate how the change in impact of the individual level variables during the 
distinct moments of the campaign varies across distinct values of the environmental/contextual 
variables.40  In summary, the model below incorporates the idea of causal heterogeneity and 
permits the assessment of the dynamic nature of learning during electoral campaigns. 
The essence of learning, understood in a Bayesian form as updating of priors, (Alvarez 
1997) or as information gains (Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell 2002), is that there are increases in 
levels of information from an initial point in time to a subsequent one.  Only in a panel study can 
individual level changes be assessed.  The following discussion takes full advantage of this 
specific characteristic of the research design. First I will discuss how initial levels of information 
about candidates competing in 2002 are affected by the distinct variables.  I will focus both on 
the main effects of the environmental, contextual and individual level variables as well as in the 
modified impact of individual ability and motivation over environmental characteristics.  Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                             
have missing data, which were dropped from the analysis, were age and education.  The number of missing points in 
these variables is small, adding to about 100 cases randomly distributed throughout all neighborhoods. 
40 For the full equation, see figure 4 in the appendix. 
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 the discussion will shift to how changes over time in information levels are affected by 
individual and contextual level variables. 
TABLE 4: FIXED EFFECTS OF POISSON REGRESSION WITH UNEQUAL 
EXPOSURE FOR INFORMATION ABOUT CANDIDATES NAMES: BRAZIL, 2002. 
Variables Full Sample Juiz de Fora Caxias do Sul 
INTERCEPT -2.45*** -2.13*** -2.85*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION -0.23* -0.22 -1.53** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2 0.02* 0.01 0.17** 
MEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL 
CONVERSATION(MNPC) 
1.52*** 0.85*** 0.58 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*PARTY ID 0.15 0.73 -0.07 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*PARTY ID -0.01 -0.05 0.03 
MNPC*PARTY ID -0.35 -0.19 0.14 
IDEOLOGY 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.33** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*IDEOLOGY -0.24 -0.90 1.32** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*IDEOLOGY 0.02 0.06 -0.19** 
MNPC*IDEOLOGY 0.62 0.59 1.32 
AWARENESS 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*AWARENESS 0.08* -0.10 0.05 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*AWARENESS -0.00 0.01 0.00 
MNPC*AWARENESS -0.13 -0.11 -0.17 
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM 0.11*** 0.10** 0.13** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*ACTIVISM 0.01 -0.30 0.16 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*ACTIVISM -0.00 0.02 -0.02 
MNPC*ACTIVISM 0.20 0.17 0.12 
POLITICAL CONVERSATION 0.06* 0.08** 0.03 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*CONVERSATION -0.10 -0.04 -0.32 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*CONVERSATION 0.01* 0.00 0.03 
MNPC*CONVERSATION -0.01 -0.22 0.29 
MEDIA 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*MEDIA 0.03* 0.08 0.10* 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*MEDIA -0.00* -0.01 -0.01* 
MNPC*MEDIA -0.01 -0.04 0.12 
POLITICAL PERSUASION -0.00 -0.09 0.09 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*PERSUASION 0.10 -0.11 0.63 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*PERSUASION -0.01 0.00 -0.08 
MNPC*PERSUASION -0.10 -0.18 1.03 
FREE ELECTORAL AIRTIME 0.00 -0.02 -0.16 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*FREE AIRTIME 0.00 -0.09 0.56 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*FREE AIRTIME -0.00 0.01 -0.07 
MNPC*FREE AIRTIME -0.08 -0.04 0.12 
EDUCATION 0.04*** 0.01 0.07*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*EDUCATION -0.04* -0.09 -0.01 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*EDUCATION 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
MNPC*EDUCATION -0.03* -0.09 -0.04 
AGE 0.01*** 0.01** 0.02*** 
AGE2 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** 
WHITE 0.06** 0.06** 0.06 
MALE 0.06*** 0.06** 0.12*** 
MARRIED 0.05* 0.03 0.05 
EMPLOYED 0.07*** 0.07** 0.08** 
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 Table 4 continued.    
INCOME 0.05* 0.03 0.06* 
PROBLEM INTERVIEWER -0.00 -0.42*** 0.35** 
QUESTIONNAIRES ENTERED ONCE -0.07** -0.08** - 
REPLACEMENTS WAVE B 0.49*** 0.55** 0.45** 
REPLACEMENTS WAVE C 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.20*** 
TIME 0.98*** 0.88*** 1.13*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*TIME 0.09 0.05 0.61*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*TIME -0.01* -0.01 -0.07*** 
MNPC*TIME -0.35** -0.19 0.00 
PARTY ID*TIME -0.13*** -0.12** -0.15*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*PARTY ID*TIME -0.07 -0.26 -0.11 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*PARTY ID*TIME 0.01 0.02 0.01 
MNPC*PARTY ID*TIME 0.26 0.13 0.15 
IDEOLOGY*TIME -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.15** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*IDEOLOGY*TIME 0.09 0.53 -0.96*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*IDEOLOGY*TIME -0.01 -0.04 0.13*** 
MNPC*IDEOLOGY*TIME -0.19 -0.15 -0.66 
AWARENESS*TIME -0.03*** -0.03** -0.05** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*AWARENESS*TIME -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*AWARENESS*TIME 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
MNPC*AWARENESS*TIME 0.02 0.04 -0.00 
ACTIVISM*TIME -0.05*** -0.05** -0.05** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*ACTIVISM*TIME -0.00 0.11 -0.08 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*ACTIVISM*TIME 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
MNPC*ACTIVISM*TIME -0.16* -0.10 -0.21 
CONVERSATION*TIME -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*CONVERSATION*TIME 0.04 -0.02 0.22 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*CONVERSATION*TIME -0.00 0.00 -0.03 
MNPC*CONVERSATION*TIME 0.05 0.09 0.01 
MEDIA*TIME -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*MEDIA*TIME -0.01** -0.04 -0.04 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*MEDIA*TIME 0.00* 0.00 0.01 
MNPC*MEDIA*TIME 0.00 0.01 -0.05 
PERSUASION*TIME 0.04 0.08** -0.00 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*PERSUASION*TIME -0.05 -0.02 -0.41* 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*PERSUASION*TIME 0.01 0.00 0.05* 
MNPC*PERSUASION*TIME 0.01 0.09 -0.62 
FREE AIRTIME*TIME 0.13** 0.08*** 0.17*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*FREE AIRTIME*TIME 0.09*** 0.20 -0.15 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*FREE AIRTIME*TIME -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
MNPC*FREE AIRTIME*TIME 0.00 0.01 -0.14 
EDUCATION*TIME -0.09 0.01 -0.01 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*EDUCATON*TIME 0.03** 0.06 0.01 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*EDUCATION*TIME -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 
MNPC*EDUCATION*TIME 0.04 0.05 0.01 
N LEVEL 1 – Number of Interviews 14373 7274 7099 
N LEVEL 2 – Number of Respondents 6731 3292 3439 
N LEVEL 3 – Number of Neighbhorhoods 44 22 22 
* = sign. < 0.10; ** = sign. <0.05; *** = sign. 0.01 
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 The first part of the table contains the fixed effects of each variable and the modified 
impact of individual level variables at different values of number of candidates and Mean 
Neighborhood Political Conversation (NPC) when time equals zero.41
First, focus on the fixed effect of the individual level variables.  This effect indicates the 
impact of each individual level variable when time is held at zero and the neighborhood level 
variables are held at their mean. 42  The statistically significant impact of most of these variables 
indicates that voters’ personal characteristics lead to differences in voters’ levels of information 
early in the electoral campaign.  Obviously, attentiveness to distinct sources of information is 
extremely important in differentiating voters.  Those who pay attention to the media, who talk 
about politics with friends and family, who engage in civil society organizations, who identify 
with a political party and who hold some ideological position start the campaign at higher levels 
of information: Voters with these characteristics know more about candidates than other voters. 
I also find that the variables related to voters’ ability to learn, such as educational level, 
age, employment status and other socio-demographic characteristics also influence initial levels 
of information as expected.  Having higher educational levels, higher income, being employed, 
and having a family all increase the likelihood of knowing candidates’ names.  Age has the 
expected impact of increasing until a certain level and then decreasing at older ages.  These 
variables also point out to the existence of biases in the distribution of information between 
males and females and between whites and non-whites.  Males and white citizens have more 
information about politics than females and non-whites. 
                                                 
41 Table 11 on the Appendix contains the Pearson Correlations for the relationships between all independent 
variables.  Correlations are all lower than .4, most being close to 0.  There are no indications of serious collinearity 
problems. 
42 The independent variables are all mean centered, except for the time variable which is coded 0 for the first wave, 
1 for wave two and 2 for the last wave. 
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 Environments voters are embedded in hardly condition the impact of individual 
characteristics.  None of the cross-level interaction terms are statistically significant in the early 
stages of the campaign.  This indicates that the impact of individual level variables does not 
change in environments with distinct characteristics.  Hence, environments do not seem to 
condition voters’ motivation to learn.  Furthermore, the impact of the individual level variables is 
almost identical in both cities, which indicates that they play similar roles independent of the 
characteristics of the broader institutional environment in each city. 
However, environments do have a direct impact in levels of knowledge.  Number of 
candidates has a negative, non-monotonic impact in information.  This impact is identical in all 3 
samples, but it is not statistically significant in Juiz de Fora, where the number of candidates is 
higher and politics is conducted in a more personalistic fashion.  This indicates that when 
variation in number of candidates is restricted to higher numbers of candidates, varying from 
about 6 to around 10, increments in numbers of candidates do not affect information levels.  On 
the other hand, at lower levels of number of candidates (Caxias do Sul) and when variation is 
broader (entire sample), then number of candidates do have an impact in information. 
The second part of the table focuses on changes in levels of information during the 
campaign.  The first result worth mentioning is the statistically significant increase in levels of 
information over the campaign indicated by the Time variable.  The conditional mean of 
information increases as the campaign proceeds.  Hence, Brazilian voters are able to learn, in 
spite of environmental and individual characteristics. 
The second finding that deserves attention is the decreasing impact of the individual level 
variables indicating voters’ motivation to learn.  As the campaign proceeds, voters who do not 
participate in politics and collective organizations and who are not attentive to the media appear 
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 to catch up with voters who carry out such activities.  Since these coefficients must be 
interpreted in comparison to the “main effects” discussed above, the impact of the individual 
level variables is still overall positive, but it decreases as the campaign goes on.43  The only 
difference regards watching the Free Electoral Airtime.  In this case, those who watch 
politicians’ ads, gain information as the campaign proceeds. 
The impact of number of candidates also varies as the campaign proceeds. The negative 
impact of this variable weakens as the campaign advances, especially in Caxias, where the 
magnitude of the decrease is higher than in Juiz de Fora and the results are statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, the curvature also changes. The curves appear to move in the direction 
of becoming more linear.  But again, these results are only statistically significant in Caxias, 
where the environment is simpler than in Juiz de Fora. In Juiz de Fora, on the other hand, 
number of candidates does not seem to affect changes in information levels. 
Perhaps a visual interpretation will help illuminate the relationship between number of 
candidates and information.  The following graphs indicate the impact of number of candidates 
on the predicted values of knows candidates’ names, holding all other variables at zero.44 The 
first graph indicates the impact of number of candidates in the entire sample, where this variable 
ranges from 1.75 to 9.77, with a mean of 5.27. The impact of number of candidates is negative, 
non-linear and identical in all three time points.  However, the distance between the lines, 
                                                 
43 To find the impact of each variable in each wave one simply has to add the initial value of the coefficient, 
indicated by the main effect, with the value of the coefficient of the interaction term between time and the 
independent variables. For example, the main effect of the Party ID variable in the full sample is 0.29.  This is the 
impact of party ID when time is equal to zero and the neighborhood level variables are held at their mean. The 
coefficient of Party ID interacted with time, which indicates how the effect to party ID changes during the campaign 
is -0.13. So, the impact of party ID on the second wave of interviews falls to 0.29+(-0.13) = 0.16. The effect is still 
positive, but weaker than in the first wave of interviews. 
44 Recall that all independent variables are mean centered, so by holding them at zero I’m actually holding them at 
their mean. 
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 indicated by the black lines, show that at each wave, voters have more information, denoting 
learning in spite of electoral competition. 
 
FIGURE 1: PREDICTED VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CANDIDATES NAMES 
AT DIFFERENT VALUES OF NUMBER OF CANDIDATES AND DIFFERENT TIME 
PERIODS. ENTIRE SAMPLE: 2002.45
 
The second graph focuses on Caxias do Sul.  The first point that needs to be emphasized 
is that the curve changes drastically as the campaign proceeds.  In the early moments of the 
campaign, voters’ levels of information drop dramatically as the numbers of candidates 
increases.  This steep drop is attenuated in the third, final wave.  The impact is still negative, but 
not as accentuated as in prior waves.  The second important point regards the change in levels of 
information when number of candidates is at its lowest.  In Caxias, the mean is 3.43, the 
minimum value of competition is 1.75 and the highest is 6.17.  Hence, when number of 
                                                 
45 Upper most line represents impact of number of candidates on information on the last wave of interviews. 
Intermediary line represents impact of number of candidates on information on second wave of interviews. The 
bottom line represents impact of number of candidates on information on the first wave of interviews. 
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 candidates is at its lowest value, a situation in which a single candidate dominates most votes of 
the locality, voters’ levels of information decrease as the campaign proceeds. 
 
FIGURE 2. PREDICTED VALUES OF INFORMATION ABOUT CANDIDATES 
NAMES AT DIFFERENT VALUES OF NUMBER OF CANDIDATES AND DIFFERENT 
TIME PERIODS. CAXIAS DO SUL: 2002.46
 
In early moments of the campaign, voters in neighborhoods where competition is weak 
already know at least one candidate.  However, as the campaign proceeds, these voters do not to 
learn about other candidates.  They stick to their initial candidate.  This is the only occasion in 
the analysis where levels of information slightly decrease as the campaign advances.  Hence, 
where competition is very low and the political system is very structured, voters have little 
incentive to learn about candidates other than the one with whom they are familiar. 
                                                 
46 The first line starting on the vertical axis of the figure indicates the impact of number of candidates on information 
in the first wave of interviews.  The second line starting on the vertical axis indicates the impact of number of 
candidates on information in the second wave of interviews. The third line indicates the impact of number of 
candidates on information in the third wave of interviews. 
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4.3.4.  Information Index 
 
The focus now shifts to the last wave of the panel and to the analysis of the Information 
Index, the more complete and detailed measure of voters levels of information about candidates 
for Federal Deputy.  Hence, results represent the final full impact of the entire campaign in a 
more complete measure of voters’ levels of information.  The model is identical to that tested in 
the case of the simpler variable, Information about Candidates’ Names. 
To recapitulate, the information index is composed by 9 items that measure information 
of both current candidates in the 2002 elections as well as of the activation of memory processes 
regarding the 1998 elections.  It includes items about naming candidates for the 2002 elections, 
vote decision in 2002, information about the chosen candidate’s party, in addition to information 
about vote in 1998 and incumbents.  All of this information focuses on identifying the main 
political actors involved in the campaign, providing a minimal basis for evaluating them. 
The first point that must be stressed is that the results in table 5 confirm those in the 
analysis of the simpler variable.  The individual level motivation variables have identical impact 
in both cities.  Even though their impact decreases as the election proceeds, these variables still 
distinguish voters in the final wave.  Furthermore, the same independent variables are significant 
in both cities and the direction of the impact is identical.  In both cities citizens have higher 
levels of information when they identify with a party and have an ideological preference, when 
they are more politically aware, when they are members of civil society organizations, when they 
engage more often in political deliberation, and when they are exposed to the media, including 
the Free Electoral Airtime.  In other words, even though changes in these variables are negative 
over the campaign, indicating that other voters catch up regarding the amount of information 
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 they have, voters who are more motivated to learn still have higher levels of information in the 
end of the campaign.  The information rich do get information richer. 
The environmental indicator of electoral competition based on number of candidates does 
not appear to have any direct impact in voters’ informational levels.  In addition, number of 
candidates does not appear to condition the impact of other factors in instructing voters about 
candidates and incumbents.  That is, not just the coefficient for electoral competition and 
electoral competition squared fail to reject the null hypotheses, but the change in impact of most 
of the individual level motivation variables across values of numbers of candidates is also 
statistically insignificant.  This confirms the expectations that voters are able to learn during the 
campaign, in spite of variation in the number of candidates.  Even though the number of 
candidates does affect the amount of information voters have in the early stages of the campaign, 
its impact changes during the electoral races and in the final wave, competition between several 
candidates no longer matters.  Voters learn, in spite of electoral complexity measured by 
increasing number of candidates. 
TABLE 5: FIXED EFFECTS OF POISSON REGRESSION WITH UNEQUAL 
EXPOSURE FOR INFORMATION INDEX: BRAZIL, 2002. 
Variables Full Sample Juiz de Fora Caxias do Sul 
INTERCEPT 1.42*** 1.54*** 1.29*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION -0.02 -0.31 -0.34 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2 0.00 0.02 0.03 
MEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL CONVERSATION 
(MNPC) 
0.75*** 0.42** 0.43 
PARTY ID 0.07*** 0.05** 0.08** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*PARTY ID 0.04 0.30 0.18 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*PARTY ID -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
MNPC*PARTY ID 0.03 0.14 0.27 
IDEOLOGY 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*IDEOLOGY -0.08 -0.08 -0.34* 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*IDEOLOGY 0.01 0.01 0.04* 
MNPC*IDEOLOGY -0.10 -0.08 -0.26 
POLITICAL AWARENESS 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*AWARENESS 0.02 -0.05 0.07 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*AWARENESS -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
MNPC*AWARENESS -0.02 0.03 -0.01 
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM 0.01 0.01 0.02 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*ACTIVISM -0.01 -0.22 0.04 
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 Table 5 continued.    
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*ACTIVISM 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
MNPC*ACTIVISM -0.05 -0.07 -0.14 
POLITICAL CONVERSATION 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*CONVERSATION -0.02 0.06 0.14 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*CONVERSATION 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 
MNPC*CONVERSATION -0.06 -0.09 0.13 
MEDIA 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*MEDIA -0.00 0.01 0.01 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*MEDIA 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
MNPC*MEDIA -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
POLITICAL PERSUASION 0.04*** 0.04** 0.03* 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*PERSUASION 0.02 -0.01 -0.3 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*PERSUASION -0.00 0.00 0.01 
MNPC*PERSUASION -0.08 -0.13 0.13 
FREE ELECTORAL AIRTIME 0.11*** 0.10* 0.48*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*FEA -0.04 0.18 0.2 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*FEA 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
MNPC*FEA -0.02 0.01 -0.06 
EDUCATION 0.01*** 0.01** 0.02*** 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION*EDUCATION 0.01* 0.04 -0.03 
ELECTORAL COMPETITION2*EDUCATION -0.00* -0.00 0.00 
MNPC*EDUCATION -0.02 -0.02 -0.07* 
AGE 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
AGE2 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
WHITE 0.04** 0.03 0.08** 
MALE -0.03 -0.04* -0.01 
MARRIED 0.04* 0.04* -0.01 
EMPLOYED 0.02 0.02 0.01 
INCOME 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
PROBLEM INTERVIEWER -0.28** -0.56*** 0.37** 
REPLACEMENT C 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
N LEVEL 1 – Individuals 6731 3292 3439 
N LEVEL 2 – Neighborhoods 44 22 22 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
Contextual and environmental variables should not be ignored in the study of political 
information.  However, the impact of these two levels of analysis is not as uniform or 
straightforward as previous studies assumed.  Both change over time and space. 
In Caxias, where communal life is stronger and institutions of organized interests are 
more active, in other words, where signaling devices are more visible, environments matter 
slightly more as indicated by the intraclass correlations.  In Juiz de Fora, the neighborhood level 
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 accounts for very little variation in levels of information.   Hence, environments are not so 
decisive in influencing voters’ levels of information in Juiz de Fora.  In sum, the impact of 
environments is not constant in all situations; it is dependent upon the organizing structures of 
the political order. 
Indicators of individual level motivation play a major role in information acquisition 
processes, independent of political environments.  As tables 4 and 5 showed, voters have more 
information about candidates and incumbents when they pay more attention to the media, when 
they talk about politics with friends, family and neighbors, when they have ideological 
preferences, feel close to a political party, engage in civic associations and are exposed to 
attempts of political persuasion by others.  Furthermore, the impact of these variables is identical 
in both cities, independent of the characteristics of political competition.  In very few instances 
does the number of candidates competing in a neighborhood alter voters’ motivation to learn. 
However, the number of candidates competing in a neighborhood does have a direct 
impact in levels of information.  Even though the impact of number of candidates is negative and 
non-linear in both cities, it is only statistically significant in Caxias and only in Caxias it changes 
dramatically as the campaign proceeds.  It appears that increases in number of candidates are 
more influential in better-structured environments.  Competition only plays a significant role in 
affecting growth curves of informational levels in Caxias do Sul, where competition by 
neighborhood occurs between 1.7 and 6 candidates and where parties are better organized.  That 
is, changes in informational levels are more sensitive to electoral competition in political orders 
that are better structured. 
Where parties are weaker organizations and competition is higher, between 5 and 10 
candidates competing per locality, as in Juiz de Fora, changes in competition do not significantly 
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 affect learning about politics.  Furthermore, as the campaign proceeds, voters appear to learn 
about politics in spite of number of candidates.  In each subsequent wave of interviews, voters’ 
levels of information were constantly higher.  Competition is no longer statistically significant – 
voters learn even in complex environments – when a more complete measure of information is 
analyzed (only in the third wave). 
Finally, the only occasion where voters did not learn during the campaign was in a very 
ordered environment with minimal levels of competition.  Where one candidate dominates most 
votes, voters do not learn.  In such environments, the lack of competition decreases voters’ 
exposition to information.  Where number of candidates is too small, then voters’ ability to learn 
is in danger.  As number of candidates increase, its impact is remains negative, but voters 
manage to gain information in the different moments of the campaign. 
The final message, then, is that the number of candidates more clearly affects 
informational levels and gains in simpler political environments.  In more complex orders, voters 
compensate for the increased burden of obtaining information about politics by paying attention 
to the media and by consulting with other voters.  In other words, in more complex orders, voters 
deflect the potentially confounding impact of environments by relying more often in 
individualized strategies of obtaining political information.  Voters learn, in spite of complex 
electoral environments. 
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 5. Chapter 5: Information, Vote Choice and Accountability: An Empirical Test 
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 5.1. Introduction 
 
As I argued before, accountability is related to voters’ capacity to learn about candidates.  
Accountability is consummated in the voting booth when the voter chooses between alternative 
electoral options.  Voters express their views about the directions of public policy, and punish or 
reward officeholders for their actions while in office.  How does information affect specific types 
of vote choice that are directly related to holding representatives accountable?  The focus of this 
chapter is on the way voters’ electoral choices are affected by information, environments and 
personal predispositions. 
There are several distinct ways to assess voters’ electoral calculus of accountability.  This 
chapter focuses on two types of vote choices that express distinct forms of holding those in office 
responsible for their actions.  The first is the decision of voting for an incumbent or a challenger.  
Holding representatives accountable is conditional upon voters’ ability to weigh incumbents 
against challengers.  There simply is no possibility of holding representatives accountable if 
there aren’t alternatives to choose from; if there isn’t the possibility for alternation in power.  
The presence of challengers is what assures that elections are contested and that voters have a 
choice.  Therefore, it is important to verify the determinants of choosing an incumbent in face of 
a challenger.  If voters evaluate incumbents based on their performance in office, this is strong 
evidence that voters are holding their representatives accountable. 
A second type of vote choice is related to holding political parties, not individual 
politicians, accountable. Voting for different parties in different races in the same election, what 
is called split-ticket voting, has been pointed out as a sign of weak political parties (Mainwaring 
and Scully 1995).  It is an indication that instead of voting based on party reputations or 
platforms, voters decide based on candidate reputations.  The inverse, then, voting for candidates 
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 of the same party, or straight-ticket voting, can be understood as voting based on partisan 
reputations and attachments.  Voters who cast straight-ticket votes are probably holding parties 
responsible for policy outcomes, not individual politicians. 
The common view about Brazil is that parties are weak, with no solid social roots or 
programmatic differences (Mainwaring 1995, 1999).  Instead, politics is centered on state-level 
machines organized by regional political bosses (Abrucio 1998, Samuels 2001).  According to 
this view, state governors and individual leaders are the key players in the Brazilian political 
system, not parties.  Nonetheless, partisanship amongst voters and the structuring of political 
parties in Brazil has increased after the re-democratization of the mid-1980s.  This is visible both 
in the functioning of parties inside congress (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995) as well as among the 
electorate (Singer 2001, Carreirão 2003).  Carlos Ranulfo, using election outcome data, has 
argued that a process of crystallization of party identification amongst the electorate is in place 
(forthcoming).  Hence, it is important to ask which factors lead voters to cast a straight-ticket 
vote. 
In the analysis of both dependent variables, the models tested take into consideration the 
impact of environments, voters’ individual predispositions and information about candidates.  
The models discussed are specified in very similar ways, but they are not identical.  Therefore, I 
will discuss them in turns.  The next section centers on the choice between incumbents and 
challengers.  I will first discuss the theoretical implications of this choice for the idea of 
accountability; I then discuss the main hypotheses, and, finally, present the results. I will then 
move on to discuss straight-ticket voting, repeating the same structure of the section on voting 
for an incumbent.  In the next sections the goal is to indicate how each of these variables relates 
to the idea of accountability and to model its variation based on voters’ information levels, 
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 personal predispositions and environmental traits.  I use the same data set described earlier for 
the analysis.  Given that both dependent variables indicate declared vote choices, only the third 
wave of interviews is analyzed. 
The central question I attempt to answer in this chapter speaks very closely to what Nie 
and Weisberg (1999) consider one of the core controversies in current voting behavior studies:  
Do voters who have more information vote differently from those who have less?  Do distinct 
types of information differently affect vote choice?  The focus of this chapter is on the 
explanatory power of political information on voters electoral choices related to holding 
politicians and political parties accountable.  In the previous chapter I discussed the factors that 
increase voters’ levels of information about their candidates for Federal Deputy.  In this chapter 
the emphasis falls on the impact of information on vote choice.  As was discussed in the 
introduction, a recent strand of literature about voting behavior claims that voters do not need to 
be fully informed about politics in order to make choices.  However, the type of information 
voters should have and what are its effects on vote choices is still a matter open to empirical 
verification.  I test both how domain specific information about candidates as well as how more 
general, encyclopedic information about politics affect vote choice. 
In addition, I also assess how number of candidates at the neighborhood level and voters’ 
party identification affect choice in Brazilian legislative elections.   Secondary questions in this 
chapter are: Does party identification play a role in affecting vote choice for Federal Deputy?  
How does competition between various candidates affect electoral decisions? 
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 5.2. Reelection for the Chamber of Deputies from the Voter’s Perspective 
 
The discussion about incumbent Federal Deputies’ reelection strategies is a well-
established debate in the study of Latin American politics that dates back to Barry Ames’ 
pioneering work in the mid-90s.  Both Ames’ initial studies, as well as recent ones (Pereira and 
Renno 2003), have found evidence that elections for Federal Deputy are strongly influenced by 
local level factors.  Pereira and Renno (2003) do find that incumbents choice of running for 
reelection is affected by his/her performance in the Chamber of Deputies, including presenting 
national level legislation and holding power positions in the hierarchy of the Chamber.47 
However, such actions have very limited effects in the actual outcome of the election.  Strategies 
of allocating pork-barrel policies to specific localities and of concentrating or dispersing votes in 
distinct municipalities are more efficient reelection strategies than claiming credit for 
participating in debates of national level issues.  Finally, Samuels has also convincingly argued 
that incumbents heavily rely on campaign expenditures (2001) and that levels of competition, 
indicated by the presence of a strong pool of challengers, effectively decrease the likelihood of 
incumbents’ electoral success. 
According to this literature, concerns with local issues supersede national ones in 
Brazilian legislative elections.  Voters appear to reward incumbents who invest time and 
resources in bringing federal monies back to their electoral strongholds, not those who engage in 
holding important power positions in the hierarchy of the Chamber or who propose legislation 
with a national scope.  Pereira and Renno (2003) argue that this is an indication that the main 
criteria voters use to punish or reward incumbents is their performance concerning municipal 
                                                 
47 Leoni, Pereira and Renno (2004) confirm these results by pointing out to the importance of certain indicators of 
performance in the Chamber in incumbents’ career choices. 
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 level problems and issues.  Voters appear to hold incumbents accountable exclusively for what 
they have done for the municipality.  National issues play a minor role.  Pereira and Renno 
(2003) go on to argue that accountability in Brazil is restricted to incumbents’ performance in 
bringing improvements to the municipality. 
Nonetheless, this debate has relied solely on data related to incumbents’ performance in 
office and election return data.  It completely ignores the voters’ perspective, in that individual 
level data have yet to be analyzed.  I start to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on voters’ 
views on elections for the Chamber of Deputies.   The first dependent variable analyzed explores 
the determinants of voting for an incumbent in opposition to voting for a challenger using the 
data set described earlier.  In this way, the goal is to provide insights about the factors that 
influence vote choice for Federal Deputy. 
Specialists agree that the Brazilian electoral system may lead to a more opaque 
relationship between voter and representative.  By this I refer to the fact that electoral rules in 
Brazil may hinder voters’ capacity to acknowledge more clearly their representatives in the 
Chamber of Deputies.  Given that several candidates are elected and that they are not formally 
bound to a municipality but to the entire state, voters might not be able to pinpoint their 
representative exactly.   This is especially problematic for voters whose candidate was not 
elected.  In such cases, voters may find it even harder to identify their representative.48  
Moreover, there are no studies that explore voters’ choices regarding Federal Deputies after the 
inauguration of the 1988 Constitution.  Evidence that voters are able to hold representatives 
accountable is scant in Brazil. 
                                                 
48 This problem is not as grave in single-member districts.  Even though a voters’ candidate might not win, the 
voters still knows who the single representative for that district is.  In proportional representation systems with at-
large districts, voters may end up having more than one representative or none from the municipality they live in. 
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 Because more than one representative is elected by district, I do not focus on analyzing 
vote for a specific incumbent in a district.  Instead, the goal is to evaluate how voters who vote 
for a Federal Deputy running for reelection, the definition of incumbent I use here, differ from 
voters who choose a candidate that does not hold office in the Chamber of Deputies, a 
challenger.  The dependent variable is dichotomous, with one category representing voting for a 
challenger and the other voting for an incumbent.  Given that the focus is on the actual vote 
choice, I only use data from the third wave of interviews, equivalent to a post-electoral survey.49  
Since I have independent variables measured at different levels of analysis, I use Generalized 
Non-Linear Hierarchical Model with a Bernoulli distribution of the dependent variable to explore 
the factors that increase the likelihood of voting for an incumbent.50
Deciding between an incumbent and a challenger is a central mechanism through which 
voters hold those in office responsible for their actions.  If voters are satisfied with incumbents, 
they should reelect them. If not, then voting for a challenger should be the most appropriate 
option.  If some variables discussed below present the expected results, this may provide 
indication that voters are able to minimally evaluate their representatives and, hence, set them 
accountable.  Below I show that there are clear patterns to voters’ choices in Brazilian legislative 
elections, despite the apparent complexity of the system.  Such patterns indicate that voters are 
able to judge representatives according to their past performance. 
 
 
                                                 
49 The third wave of interviews is composed in its majority by respondents who had already answered the two 
previous waves. But it also incorporates voters who answered only one of the previous waves, most of them having 
participated in the second wave of interviews but a few who participated only in the first wave.  Finally, a fresh 
cross-section of respondents interviewed only in the third wave is also included in the analysis.  This is done to 
restrict problems of panel conditioning and selection bias. 
50 I did not detect problems of over or under dispersion in the analysis that follows. 
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 5.2.1. A Model of Voting for Incumbents 
 
The Brazilian system offers interesting opportunities to test hypotheses about the impact 
of information in voters’ choices.  Given the complexity of the system –multi-member districts, 
multiple parties, and an elevated number of candidates – it becomes imperative to know the most 
common informational shortcuts voters use when making their electoral choices.  Do voters who 
have specific types of information behave differently from other voters in environments with 
different levels of complexity?  Does information lead voters to make different choices?  I 
provide answers to these questions by including in the model that explains voting for incumbents 
two variables that are directly related to voters’ levels of information about candidates for 
Federal Deputy. 
Two of the central variables in the model are dummies that indicate if the respondent 
knows a challenger (KNOWS CHALLENGERS) or knows an incumbent (KNOWS 
INCUMBENTS) who is candidate for Federal Deputy.  A first expectation about information 
about candidates is that voters who know candidates’ names will behave differently from those 
who do not.  If these variables have a statistically significant impact in vote choice, this is 
evidence that there are differences in electoral choice caused by variation in information levels.  
Second, voters who know challengers’ names should be less inclined to vote for incumbents.  
Those who know names of challengers will necessarily have more information about distinct 
candidates, decreasing the likelihood of voting for an incumbent. 
There are a few interesting facts about the relationship between these two variables. First, 
they are very weakly and negatively correlated, -0.078.  This means that voters tend to know 
either challengers or incumbents, rarely both.  In fact, of the entire sample only 11% know both 
challengers and incumbents.  Thirteen percent know only challengers and 37% know only 
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 incumbents.  Of those who know challengers, 43% also know and incumbent. On the other hand, 
of those who know an incumbent, only 21% also know a challenger.  This means that those who 
are aware of challengers are more likely to also be aware of incumbents, the opposite not being 
true.  Overall, then, voters who are aware of challengers (KNOWS CHALLENGERS) appear to 
be fuller informed about candidates than voters who know incumbents. 
I also include in the analysis a measure of generalized knowledge about politics 
(POLITICAL AWARENESS), which is based on respondents’ correct answers to a political quiz 
about general facts on Brazilian politics.  This provides the opportunity to test how generalized 
information about the political system, very closely associated to the idea of encyclopedic 
knowledge of politics, affects vote choice (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  The expectation is that 
political awareness, because of its more general character, may not affect vote choices as 
strongly as domain specific information, such as knowing the names of incumbents and 
challengers. 
Another variable included in the model refers directly to voters’ evaluations of 
incumbents.  This is a central hypothesis to test if voters are able to hold representatives 
accountable.  If accountability is to take place, those who positively evaluate incumbents should 
vote for an incumbent.  Those who are unhappy with incumbents’ performance should not vote 
for an incumbent.  Respondents were asked if they were satisfied with the performance of the 
candidate they voted for Federal Deputy in the previous election.  My expectation is that those 
who were satisfied with their representative will vote for an incumbent again.  This is a central 
aspect of accountability, because it is in the essence of punishing incumbents for wrong doing.  
Therefore, the variable SATISFIED WITH INCUMBENT should have a positive impact in vote 
for an incumbent. 
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 Given that we know very little about how Brazilian voters make their choices for Federal 
Deputy and given that there is a widespread creed that such choices are simply based on 
clientelistic exchanges of favors or are simply done at random, with no clear pattern, it is 
important to verify if voters employ any criteria in choosing candidates.  A decisive factor for 
supporting an incumbent is to be satisfied with incumbents’ performance in office. 
The model also includes other factors that may affect voting for an incumbent.  The first 
refers to electoral competition between several distinct candidates at the neighborhood level 
(NUMBER OF CANDIDATES).  There are two alternative expectations regarding the role of 
the number of candidates in vote choice.  First, the more competition there is, the harder it is for 
incumbents to get reelected.  If voters have more choices, this increases their ability to choose 
from different alternatives.  This hypotheses stems directly from Mayhew’s (1974) view about 
the role of electoral competition in single-member districts and  Samuels’ (2001) claim that 
incumbents are threatened by a large pool of qualified challengers in Brazil. 
Another view about electoral competition, one that takes into account the number of 
candidates, focuses on the potential for information overload generated by the presence of 
several candidates (Redlawsk and Lau 2001; Rahn 1993). The idea is that the more candidates 
there are, the more complex the environment, the harder it is for voters to deal with all the 
information about the different candidates.  The consequence is that voters become more tempted 
to refrain from learning about all the candidates and the consequence is an increase in 
incumbency advantage.  The hypothesis derived from this debate is that as the number of 
candidates increase, the more tempted voters will be to vote for incumbents.  Voters satisfice by 
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 voting on incumbents as electoral complexity increases.51  This idea points out to the possibility 
that the fragmentation of vote in a specific locality between several candidates benefits 
incumbents.  
In addition to these factors, risk acceptant behavior (RISK ACCEPTANT) may also 
affect voting for an incumbent.  Risk acceptance is a main factor in explaining voting behavior in 
Mexico (Domingues and McCann 1996, Cinta 1999, Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001).  The 
classical view about this issue was proposed by Domingues and McCann in their discussion of 
the two-step decision process:  First, voters decide if they will engage in the risky choice of 
voting for an opposition party instead of voting for the incumbent party that ruled Mexico for 
over 70 years.  The idea is that risk acceptant voters will be more prone to vote for a challenger 
because they are more willing to accept the risk of electing a candidate they do not know all that 
well.  The second step is then to decide which of the opposition parties to support.  In the essence 
of their claim is the idea that risk acceptant behavior is contingent upon information levels. 
Morgenstern and Zeichmester (2001) revise this idea and argue that the propensity of 
accepting risks is an individual predisposition from lack of information about challengers.52  In 
these authors view, individuals who are risk acceptant behave differently from other voters.  In 
the Mexican case, risk acceptant voters are more prone to vote against the dominating PRI.  If we 
generalize this claim to other electoral systems, it can be said that risk acceptant voters are, in 
general, more prone to support challengers.  Therefore, this hypothesis is related to the decision 
                                                 
51 Number of candidates was measured in the same way as in the previous chapter.  I also included in the model a 
squared term for number of candidates to test for possible non-linear effects of this variable.  The rationale is that 
over a certain number of candidates, the effect is no longer significant. 
52 Dominguez and McCann (1996), who originally devised this hypothesis, claimed that voters preferred the PRI 
because they knew little about opposition parties. This was especially true in the early 1980’s, when opposition 
parties were relatively new, unknown forces in Mexico’s political system dominated for 70 years by the PRI.  
However, today, voters know more about opposition parties.  Morgenstern and Zeichmester claim that risk 
acceptance is a personal characteristic more than a consequence of lack of information.  Based on their view, I enter 
risk acceptance alongside information levels in the right hand side of the equation. 
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 of voting for incumbents and challengers anywhere, not just in Mexico.  I test it in the Brazilian 
elections for Federal Deputy. 
A set of dummy variables included in the model also deserves greater attention because it 
touches upon a central aspect of legislative elections in Brazil – the declared reasons for voting 
for a candidate.  These include personal, local and national reasons for vote choice.  These three 
factors are indicators of the distinct motivations that guide voting for Federal Deputy.  The first 
two are more clearly associated with casework and pork-barrel politics.  These are usually seen 
by the literature as less desirable reasons for voting for representatives (Ames 1995), in that they 
are based on the exchange of particularized goods and not on ideology or partisanship.  Personal 
and municipal motivations are associated with distributive policies, which concentrate benefits 
and diffuse costs (Lowi 1964).  It is also related to clientelism, where incumbent politicians, who 
have access to the distribution of public resources, use their power of allocating such resources to 
gain votes in elections.  Clientelism is based on the idea of asymmetry in power between 
incumbents and voters, where incumbents assure their continuation in power by taking advantage 
of such asymmetry (Fox 1997; Gay 1994).  Hence, pork-barrel, understood as a clientelistic 
mechanism, restricts accountability to the exchange of particularized goods and strengthens the 
asymmetry in power between elected politicians and voters. 
This claim, in my view, is especially valid for the case of voting based on casework or 
personal reasons.  In such case, the relation between voter and Federal Deputy is particularized 
to the extreme, bonding the individual voter to the representative in a dyadic relation based on 
asymmetries of power, the classic definition of clientelism (Fox 1997).  However, voting based 
on municipal issues, usually pejoratively associated with pork-barrel politics, may not be so 
detrimental to the functioning of politics in Brazil.  Undoubtedly, such policies do concentrate 
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 benefits and diffuse costs (Lowi 1964).   But because they serve the purpose of bringing 
improvements to specific municipalities, this provides essential services and infra-structure 
improvements for municipalities.  Local improvements are fundamental for improving voters’ 
everyday lives in a country like Brazil, which has widespread poverty and extremely high levels 
of income inequality.  Hence, transfers of federal monies to specific localities can attenuate 
situations of extreme poverty and underdevelopment.  Pereira and Renno (2003) infer, based on 
aggregate data, that the foundations of accountability in Brazil are related to incumbents’ 
performance in local politics.  I test such claims using individual level data.  If voting for 
incumbents is positively affected by local factors, then Pereira and Renno’s (2003) argument will 
be confirmed at the individual level. 
Another hypothesis refers to the role of political parties.  Most scholars who study 
political parties in Brazil claim that partisanship plays a minor role in Brazilian legislative 
elections.  The argument is that the open-list proportional representation system creates 
incentives for a personal vote as well as for intra-party competition, weakening the grip of 
political parties over its members (Shugart and Carey 1995, Samuels 2000).  Given that the final 
party list is defined a posteriori, based on each candidate’s final vote, and fund-raising is mostly 
in the hands of candidates, the incentives for candidates to cultivate personal reputations and not 
party reputations are high (Shugart and Carey 1998).  The general idea is that parties matter very 
little in electoral systems like the Brazilian one. 
However, there are institutional minutiae that might lead to a heightened influence of 
parties in elections. Certain rules minimize intra-party competition.  The electoral quotient, the 
minimum number of votes necessary for receiving a seat, is defined by the total votes aggregated 
by party.  This creates incentives for candidates to cooperate with fellow party members, 
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 diminishing intra-party competition. 53  In addition, the D’Hondt formula is employed to allocate 
vote remainders, favoring larger parties.  Both of these rules stimulate party reputations.  One 
other factor is that in the 2002 elections for the first time incumbents did not have their reelection 
bid assured.  Before 2002, incumbents had the right to run for reelection, which was called the 
candidato nato (natural candidate) rule.  This rule was no longer valid in 2002, increasing the 
discretionary power of parties when nominating candidates. 
There is also documented evidence that partisanship affects vote choice for president, as 
was discussed in Chapter 3.  Hence, it is important to include partisanship in a model that 
explains vote for Federal Deputy.  The main question in this case is if partisanship will matter at 
all.  Conventional wisdom in Brazil argues that party identification should not make any 
difference in Brazilian legislative elections.  However, such hypothesis has not been tested yet. 
I expect partisanship to make a difference in Brazilian legislative elections by increasing 
the likelihood of voting for an incumbent.  Partisanship increases voters’ ability to understand 
politics and to take sides on it.  Partisans will do what ever is in their power to keep incumbents 
from their parties in office.  In order to maximize their parties’ influence in power, voters who 
have some party preference will predominantly opt to support incumbents.  Hence, partisanship 
should increase the likelihood of voting for an incumbent.  Voters who do not sympathize with 
parties are more open to choosing from different alternatives and may feel freer to choose 
amongst the pool of challengers. 
 
 
                                                 
53 It is true that when political parties engage in coalitions, it is the total vote of the coalition that matters when 
calculating seat allocation. This certainly diminishes parties’ influence over the results of the election (Nicolau 
1999). However, the decision to join a coalition is still in the hands of the political parties.  So, in last stance, parties 
do influence election outcomes. 
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 5.2.2. Results 
 
Table 5 presents the results for the analysis of voting for an incumbent testing the above 
expectations and controlling for several other factors affecting vote choice.54  The data confirm 
most of the theoretical expectations discussed above.55
TABLE 6: FIXED EFFECTS FOR LOGIT REGRESSION OF VOTING FOR 
INCUMBENT: BRAZIL 2002. 
Variables Full Sample Juiz de Fora Caxias do Sul 
Intercept 0.87***  2.78*** -0.36*** 
Number of Candidates 0.96*** (2.61) -0.79 (0.45) 0.24 (1.27) 
Number of Candidates2 -0.04*** (0.96) 0.05 (1.05) -0.01 (0.99) 
Knows Challengers -1.76*** (0.83) -4.21*** (0.01) -1.04*** (0.35) 
Knows Incumbents 0.88*** (2.41) 0.56*** (1.75) 1.04*** (2.82) 
Awareness -0.06 (0.94) -0.21* (0.81) -0.04 (0.96) 
Risk Acceptant 0.04 (1.04) -0.14 (0.86) 0.11* (1.11) 
Satisfied with Incumbent 0.01 (1.01) 0.94*** (2.56) -0.42** (0.65) 
Reason for Vote – Local 0.07 (1.07) 1.21*** (3.35) -0.70** (0.49) 
Reason for Vote – National -0.12 (0.88) -0.45 (0.63) -0.16 (0.85) 
Partisanship 0.27*** (1.31) 0.35* (1.41) 0.36* (1.43) 
Male 0.10 (1.10) 0.24 (1.27) 0.20 (1.22) 
Married 0.03 (1.03) -0.38 (0.68) 0.12 (1.12) 
Employed 0.08 (1.08) 0.10 (1.10) 0.02 (1.02) 
White 0.10 (1.10) 0.13 (1.13) -0.04 (0.96) 
Income -0.07 (0.93) -0.11 (0.89) -0.12 (0.88) 
Age -0.00 (1.00) 0.01 (1.01) -0.01 (0.99) 
Education -0.02 (0.98) 0.11* (1.11) -0.05 (0.95) 
Replacement C 0.18 (1.19) 0.38 (1.46) 0.23 (1.25) 
Problem Interviewer 0.25 (1.28) 0.98 (2.66) 0.02 (1.02) 
N Level 1 2541 1358 1183 
N Level 2 44 22 22 
* = sign. <.05, ** = sign. <.01, *** = sign. <.001 
(Odds Ratios in Parentheses) 
 
First, information matters and different types of information matter differently.  Voters 
who are more aware of challengers do not vote for incumbents (KNOWS CHALLENGERS).  
On the other hand, those who know incumbents vote for incumbents (KNOWS INCUMBENTS).  
Recall that those who know challengers are also more likely to knowing incumbents too.  Hence, 
                                                 
54 I control for the usual suspects: gender, age, race, income, education, marital status and employment status. I also 
control for the influence of the research design, including dummies for replacement respondents who entered the 
sample only in the third wave and for problematic interviewers. 
55 The correlations between the independent variables for this chapter are presented in Table 12 of the appendix.  
Correlations are overall low, indicating that collinearity is not a problem. 
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 such voters have broader information about the election.  If a voter knows at least some 
challengers, he/she is less prone to support an incumbent.  This means that more information 
about candidates increases voters’ ability to punish incumbents.  Knowledge about more 
electoral options leads to more control over incumbents, an idea essential to accountability. 
Political Awareness, on its turn, only affects vote choice in Juiz de Fora, and even so, just 
barely.  Generalized information about politics – encyclopedic knowledge about politics – in fact 
plays a very limited role in elections.  As we saw above, what matters is domain specific 
information focusing on the actors of the political system. 
However, simply being conscious about the menu of electoral options is not enough to 
hold incumbents accountable.  In order to punish an incumbent, the voter must be dissatisfied 
with his/her performance in office.  The impact of voters’ satisfaction with incumbents varies 
from one city to the other, but is statistically significant in both.  In Caxias, the impact of being 
satisfied with incumbents presents results apparently contradictory to theoretical expectations.  
There is, though, a circumstantial campaign event that explains these confounding effects.  
Nonetheless, the important thing is that voters do evaluate candidates based on the performance 
of incumbents, which is a strong sign that voters are able to hold representatives accountable for 
their performance in office. 
In Caxias do Sul, the main incumbent of the city, Germano Rigotto, did not run for 
reelection in 2002. Instead he successfully ran for governor, beating the incumbent 
administration of the Workers’ Party.  The other incumbent of the city, Ana Corso, was not as 
popular as Rigotto. In fact, she was elected a substitute deputy in 1998 and only exercised the 
mandate of Federal Deputy for brief periods of time.56 On the other hand, Ivo Sartori, an 
                                                 
56 In Brazil, candidates for Federal Deputy are elected either as main officeholders (titulares) or as substitutes 
(suplentes).  Several substitutes take office because main officeholders occupy positions in the bureaucracy.  This 
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 ambitious state deputy who has been an active politician in the city, including running for Mayor 
in 2000, decided to run for federal deputy and received Rigotto’s endorsement.  Because Sartori 
was running for Federal Deputy for the first time, in spite of being an insider of Caxias’ politics, 
he was coded as a challenger.  Sartori is a clear example of what Samuels (2001) refers to as a 
strong challenger.  He has been active in city and state politics for a very long time and was 
endorsed by a very popular politician in the city. 
Sartori ended up elected in 2002, and Ana Corso again only obtained enough votes to be 
elected a substitute.  In Caxias, a positive evaluation of an incumbent leads to a decrease in votes 
to incumbents, as can be seen by the negative sign of the “Satisfied with Incumbent” variable.  
This occurs because the main winner in the city was a challenger who was strongly endorsed by 
a previous incumbent.  On the other hand, the candidate that was running for reelection, Ana 
Corso, was electorally more vulnerable than the challenger and ended up getting fewer votes 
than the challenger.  Those who were satisfied with an incumbent, mostly Rigotto voters, ended 
up voting for a challenger.  Hence, satisfaction with an incumbent helped elect a challenger 
supported by the most popular incumbent in the locality.57  Even though this result seems 
contrary to theoretical expectation, in fact it shows that the endorsement of a popular incumbent 
who was then running for a higher office was fundamental for the success of a challenger. 
In Juiz de Fora, where there was no drastic change in the electoral scenario from 1998 to 
2002, it is clear that voters satisfied with the performance of their elected representative tended 
                                                                                                                                                             
was the case of Ana Corso, who took over office after a seat was vacated because a titular left for a position in the 
executive branch.  It is important to mention, though, that the titular mai return to office at his/her will.  In this case, 
the substitute leaves office and waits for another opportunity. 
57 The situation of Caxias do Sul is similar to that of an open-seat contest in single-member districts like those of the 
U.S.  In such cases, attribution of responsibility is less clear. Endorsements and partisanship should be stronger cues 
for voters in such settings then incumbency. 
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 to vote for an incumbent.  This is the finding one expects if voters are minimally able to hold 
their representatives accountable. 
The impact of the dummy variables related to voters’ reasons for voting for Federal 
Deputy also presents interesting results.  First, national level issues have no statistically 
significant impact in affecting the likelihood of voting for incumbents.  The incumbent vote is 
more clearly affected by local level factors and voters’ personal reasons (the excluded category 
represented by the intercept).  However, these impacts are different in each city.  In Juiz de Fora, 
personal and local level factors have a statistically significant and positive impact in voting for 
incumbent Federal Deputies. In this city, incumbents benefit from policies that concentrate 
benefits and diffuse costs, as Pereira and Renno (2003) predicted. 
In Caxias do Sul, incumbents do not benefit from local and personal factors.  The impact 
of this variable decreases the likelihood of voting for incumbents.  Recall that Caxias differs 
from Juiz de Fora in that the main incumbent did not run for reelection and endorsed a 
challenger.  So, the inverted signs in Caxias should be analyzed with caution.  In fact, they 
indicate that the vote for the main challenger is also affected by personal and municipal reasons 
for vote.  In sum, voting in the elections for Federal Deputy is related exclusively to personalistic 
and municipal motivations.  In Juiz de Fora, personal and municipal motivations benefit 
incumbents. In Caxias, such motivations benefit the main challenger who was endorsed by an 
incumbent.  In sum, voters expect incumbents to invest in transferring funds to the municipality 
and to help voters in dealing with personal issues. 
Other findings that deserve to be highlighted refer to the role of number of candidates and 
partisanship.  First, electoral competition between several different candidates only affects vote 
choice in the combined sample, when the variation in number of candidates is higher.  The 
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 effect, though, is just the opposite of what Mayhew’s theory about the U.S. predicts and 
Samuels’ claims in relation to Brazil.  The more competition, the more inclined voters are to vote 
for an incumbent.  Incumbency advantage plays a more important role in complex environments.  
Voters satisfice by voting in incumbents in environments were they have to deal with more 
information about candidates.  But this impact smooth off as levels of competition increase, as 
indicated by the negative impact of the squared term for number of candidates. Another 
interesting finding regards partisanship.  Voters that feel closer to parties tend to vote for 
incumbents.  Hence, political parties matter in affecting voters’ choices for Federal Deputy in 
Brazil. 
 
5.3. Straight-Ticket Voting 
 
The second dependent variable analyzed refers to voting for candidates from the same 
party for different offices in the same election.  In the case of this study, I focus on voting for 
Federal Deputy and for President in the 2002 elections.  Voters who split their vote choose a 
candidate for Federal Deputy that is from a different coalition from their candidate for president. 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) have pointed out that split-ticket voting is a sign of weak 
political parties.  It is an indication that parties are not deeply rooted in society and that they do 
not closely represent the interests of cross-cutting social cleavages.  Split-ticket voting also has a 
negative impact on the strengthening of political parties, because instead of centering the 
political debate on programmatic proposals forwarded by political organizations, split-ticket 
voting is evidence of candidate-centered appeals.  If Mainwaring and Scully’s assessment of 
split-ticket voting is correct, then data from the two cities studied here confirm Mainwaring’s 
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 claim that Brazil is an example of political party underdevelopment. Thirty percent of the voters 
in Caxias do Sul cast a straight-ticket and even fewer, 24%, did so in Juiz de Fora.  This amounts 
to 27% in the combined sample. 
How does Brazil compare to other countries in this respect?  In the United States, Lewis-
Beck and Nadeau (2004) report that 78% of the respondents in the American National Election 
Studies (ANES) of 1992 and 80% in the 1996 ANES are straight ticket voters.  However, there 
are major institutional differences in the party and electoral systems in Brazil and the United 
States that certainly underlie these distinct patterns.  A more appropriate comparison would be 
Brazil versus other multi-party systems.  However, studies on the topic outside the United States 
are scant. 
In spite of the lack of evidence, split-ticket voting might be more common in multi-party 
systems for the simple reason that in such systems voters have more political parties to choose 
from.  It might simply be harder to vote for the same party in different races when there is a 
multiplicity of options, not just two as is the case in the US.  This is especially true when there is 
more than one party in the same side of the ideological spectrum, which is the case of Brazil.  
Hence, understanding the foundations of split-ticket voting is an important issue for all systems 
where the executive and legislative branches have independent mandates. 
The literature focusing on the US provides some theoretical insights about the impact of 
split-ticket voting in the political system and what leads voters to split their vote.  Although split-
ticket voting is much less widespread in the US than in Brazil, those who study the topic in the 
US have a less critical view of the causes of split-ticket voting than Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995).  There are several distinct points of view about this topic.  Some argue that voters 
intentionally choose candidates from different parties for the House of Representatives and for 
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 President to increase inter-branch accountability (Fiorina 1992, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2004)58.  
This view claims that split-ticket voting is in fact a positive trait of a political system, which 
decreases politicians’ discretion by dividing power between different political parties. 
Another view, espoused by Jacobsen (1990), is based on the idea that split-ticket voting is 
caused by the distinct dynamics that orient presidential and house elections.  House elections are 
guided by local level dynamics and by incumbents’ investment in the electoral district.  
Presidential elections, on the other hand, are affected by national issues, such as defense and 
foreign policy.  According to Jacobsen, the Democratic Party always had stronger links with 
local level politics through very active and engaged activists and grassroots projects.  On the 
other hand, the Republican Party has specialized on national level issues, which leads them to 
win presidential elections more successfully.  In Jacobsen’s view, split-ticket voting is the result 
of the characteristics of partisan competition. It is neither good nor bad for the system; it is 
explained by historic factors and partisan specialization in governing. 
A point of view that is overlooked by this previous literature is that when split-ticket 
voting leads to divided government, this may hinder voters’ capacity to hold incumbents 
accountable by increasing incumbents’ possibilities of shirking.  In situations of divided 
government, blame-shifting is much easier than during unified government.  Divided 
government, when different parties control the different branches of government, increases 
politicians’ latitude to mislead voters and shift blame.  Even though divided government may 
increase accountability without necessarily leading to gridlock, as Mayhew (1991) argues, it may 
blur responsibilities about the policy-making process.  The potential for blame-shifting is 
definitely higher in divided governments than in unified governments. 
                                                 
58 The literature about split-ticket voting in the United States is quite impressive. See Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 
(2004) for a review of this literature. 
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 Obviously, blame-shifting distorts representation because representatives purposely shirk 
from their own responsibilities when blaming others. This is a clear attempt to mislead voters 
deliberately.  Political misleading, in fact, is a common practice among politicians (Ferejohn 
1990), but it probably is more common when the blame can be shifted to an adversary and 
divided government offers the perfect opportunity to do so. 
Therefore, the impact of split-ticket voting on the functioning of the political system is 
not straightforward.  A clearer indication of its role in the political system may be identified by 
uncovering the characteristics of voters who cast a straight-ticket.  Systematic differences 
between voters who engage in straight-ticket voting and those who cast a split-ticket vote may 
indicate what this electoral choice represents for the political system. 
5.3.1. A Model of Straight-Ticket voting in Brazil 
 
In Brazil, it is very common that parties engage in electoral coalitions with other parties, 
as is the case with most multi-party systems.  Coalitions are usually formed by parties on the 
same side of the ideological spectrum.  This forcefully poses a measurement issue; in multi-party 
democracies, should split-ticket voting be based on party voting or coalition voting? 
Given that in Brazil electoral quotas in the elections for Federal Deputy are defined at the 
coalition level, not the party level, and also given that most coalitions tend to be formed by 
parties on the same side of the ideological spectrum, split-ticket voting should be based on 
coalition membership.  Furthermore, in the 2002 elections, a ruling of the Superior Electoral 
Court declared that parties were prohibited to engage in different coalitions in different states, 
common practice in the past. 59  Parties had to repeat in all states the coalition with the same 
parties they engaged in at the national level or run independently in the states where the national 
                                                 
59 This measure was very criticized because it was imposed by the courts and not by a Congressional decision.  Its 
objective, though, was clearly to nationalize local level elections for Federal Deputy and to strengthen party voting.  
144 
 level coalition could not be repeated due to regional grievances between parties.  There were 
states in which parties decided to run independently from the national coalition due to local 
problems.  This was permitted by law, but parties could not engage in coalitions with different 
parties at the national and state level. 
Certainly, a goal of this proposal is to increase the likelihood of straight-ticket voting.  
The Superior Electoral Court aimed at centering the debate in races for the Chamber of Deputies 
on national issues related to partisan policy proposals instead of in local level demands for the 
transfer of monies to specific municipalities.  Another concern was with increasing the likelihood 
of a coat-tails effect and consequently increasing the chances that the newly elected president 
would have a solid basis of support in the Chamber.  Governability has always been a problem in 
Brazil, and assuring that presidents have support in Congress has been in the core of most 
political reforms the country faced in the recent past. 
In fact, the concern with creating a stronger basis of support for the president in Congress 
was central in the reforms that made presidential and congressional elections concomitant in the 
1988 constitution.  The 1989 victory of Fernando Collor, a president with no partisan support in 
Congress, and his impeachment in 1993 exacerbated the concern with stimulating straight-ticket 
voting.  Perez-Linan has argued that the lack of a protective legislative shield – the support of a 
qualified majority in Congress – was in the essence of Collor’s failure in dealing with Congress 
during the impeachment process (2002). 
Another view about the problems created by split-ticket voting spurs from Ames’ 
discussion about the deadlock of democracy in Brazil (2001). The core of his view is the idea 
that multiple parties generate excessive veto points, hindering governments’ ability to efficiently 
construct stable governing majorities.  In Ames’ view, majorities in Congress are not stable.  
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 They are grounded in situations similar to those of conditional party government developed to 
explain partisan politics in the US (Aldrich 1995), where policy making is only possible when 
there is preference congruence between majorities of representatives.  In the Brazilian case, the 
absence of preference congruence is supplanted by wheeling and dealing.  The Brazilian system 
is designed in a way that facilitates gridlock and increases the costs of governing (Ames 2001). 
This view is not consensual though.  Other authors point to the fact that in spite of the 
high number of parties, parties are still important actors in the Brazilian legislative arena.  
Furthermore, the flow of legislative production in Congress is not so slow and inefficient, 
especially during the Cardoso admnistration (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995, 1999, Amorim Neto 
and Santos 2000, Pereira 2000, Santos and Renno forthcoming, Pereira, Power and Renno 
Forthcoming, Amorim Neto, Cox, McCubbins 2003).  A central aspect in some of these pieces is 
that rules inside Congress centralize the decision-making process in the hands of party leaders 
from the governing coalition by granting them agenda power and gate keeping posts.  Hence, the 
centralization of power inside Congress mitigates the centripetal impact of multiple parties in the 
policy-making process. 
In spite of this debate, all of these authors agree that the construction of a stable majority 
is important for governance at the national level in Brazil.  This view points to the central role 
Congress plays in the current Brazilian policy process and to the increasing influence of political 
parties in affecting the functioning of Congress.  In fact, Johnson and Crisp (2003) have argued 
that Congresses throughout Latin America have gained power in the 1990s. 
The important point of this debate is the idea that the larger the coalition supporting the 
president in Congress, the easier it will be for the President to govern.  Given that Brazil is 
constantly facing processes of constitutional reform that require qualified majorities in Congress, 
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 having a stable governing coalition becomes imperative to efficiently approve reforms.  Straight-
ticket voting, hence, could increase presidents’ ability to govern, by facilitating the construction 
of a broader base of support in Congress. 
From the perspective of increasing governance, straight-ticket voting is a desirable trait 
of the political system.  From the perspective of increasing accountability, the literature about 
straight-ticket vote indicates that it may weaken the checks and balances between the branches of 
government.  On the other hand, straight-ticket voting may represent holding parties accountable 
for their performance in office and not individual politicians.  Furthermore, in situations of 
unified government, which are dependent upon straight-ticket voting, it is much harder to shift 
blame and to mislead voters.  Straight-ticket vote may, in this sense, strengthen accountability 
and it does so by shifting it from individuals to political parties.  
Uncovering what are the determinants of straight-ticket voting may provide some 
evidence of its implications for the political system.  Finally, divided government is a central 
characteristic of Brazilian politics.  Probably only Fernando Cardoso had a solid, stable support 
coalition in congress (Pereira et. al forthcoming, Amorim Neto et al. 2004).  It becomes 
important, then, to uncover the individual and contextual level factors that lead to straight-ticket 
voting.  Such factors may shed light in the role straight-ticket voting plays in Brazil. 
The main variables tested in the model below are information about incumbents and 
challengers, general political awareness, partisanship, number of candidates competing at the 
neighborhood level,  mean neighborhood political conversation, positive attitudes towards 
specific politicians and reasons to vote for Federal Deputy, if national, local or personal.  A 
possible hypothesis is that those who cast a straight-ticket vote are more aware of national issues, 
feel closer to political parties, and vote for their representatives in Congress based on national 
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 level issues.  If this is so, then straight-ticket voting is a vote choice of those who focus more on 
setting political parties accountable for their performance on national issues than on individual 
candidates and their investment in transferring funds to specific localities. 
The impact of environmental and contextual variables, respectively number of candidates 
and mean neighborhood political conversation, has never been tested in models that explain 
straight-ticket voting.  I expect that as competition between several candidates for Federal 
Deputy increases at the neighborhood level, the harder it is for voters to cast a straight-ticket.  
The logic of this argument is that the more options available, the greater the likelihood they will 
be from different parties and also the greater the opportunities for a voter to choose a candidate 
for Federal Deputy that is from a different coalition from his/her candidate for President. 
Mean neighborhood political conversation, on the other hand, should lead to increases in 
straight-ticket voting.  The idea is that such conversations lead to an increase in the level of 
information in the system about candidates.  As was said before, more information should 
increase the overall level of attention towards politics and hence the likelihood that partisan and 
national issues gain salience in voters views. 
The fact is there are no previous studies of straight-ticket voting in Latin American using 
survey data. All of the possible conjectures about its causes are thus open to empirical 
investigation. 
I also include in the model voters’ attentiveness to the Free Electoral Airtime.  Schimitt, 
Carneiro and Kuschnir (1999) have argued that the Free Electoral Airtime increases the influence 
of political parties in voters’ choices.  If this is so, then those who are exposed to candidates’ and 
parties’ ads in the media will be more likely to cast a straight-ticket. 
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 Finally, straight-ticket voting, as Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2004) argue, may also be 
motivated by candidates’ personal characteristics.  That is, voters end up voting for candidates of 
the same party, not out of any special sympathy for the party, but because both candidates, for a 
coincidence, are from the same party.  In such a case, straight-ticket voting is nothing but an 
unintentional consequence of candidate-centered voting.  I control for this possibility by 
including in the equation variables that indicate positive evaluations of presidential candidate 
Lula da Silva and Jose Serra as well as candidates for Federal Deputy in both cities; Ana Corso 
and Jose Ivo Sartori in Caxias do Sul/ Paulo Delgado and Custodio Mattos in Juiz de Fora. 
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 5.3.2. Results 
 
Table 7 indicates that most of the expectations discussed above are confirmed by the 
data.  Voters who are more politically aware, who are better informed about candidates for 
Federal Deputy and who feel closer to political parties are more likely to cast straight-ticket 
votes in all the three different samples analyzed. 
TABLE 7: FIXED EFFECTS FOR LOGIT REGRESSION OF STRAIGHT-TICKET 
VOTING: BRAZIL 2002. 
Variables Full Sample Juiz de Fora Caxias do Sul 
Intercept -1.48*** -1.74*** -1.30*** 
Number of Candidates -0.16 (0.85) -0.17 (0.84) -1.05* (0.35) 
Number of Candidates2 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 0.13 (1.13) 
Neighborhood Political Conversation 1.05** (2.85) 1.36** (3.89) 0.53 (1.69) 
Knows Challengers 0.54*** (1.71) 0.51*** (1.61) 0.54*** (1.71) 
Knows Incumbents 0.42*** (1.52) 0.37*** (1.66) 0.50*** (1.64) 
Awareness 0.15*** (1.16) 0.13** (1.13) 0.15** (1.16) 
Reason for Vote – Local 2.07*** (7.92) 1.99*** (7.31) 2.19***  (8.93) 
Reason for Vote – National 2.17*** (8.75) 2.43*** (11.3) 1.90*** (6.68) 
Partisanship 0.39*** (1.47) 0.39*** (1.47) 0.30** (1.34) 
Free Electoral Airtime 0.14 (1.15) 0.11 (1.11) 0.19 (1.21) 
Positive Evaluation – Lula da Silva 0.11 (1.11) -0.02 (0.98) -0.12 (0.88) 
Positive Evaluation – José Serra  0.40** (1.49) 0.25 (1.28) 0.54*** (1.71) 
Positive Evaluation – Ana Corso -- -- 0.49*** (1.63) 
Positive Evaluation – Jose Ivo Sartori -- -- 0.06 (1.06) 
Positive Evaluation – Paulo Delgado -- 0.90*** (2.45) -- 
Positive Evaluation – Custodio Mattos -- -0.57*** (0.56) -- 
Male -0.19** (0.83) -0.27* (0.76) -0.07 (0.93) 
Married -0.13 (0.87) -0.02 (0.98) -0.18 (0.83) 
Employed 0.02 (1.02) -0.17 (0.84) -0.04 (0.96) 
White 0.12 (1.13) 0.12 (1.12) 0.15 (1.16) 
Income 0.21* (1.23) 0.18 (1.19) 0.20 (1.22) 
Education 0.02 (1.02) 0.04 (1.04) 0.01 (1.01) 
Age 0.00 (1.00) -0.00 (1.00) 0.01* (1.01) 
Replacement C 0.32** (1.37) 0.36* (1.43) 0.27* (1.31) 
Problem Interviewer -0.42 (0.65) -0.40 (0.67) -0.18 (0.83) 
N Level 1 5080 2568 2512 
N Level 2 44 22 22 
* = sign. <.05, ** = sign. <.01, *** = sign. <.001 
(Odds Ratios in Parentheses) 
 
It is interesting to notice the impact of the variables that indicate voters’ reasons for 
voting for Federal Deputy. Both those who vote for Federal Deputy based on national and local 
level issues are more prone to cast a straight-ticket vote.  The excluded dummy, on this case, 
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 voting based on personal reasons due to casework, is represented by the intercept.  The impact of 
personal reasons for voting for federal deputy is negative on straight-ticket voting, whereas 
voting based on local and national issues is positively related to straight-ticket voting.  Hence, 
those who vote for Federal Deputy based on local, municipal level factors and national level 
factors are quite distinct from voters who base their votes on personal reasons.  On the other 
hand, at least when it comes to voting for the same party in legislative and executive elections, 
voting based on local and national level factors have similar impacts. 
It is also interesting to note that electoral competition between several distinct candidates 
at the neighborhood does not have an effect in voters’ choice of casting a straight-ticket in the 
full sample and in Juiz de Fora, but it does in Caxias and has the expected negative impact.  This 
resonates with the findings of the previous chapter, where increases in the number of candidates 
only matters when the maximum number of candidates goes up to 5 or 6.  After that, which is the 
case of Juiz de Fora, changes no longer matter. 
Neighborhood political conversation, on its turn, also has the expected result, but only in 
the combined sample and Juiz de Fora.  In Caxias, political interaction at the neighborhood level 
does not really matter for casting a straight-ticket. 
Finally, straight-ticket voting also seems to be motivated by voters’ candidate preference.  
The data indicates that voters’ who support Ana Corso in Caxias do Sul and Paulo Delgado in 
Juiz de Fora, both members of the Workers’ Party, are more prone to cast a straight-ticket vote.  
However, those who support Lula da Silva, the Workers’ Party candidate for president are not 
necessarily inclined to cast a straight-ticket vote.  This is an indication that most of Lula voters 
do not vote for a candidate from his party for Federal Deputy.  On the other hand, voters who 
choose a Worker’s Party candidate for Federal Deputy necessarily vote for Lula for President.  
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 This indicates that not all Lula supporters vote for the Workers’ Party in legislative elections, but 
most who vote for a Workers’ Party candidate for Federal Deputy choose Lula as their candidate 
for President.  People who vote for Lula do not necessarily vote for a candidate for Federal 
Deputy from his coalition.  This is so because Lula has received enormous support in 2002, not 
just from Workers’ Party sympathizers. 
José Serra, the candidate from the governing party was not as popular as Lula.  Serra 
supporters were more likely not just to vote for him, but also for a candidate of his coalition.  
Serra supporters are fewer than Lula supporters; hence true Serra supporters include a more 
concise group of voters that are also more likely to support candidates for Federal Deputy of his 
coalition. 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
Voters can hold politicians or political parties accountable for their performances in 
office.  In Brazil, voters place more emphasis on holding individual candidates accountable 
instead of parties.  This is clear by the high level of split-ticket voting; only a third of the voters 
vote for candidates of the same party for different offices.  This does not mean, however, that 
voters are not holding individual politicians accountable.  It simply means that instead of 
exercising control over parties, voters prefer to judge politicians. 
It is also important to keep in mind that incumbents do not automatically receive voters’ 
support.  A similar diagnosis of vanishing marginals made by Mayhew in relation to the case of 
the United States certainly does not apply to Brazil (1974).60  In Caxias do Sul in 2002, for 
example, the main incumbent of the city did not run for reelection.  Instead he supported a 
                                                 
60 According to Samuels (2001), the problem in Brazil is just the opposite, extremely high turnover rates.  For a 
competing view see Leoni, Pereira and Renno (2004). 
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 challenger who was an ambitious State Deputy.  The result was that 57% of the voters in the 
Caxias sample voted for a challenger.  In Juiz de Fora, since all incumbents attempted reelection, 
84% of the sample in that city voted for an incumbent.  However, the most important finding is 
that voters do seem to apply consistent criteria when judging incumbents.  Voters’ satisfaction 
with incumbents plays a role in affecting voting decisions, as well as information about 
candidates.  The Caxias do Sul case is especially interesting because a popular incumbent who 
did not run for reelection was able to help a challenger win the election.  In the same city, an 
incumbent who was not as highly evaluated was not successful in receiving votes. 
Incumbents also seem to be evaluated predominantly for their efforts of investing in the 
municipality.  In both cities, around 40% of voters focus on municipal level factors when 
justifying their vote for Federal Deputy.61  Around 20% of the respondents justify their choices 
based on national level issues and only around 5% base their decisions on having received a 
personal favor.  Each of these motivations were coded as dummy variables and entered in the 
equations that explain voting for an incumbent.  National motivations are never significant. Only 
personal and municipal factors influence voting for an incumbent. 
It is also interesting to note that partisanship affects voting in Brazilian legislative 
elections.  Voters who identify with a political party behave differently from those who do not.  
This is indication that parties do matter when voters make their electoral choices, even when 
evaluating individual candidates. 
A final question is how do the criteria voters use to evaluate parties differ from that used 
to evaluate individual candidates?  Are the variables that affect casting a straight-ticket vote 
similar to those that affect voting for an incumbent?  This is a difficult comparison to make 
because the specification of these models is not identical.  Nonetheless, some comparisons are 
                                                 
61 This amount reaches 60% if those who refrain from pointing out any reason are excluded from the sample. 
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 possible. For instance, voters’ motivations to choose a candidate for Federal Deputy have quite 
distinct impacts in judging individual politicians and parties.  National level motivations increase 
the likelihood of casting a straight-ticket vote.  Municipal level factors are the main influence in 
incumbents’ evaluations.  Therefore, voters’ motivations to choose a candidate for Federal 
Deputy clearly affect straight-ticket voting differently from voting for an incumbent.  On the 
other hand, there is evidence that both partisanship and information strongly affect voters’ 
choices when they are setting both individual candidates as well as political parties accountable. 
The central conclusion, though, is that there are clear patterns in voters’ electoral 
decisions in spite of the political system’s complex characteristics. 
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 6. Chapter 6: Conclusion 
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 The normative backdrop of this dissertation is the idea of accountability, of voters being 
able to evaluate their representatives based on their performance in office and oust incompetent, 
dishonest politicians from politics.  Accountability is by definition related to voters’ 
retrospective evaluation of politicians and the punishment of incumbents who do not fare well.  It 
must be clear that this is not the only way voters come to terms with making their electoral 
decisions.  Several authors have shown that voters employ a diverse array of strategies when 
casting a vote.62  Some voters look forward and focus on candidates’ promises, other voters 
believe that the hardships of the present are not the responsibility of incumbents and decide to 
support them.  Others blame factors beyond the control of politicians for the adversities of the 
present.  In sum, there are many ways politicians can evade blame legitimately, without 
necessarily deceiving the voter.  All of these are choices where ties between voters and 
representatives are not severed, where the politician is not engaging in behavior that harms the 
voter, without justifying this behavior to voters. 
However, there clearly are situations where voters are harmed by politicians, where the 
public interest is not served, and politicians still manage to escape punishment.  There are cases 
where voters are deceived by corrupt politicians.  These types of relationship have been in the 
essence of clientelism, where politicians keep their power by controlling specific cohorts of 
voters and from time to time distributing personal favors in exchange for the voter’s support.  As 
Fox has argued, clientelism is based on an unequal distribution of power between individuals 
(1997).  Disempowered voters exchange votes for crumbs, and dishonest politicians thrive.  
Usually, politicians who rely on clientelistic practices are the same that seek rent from the state 
for their own interest and in detriment of the majority.  Such politicians prosper based on voters’ 
subordinate condition and the belief that voters lack the power to punish incumbents for wrong-
                                                 
62 See the many excellent articles in Susan Stokes’ book (2001). 
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 doing.  In sum, this type of politician survives due to the lack of accountability.  Unfortunately, 
corruption and clientelism are widespread in Latin American politics, and the lack of 
accountability is certainly on the roots of these problems. 
Given that a majority of the population in Latin America is poor, with low living 
conditions and low levels of education and health, it is very easy for politicians to make a career 
based on clientelism.  In spite of the deepening of democracy in several Latin American 
countries and strong reactions to traditional political practices (Chalmers et al 1997, Baiocchi 
2003), some politicians still feed from the overarching inequality that corrodes the social fabric 
of Latin America. 
Specific examples abound.  Just to mention a major one: A former President (similar to 
the speaker) of the Brazilian Senate, Jader Barbalho, was involved in a huge corruption scandal 
during his most recent term as senator.  He was forced to step down from the Senate in 2000 and 
was sent to jail for a few hours. His pictures with hand-cuffs on circulated the country, piles and 
piles of evidence against him were amassed, and still he won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies 
in the 2002 election.  And this is the case of a big fish, less known cases of unpunished 
wrongdoing in elections abound. 
Clearly, the existence of these cases is the result of pure lack of accountability; voters’ 
inability to punish an officeholder for opportunistic behavior.  It is clear that punishing 
incumbents is not the only way voters can and should make vote choices, but in countries with 
widespread corruption and abuse of power, holding those in office responsible for their actions is 
a requirement for the strengthening of democracy.  As Pitkin has argued, if a politician is able to 
evade punishment for wrongdoing and is not able to justify his/her actions to the voters and still 
survives in office, representation is no more.  Without representation, democracy ceases to be. 
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 This dissertation attempted to explore the micro-foundations of accountability in Latin 
America.  I argued that for voters to be able to hold their representatives accountable for what 
they do in office, they must have minimal amounts of information about candidates.  Voters must 
be aware of who the contenders are and some of their basic characteristics in order to compare 
with incumbents.  In order to evaluate incumbents, voters must also be able to evaluate them 
minimally, and information is in the essence of this evaluative process. 
Hence, information is in the root of accountability.  I tested a model of information 
acquisition during campaigns to identify the factors that increase voters’ levels of information 
about candidates for Federal Deputy.  I also argued that accountability is only consummated in 
the voting booth, when the voter makes her/his choice.  Therefore, it is also important to evaluate 
how information, alongside other factors, affects vote choices.  The second data analysis chapter 
explored the impact of information in voting for incumbents and in casting a straight-ticket vote, 
both directly related to holding politicians and political parties accountable. 
The theoretical discussion that oriented the data analysis comes from the huge literature 
on voting behavior.  Several of the concepts developed in the study of the United States were 
adapted to the Brazilian case and tested using a unique data set collected during the 2002 
elections.  A main controversy related to this literature, which I addressed in my study, regards 
the role of information in elections.  The literature on voting behavior has come to an impasse 
about how much information voters must have in order to vote.  This controversy has inspired a 
huge discussion that spans for over half a century.  The key question is do voters need to be fully 
informed about politics or do they simply need to have minimal information about specific 
aspects of the political system?  The literature has moved in the direction of supporting the latter.  
However, even such simple information is not widespread.  There is variation between voters in 
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 the minimal levels of information.  Therefore, identifying the factors that explain such variation 
is important if one is concerned with how instructed voters are about politics. 
Related to this is the question of how environments affect voters’ levels of information 
and vote choices.  This is a debate that has developed more recently in the literature about voting 
behavior but has gained much attention.  The general view is that voters may not know enough 
about politics because the conditions made available to them by the political and informational 
environments are not prone to increasing levels of information.  Clearly, a debate about 
environmental impact in vote choices requires variation in environments:  requires the 
comparison of distinct environments. 
Unfortunately, most studies on the topic have failed to engage in a comparative study of 
electoral environments.  Most studies focus in only one case, the United States, where variation 
in environmental characteristics related to electoral competition and strength of partisanship is 
much lower than in Latin America.  These studies have also failed in conceptualizing 
environments as a different level of analysis and of measuring it as such.  This has lead to an 
overestimation of the impact of environments in vote choice. 
Finally, another topic related the debate about information is the role it plays in actual 
vote choices.  Do different types of information differently affect voting?  What is more 
influential in voting, domain specific information or general information?  These questions were 
also addressed in this dissertation. 
I was able to explore all of the above issues using a data set that measures variation over 
time and across space.  The research design maximized variation in electoral environments and 
measured voters’ opinions on issues, partisanship, vote intention and information levels in three 
moments during the 2002 campaign.  The study included two cities with very distinct political 
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 characteristics, albeit similar in socio-economic and demographic terms, and neighborhoods 
inside these cities with distinct numbers of candidates competing in each.  The data set captured 
both the dynamic process of change during a campaign as well as the cross-sectional comparison 
between environments.  The design truly offers the possibility of a comparative study of the 
impact of political environments in changes in levels of information and vote choice. 
These data allowed me to test several distinct hypotheses about how voters learn about 
candidates for Federal Deputy and how information affects vote choices.  Brazil is seen as a 
classic example of party underdevelopment and of weak ideological divides.  Cues coming from 
parties and based on ideology should have a lower impact in information gain and voting than in 
other places.  With this in mind, I developed a model that incorporates all the distinct sources of 
information voters might have during elections.  These include participation in civil society 
organizations, media attention, talking about politics, watching politicians’ ads, all of these being 
indicators of voters’ motivation to learn about candidates.  The model also included 
neighborhood measures of the extent of political deliberation and the number of candidates 
competing in that neighborhood as a proxy for electoral competition.  Finally, using interaction 
terms, the model also evaluated how individual level factors, linked to motivation to learn about 
politics, are affected by neighborhood characteristics.  I never discarded the possibility of causal 
heterogeneity. 
The results indicate that individual level characteristics are the main causes of variation 
in voters’ levels of information in both cities studied.  Voters who are engaged in civil society 
activism, who pay attention to the media, who talk about politics, who are exposed to attempts of 
persuasion, who have some form of party identification and an ideological preference are all 
better informed about candidates.  It is true that voters without these characteristics do catch up 
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 during the campaign.  The impact of individual level variables decreases as the campaign 
proceeds.  However, in the final wave, voters who are more motivated to learn still know more 
than those who are less motivated.  The “information rich” do get “information richer”. 
The impact of environments in learning is less straightforward.  Environments provide 
the opportunities to learn.  It was argued that in environments where the number of candidates 
competing is very high, it is harder for voters to learn because the cognitive complexity of the 
setting is enhanced.  Therefore, environments not just provide incentives for learning, they can 
also generate constraints.  This contradicts initial views about the role of competition in 
elections.  Zaller (1992) and Mayhew before him (1974) have argued that the more competition 
leads to the more informed voters.  This is only true for systems where increases in competition 
are limited to the addition of a single strong challenger to the race.  In environments where 
competition occurs between more than two candidates, then increments in the number of 
candidates may hinder voters’ ability to learn about the different alternatives. 
Such a hypothesis is directly related to Lupia and McCubbins’ (1998) and Sniderman’s 
(2000) claim that the role of cues in voters’ ability to learn about candidates changes according 
to the characteristics of political institutions that surround voters.  Environments, in the form 
they are used here and following Huckfeldt and Sprague’s work (1990), is a direct result of the 
institutional framework of a locality.  Levels of competition in Brazil are so high and variegated 
because electoral rules allow politicians to concentrate their efforts in specific localities inside 
the electoral district.  Electoral rules stimulate a concentration of campaigning in different 
environments, which leads to variation in the number of candidates competing in a specific 
locality.  In addition, political parties are not equally weak throughout Brazil.  Hence, there are 
cities like Caxias do Sul where there is a strong partisan divide based on ideological and class 
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 disagreements.  The research design mentioned above took advantage of this and allowed me to 
engage in a comparative study of electoral environments. 
First, I found that the impact of number of candidates is not identical in both cities and in 
all three waves.  In Juiz de Fora, where variation in the number of candidates ranges from around 
6 to about 10 candidates competing in a neighborhood, increments in the number of candidates 
do not alter voters’ levels of information.  Furthermore, as the campaign proceeds, voters know 
more about candidates.  When competition is restricted to a high number of candidates, 
environments do not seem to decisively intervene in voters learning processes. 
In Caxias do Sul the impact is totally distinct.  Where variation is restricted to about 2 
candidates to around 5 candidates, increments in number of candidates do decrease voters’ 
ability to learn.  Higher numbers of candidates do appear to decrease voters levels of 
information, as Lau and Redlawsk (2001) argued.  However, the impact of this variable is not 
uniform in all three waves of interviews in Caxias do Sul.  As the campaign proceeds, voters 
embedded in environments with very low levels of competition, where one candidate dominates 
most votes, do not learn about other candidates.  Levels of information decrease as the campaign 
proceeds in environments with extremely low numbers of candidates competing.  In the third 
wave of interviews in neighborhoods where only one candidate received most votes, voters 
actually knew less about other candidates than when they were first interviewed, early in the 
campaign.  This was the only occasion in which levels of information did not increase over the 
campaign.  Curiously, this specific instance supports Mayhew’s expectation about the vanishing 
marginals; when one candidate dominates most votes of a locality, voters learn less about 
incumbent and challengers, and accountability is in risk. 
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 Hence, environments that are polarized, where political parties are strong, and where 
electoral competition is very low do not generate incentives for learning.  Voters stick to their 
most preferred candidate and do not even bother learning about other alternatives.  In my view, 
this is an impediment for judging the incumbent.  It is as if voters had no opportunities to learn.  
Again, the assumption is that if there is no learning, if there is no informational gain about 
candidates, accountability is at risk. 
This assumption is actually backed by evidence in the analysis of the impact of 
information in vote choices.  Information does affect choice.  Voters who are more aware about 
challengers are less likely to support incumbents.  Voters who are better informed choose 
differently from those who are less informed. 
In addition, when it comes to choosing their candidates for Federal Deputy, voters seem 
to be able use distinct criteria to make electoral choices.  There are clear patterns to how voters 
choose their candidates for Federal Deputy.  Voters take into consideration incumbents’ previous 
behavior.  Partisanship also impacts voters’ choices for Federal Deputy. 
The same is also true in the case of those who vote for candidates of the same party.  
Better informed, more partisan voters are more likely to cast a straight-ticket vote.  In spite of the 
complexity of the electoral environment, there is a rational for choosing a candidate for the 
Chamber of Deputies.  Such vote is not a random decision voters engage in.  It involves 
reasoning and consideration. 
There are implications of these findings for reform proposals of the Brazilian political 
system.  Restricting the number of candidates too much, in environments where competition is 
more polarized and political parties are stronger, like the case of Caxias do Sul, is detrimental for 
voters’ ability to learn during the campaign.  Recall that the only occasion in which voters’ levels 
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 of information were lower after the election in comparison to the beginning was where one 
candidate dominated most of the local votes.  This is the only situation in which voters did not 
gain information during the campaign.  In fact, it might be that it is lack of competition between 
various candidates that still allows for the electoral survival of corrupt, clientelistic politicians.  
Voters might feel compelled to support these types of politicians for pure lack of options.  The 
dilemma the Mexican voter faces, better the devil you know than the saint you do not, might be 
in the root of the survival of corrupt, clientelistic incumbents in Brazil.  The issue then would be 
to discover how impervious the electoral strongholds of these politicians are, but this would be 
the subject of future studies. 
However, one must not loose sight also that increments in the number of candidates 
competing in a neighborhood in a single moment of the campaign leads to decreases in levels of 
information, especially in Caxias do Sul.  Furthermore, as was discussed in Chapter 5, as the 
number of candidates increase, voters appear to be more likely to vote for incumbents.  This is an 
indication that instead of stimulating learning about challengers, higher number of candidates 
appears to increase the cognitive complexity of the election, leading voters to satisfyce and 
choose the easiest alternative, vote for an incumbent.   
A combination between reducing competition and still allowing for the existence of more 
than two candidates seems to be the appropriate solution for this problem.  Therefore, changing 
the system from proportional representation, to single-member districts could actually lead to 
more negative externalities than anything else.  The cutting of districts would be such a 
problematic issue that it could give gerrymandering a new meaning!  It also seems that 
dramatically reducing the number of parties, to say two, could also lead to problems.  It is only in 
Caxias do Sul, where parties are strong and ideological divides cross-cuting that voter’s loose 
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 information when competition is restricted to two candidates.  As Mayhew argued, a problem of 
vanishing marginals, of excessive domination by a single candidate, reduces voters’ ability to 
learn and to hold politicians accountable.  It seems that the trick is to strike a balance by reducing 
the number of candidates, without necessarily altering the multi-party nature of Brazilian. 
An alternative, simpler, option is to reduce the number of candidates parties are allowed 
to nominate.  In Brazil, parties can nominate up to one and half the number of candidates in 
relation to seats available.  This means that in the state of Minas Gerais, which has 53 seats, 
parties can nominate up to 79 candidates for Federal Deputy.  Given that there are 27 parties 
registered in the state, it becomes easy to understand why there were 554 candidates for Federal 
Deputy in the 2002 elections in Minas Gerais.  Two things can be done: increase the entrance 
barrier for parties, so that the number falls to a more manageable size, and restrict the number of 
candidates each party can nominate.  The second change is actually very easy to implement.  It 
only requires a simple majority in Congress.  The more stringent entrance barriers were already 
defined and will become effective in the 2006 elections. 
The goal of a successful reform of the Brazilian political system, from the standpoint of 
increasing accountability, is one that maximizes voters’ ability to learn about candidates in the 
elections for the Chamber of Deputies.  Reducing the complexity of the system is a step in that 
direction.  As was seen, not just electoral complexity hinders learning, other factors increase 
voters ability to learn.  Strengthening partisanship, stimulating participation in civil society 
organizations and increasing access to diversified news sources are also factors that should 
increase voters’ motivation to learn.  All of these factors lead to increased knowledge about 
politics.  A country that so desperately needs accountability will only benefit if voters’ 
motivation to learn about politics is stimulated and environmental complexity reduced. 
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 A final word: The study of voters’ levels of political information and its impact in 
electoral choices in Latin America is completely open to investigation.  This dissertation only 
started to scratch the surface of this debate and more research is certainly called for.  Certain 
areas are strong candidates for future studies.  First, almost nothing is known about voters’ levels 
of information about other topics related to politics, such as how much voters know about issues, 
about candidates’ stances on issues, on governmental policies, and so many other facets of 
politics.  A full exploration of what type of information voters have about the political system in 
Latin America is certainly necessary. 
Second, this dissertation pointed very briefly to a very disturbing facet of the patterns of 
distribution of information in Brazil; there is a clear racial and gender gap in informational 
levels.  White men are more likely to be better informed than African-Brazilians and women.  
Such patterns of informational biases can lead to an aggravation of the current situation of 
groups that are already discriminated against in Brazil.  Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) and 
Mondak and Anderson (2004) document this same phenomenon in the United States.  Similar 
investigations are necessary in Brazil, where problems of racial discrimination are rampant.  The 
implications of unequal distributions of political information can play a reinforcing role in the 
already underprivileged and subordinate life condition of so many Brazilians, with devastating 
effects for the strengthening of democracy in the country. 
 The study of political information in Latin America is uncharted territory.  This 
dissertation attempted to start to explore this territory.  It provided some insights about what 
increases voters’ levels of information and how information affects specific vote choices in the 
race for Federal Deputy.  There are clear patterns in learning about politics and in vote choices 
related to holding individual politicians and political parties accountable.  Some of these findings 
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 indicate that variables like partisanship and ideology play a significant role in Brazilian 
legislative elections, contrary to the expectations of pundits and laymen alike.  It also shows that 
environmental conditions should not be ignored.  Learning and voting are not only a 
consequence of individual preferences and behavior but are also affected by the environments in 
which voters are embedded. 
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TABLE 8: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SES VARIABLES FOR JUIZ DE FORA AND 
CAXIAS DO SUL: BRAZIL, 2000. 
20144080Deaths
123217Deaths - younger than 1 year old
231273Deaths - external causes
R$ 753,334,828.00R$ 527,387,654.00Wages paid by Local Businesses
R$ 18,337,538.68R$ 15,410,838.80Federal Educational Fund
R$ 9,794,409.82R$ 11,077,834.08Federal Transfers
R$ 121,228,964.84R$ 203,254,396.05Budgetary Expenditures
R$ 30,423,079.32R$ 48,059,511.73Municipal Tax Revenue
4135Banks
115328106787Employed Personnel
1799116132Number of Business Enterprises
229614312474Voters
1526826705Enrolled in High School
5741079836Enrolled in Elementary School
417Hospitals
290772367844Literate Population over 10 years of Age
360419456796Population
CAXIAS DO SULJUIZ DE FORAVariable
Source: IBGE, Brazilian Census 2000.
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 TABLE 9:  DATA CHARACTERISTICS. 
Juiz de Fora, MG
15%4792594October
23%4102299August
2447March/April
AttritionReplacementsInterviewsWave
Caxias do Sul, RS
24%5772528October
29%4842208August
2433March/April
AttritionReplacementsInterviewsWave
Sample Size: 14509
Attrition: 
31% in Juiz de Fora 1689 Subjects Responded 3 waves
44% in Caxias do Sul 1359 Subjects Responded 3 waves
38% Combined Sample 3048 Subjects Responded 3 waves  
 
TABLE 10: VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
VARIABLES Description 
Opportunities   
Number of Candidates Juan Molinar’s Count of Number of Candidates in Neighborhood 
Number of Candidates2 Juan Molinar’s Count of Number of Candidates in Neighborhood 
Squared 
Mean Neighborhood
Political Conversation 
(MNPC) 
 Neighborhood Mean of the Index of Political Conversation 
Individual Motivation Description 
Partisanship 2 = Identifies Strongly with a Political Party; 1 = Identifies Weakly 
with a Political Party; 0 = Does not Identify with Political Party 
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 Ideology 1 = Self-places in a Left-Right Ideological Continuum; 0 = Does not 
self-place in a Left-Right Ideological Continuum 
Awareness Index composed by responses to political knowledge questions. 
Items include knowledge about the office of an important local 
politician, of the Vice-President’s name, the political party of 
President Cardoso, countries that belong to the Mercosur, name of a 
Senator from the state and name of the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Min: 0. Max: 7. Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.67 
Civil Society Activism Index composed by responses to items on participation in 
organizations of the civil society. Includes participation in 
Neighborhood associations, Sport Clubs, Church Groups, Labor 
Unions, and meetings of the Participatory Budget. Min: 0.  Max: 6. 
Asked only on the first wave of interviews and carried forward. 
Political Conversation Index composed by responses to items on habits of talking about 
politics with neighbors, friends, at work, and with family members. 
Min: 0. Max: 1 Cronbach’s Alpha: .59 
Media Index composed by responses to items on frequency of watching the 
top two most watched television news broadcasts by the respondent 
in a week and the frequency of reading the top two newspapers 
most read by the respondent in a week. Min: 0. Max: 26. 
Persuasion Index composed by responses to items about exposure to attempts 
of persuasion by other citizens, party activists and members of the 
neighborhood association. Min: 0. Max: 3 
Free Electoral Airtime Dummy variable for having watched the Free Electoral Airtime 
programs for Federal Deputy. 
Individual Ability Description 
Education Response to item on last school year attended. Ranges from 0, 
illiterate, to 15, completed graduate school. 
Age and Age2 Age of respondent based on response on year of birth. Squared 
Value of Age. 
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 White Response to self-description of item on skin color. 1= White, 0 = 
Non-White. 
Income Coded 1 if Respondent earns $1000 or more and 0 if respondent 
earns less than $1000.  Divided based on the income value of the 
top third percentile. 
Married Receives value 1 if respondent is formally or informally married. 
Employed 1 if respondent is employed, 0 otherwise. 
Design Controls Description 
Problem Interviewer Some interviewers were caught falsifying questionnaires. The 
falsified questionnaires were discarded. The questionnaires by these 
interviewers that were not falsified were controlled for. The variable 
receives value 1 if it was done by an interviewer caught falsifying. 
Questionnaires Entered
Once 
 1 if questionnaires were only checked once, 0 otherwise. 
Replacements Wave B 1 if the respondent was part of a fresh cross-section interviewed in 
wave 2, 0 otherwise. 
Replacements Wave C 1 if the respondent was part of a fresh cross-section interviewed in 
wave 3, 0 otherwise. 
Knows Challengers Receives values from 0 to 3.  0 means the respondent does not know 
the name any challenger.  Values from 1 to 3 indicate the number of 
challengers the voter can state. 
Knows Incumbents Identical to above variable, only that indicates knowing names of 
incumbent Federal Deputies.  I cross-checked lists of candidates 
who ran for office and of lists of current Federal Deputies with the 
names mentioned by the respondent.  
171 
 Risk Acceptant Dummy variable indicating if voter is more risk acceptant.  The 
questionnaire item asked the respondent which of the following two 
options they agreed more with:  better a bird in the hand than two in 
the bush, or those who don’t take chances, don’t make gains (quem 
não arrisca não petisca).  Those who agreed more with the latter 
were considered risk acceptant individuals. 
Satisfied with Incumbent Respondents were asked how satisfied they were with incumbents. 
Response alternatives included very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied 
and very dissatisfied.  Those who said they were satisfied or very 
satisfied were coded 1, all others coded 0. 
Reason for Vote Respondents were asked the main reason for choosing their 
candidate for Federal Deputy.  Response alternatives included 
“because he/she will help my city”, “he/she will present projects 
with a national scope” and “because he/she has helped me before”. 
A dummy variable was created for each response. 
Positive Evaluations of 
 
 
 
 
These responses were based on feeling thermometers.  Those who 
felt strongly towards a candidate were coded 1, all the other 
responses were coded 0.  Strong feelings were those who ranked 8 
or higher on a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 indicates liking the 
candidate very much and 0 not liking him/her at all. 
Politicians: Lula da Silva
and José Serra, both
presidential candidates: Ana
Corso and José Ivo Sartori,
candidates for Federal 
Deputy in Caxias: Paulo 
Delgado and Custodio 
Mattos, candidates for 
Federal Deputy in Juiz de 
For a.  
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 Figure 3: Electronic Ballot Used in Brazilian Elections 
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 INDIVIDUAL GROWTH CURVE MODEL
Level-1 Model
E(Y|B) = EXPOSURE    *L
V(Y|B) = EXPOSURE    *L
log[L] = P0 + P1*(TIME) 
Level-2 Model
P0 = B00 + B01*(MOTIVATION) + B02*(ABILITY) + R0
P1 = B10 + B11*(MOTIVATION) + B12*(ABILITY) + R1
Level-3 Model
B00 = G000 + G001(ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITIES) + U00
B01 = G010 + G011(ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITIES) + U10 
….
Combined Model
log[L] = G000 + G010(MOTIVATION) +G001(ENVIRONMENT) + 
G011(ENVIRONMENT)*(MOTIVATION) + 
G100(TIME) + G110(TIME)*(MOTIVATION) + 
G101(TIME)*(ENVIRONMENT) + 
G111(TIME)*(MOTIVATION)*(ENVIRONMENT) + R0 + R1 + U00 + 
U10 ….
 
Figure 4: Equation of Information Acquisition Model 
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 TABLE 11: CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN CHAPTER 4 
  PO
LIT
ICA
L 
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EN
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PE
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EN
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Y 
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ED 
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PO
LIT
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L 
CO
NV
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SA
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N 
ME
DIA 
PE
RS
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SIO
N 
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OG
Y 
FR
EE 
EL
EC
TO
RA
L 
AIR
TI
ME 
INC
OM
E 
AG
E 
ED
UC
ATI
ON 
PA
RT
Y 
ID 
POLITICAL AWARENESS 1 .173
(**) 
.072
(**) 
.306
(**) 
.393
(**) 
.111
(**) 
.293
(**) 
.123
(**) 
.284
(**) 
.058
(**) 
.412
(**) 
.164
(**) 
PERMANENTLY EMPLOYED .173
(**) 
1 .045
(**) 
.219
(**) 
.079
(**) 
-
.030
(**) 
.103
(**) 
-
.039
(**) 
.141
(**) 
-
.215
(**) 
.263
(**) 
.060
(**) 
ACTIVISM .072
(**) 
.045
(**) 
1 .171
(**) 
.100
(**) 
.088
(**) 
.069
(**) 
.047
(**) 
-
.010 
.058
(**) 
-
.018
(*) 
.120
(**) 
POLITICAL CONVERSATION .306
(**) 
.219
(**) 
.171
(**) 
1 .277
(**) 
.157
(**) 
.255
(**) 
.083
(**) 
.153
(**) 
-
.207
(**) 
.337
(**) 
.186
(**) 
MEDIA .393
(**) 
.079
(**) 
.100
(**) 
.277
(**) 
1 .115
(**) 
.214
(**) 
.146
(**) 
.210
(**) 
.075
(**) 
.284
(**) 
.140
(**) 
PERSUASION .111
(**) 
-
.030
(**) 
.088
(**) 
.157
(**) 
.115
(**) 
1 .098
(**) 
.123
(**) 
.004 .012 .084
(**) 
.079
(**) 
IDEOLOGY .293
(**) 
.103
(**) 
.069
(**) 
.255
(**) 
.214
(**) 
.098
(**) 
1 .073
(**) 
.115
(**) 
-
.059
(**) 
.212
(**) 
.212
(**) 
FREE ELECTORAL AIRTIME .123
(**) 
-
.039
(**) 
.047
(**) 
.083
(**) 
.146
(**) 
.123
(**) 
.073
(**) 
1 -
.005 
.034
(**) 
.032
(**) 
.087
(**) 
INCOME .284
(**) 
.141
(**) 
-
.010 
.153
(**) 
.210
(**) 
.004 .115
(**) 
-
.005 
1 -
.039
(**) 
.387
(**) 
.011 
AGE .058
(**) 
-
.215
(**) 
.058
(**) 
-
.207
(**) 
.075
(**) 
.012 -
.059
(**) 
.034
(**) 
-
.039
(**) 
1 -
.409
(**) 
-
.067
(**) 
EDUCATION .412
(**) 
.263
(**) 
-
.018
(*) 
.337
(**) 
.284
(**) 
.084
(**) 
.212
(**) 
.032
(**) 
.387
(**) 
-
.409
(**) 
1 .098
(**) 
PARTY ID .164
(**) 
.060
(**) 
.120
(**) 
.186
(**) 
.140
(**) 
.079
(**) 
.212
(**) 
.087
(**) 
.011 -
.067
(**) 
.098
(**) 
1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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 TABLE 12: CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN CHAPTER 5 
  Risk 
acce
ptant 
Politi
cal 
aware
ness 
Reaso
n for 
vote 
local 
Reaso
n for 
vote 
nation
al 
Reaso
n for 
vote 
self 
Satisf
ied 
with 
incum
bent 
Party 
id 
Perm
anentl
y 
emplo
yed 
Inco
me 
Age Educa
tion 
Know
s 
challe
nger 
Know
s 
incum
bent 
Risk 
acceptant 
1 .029(
*) 
-
.045(
**) 
.051(
**) 
.012 .014 .066(
**) 
.036(
**) 
.045(
**) 
-
.190(
**) 
.166(
**) 
-.020 .054(
**) 
Political 
awareness 
.029(
*) 
1 .058(
**) 
.172(
**) 
-.013 .275(
**) 
.152(
**) 
.158(
**) 
.292(
**) 
.047(
**) 
.425(
**) 
.270(
**) 
.384(
**) 
Reason for 
vote – local 
-
.045(
**) 
.058(
**) 
1 -
.439(
**) 
-
.146(
**) 
.074(
**) 
-.020 -.002 -.004 .072(
**) 
-
.041(
**) 
.089(
**) 
.109(
**) 
Reason for 
vote – 
national 
.051(
**) 
.172(
**) 
-
.439(
**) 
1 -
.087(
**) 
.127(
**) 
.111(
**) 
.080(
**) 
.087(
**) 
-
.053(
**) 
.193(
**) 
.115(
**) 
.158(
**) 
Reason for 
vote – self 
.012 -.013 -
.146(
**) 
-
.087(
**) 
1 .017 .000 -.018 -.007 .018 -.002 -.007 .046(
**) 
Satisfied with 
incumbent 
.014 .275(
**) 
.074(
**) 
.127(
**) 
.017 1 .117(
**) 
.076(
**) 
.102(
**) 
.124(
**) 
.127(
**) 
.091(
**) 
.295(
**) 
Party id .066(
**) 
.152(
**) 
-.020 .111(
**) 
.000 .117(
**) 
1 .053(
**) 
.021 -
.092(
**) 
.114(
**) 
.042(
**) 
.127(
**) 
Permanently 
employed 
.036(
**) 
.158(
**) 
-.002 .080(
**) 
-.018 .076(
**) 
.053(
**) 
1 .128(
**) 
-
.218(
**) 
.248(
**) 
.114(
**) 
.060(
**) 
Income .045(
**) 
.292(
**) 
-.004 .087(
**) 
-.007 .102(
**) 
.021 .128(
**) 
1 -
.029(
*) 
.382(
**) 
.158(
**) 
.136(
**) 
Age -
.190(
**) 
.047(
**) 
.072(
**) 
-
.053(
**) 
.018 .124(
**) 
-
.092(
**) 
-
.218(
**) 
-
.029(
*) 
1 -
.404(
**) 
.012 -.003 
Education .166(
**) 
.425(
**) 
-
.041(
**) 
.193(
**) 
-.002 .127(
**) 
.114(
**) 
.248(
**) 
.382(
**) 
-
.404(
**) 
1 .156(
**) 
.288(
**) 
Knows 
challenger 
-.020 .270(
**) 
.089(
**) 
.115(
**) 
-.007 .091(
**) 
.042(
**) 
.114(
**) 
.158(
**) 
.012 .156(
**) 
1 -
.078(
**) 
Knows 
incumbent 
.054(
**) 
.384(
**) 
.109(
**) 
.158(
**) 
.046(
**) 
.295(
**) 
.127(
**) 
.060(
**) 
.136(
**) 
-.003 .288(
**) 
-
.078(
**) 
1 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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